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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This enquiry seeks to explore what philosopher and critic Peter Osborne identifies as the 
philosophical character of contemporary art. The purpose of this enquiry is not to 
resolve the ambiguous relationship between art and philosophy that he observes in 
contemporary art, but to address the complex engagement between them in a focused 
manner by examining how philosophy comes into play in my post-conceptual practice.  
 
This enquiry emerges from and is orientated by an ongoing post-conceptual practice. 
The central questions of the enquiry ask: What is the relationship between art and 
philosophy in my post-conceptual practice? How might my artworks raise philosophical 
ideas and thought? What is the nature of this thought? 
 
The primary component of the research project consists of three specific event-based art 
works: Gatherings (Transitory Encounters) (2008), Mystical Anarchism (2009-2012) 
and Metaphysical Longings (2006 -). Through the development, enactment and critical 
reflection on these works I explore how my practice provides a domain to engage with 
philosophy and how the artworks that unfold out of this might implicate philosophical 
ideas and engender thought. These works seek to enact an other space.  I use the term 
other space to articulate a temporary, experiential and/or symbolic space that differs 
from the quotidian. I develop my understanding of the philosophical character of art by 
exploring how philosophical ideas might be implicated in these works in an experiential 
manner by considering how these works invite thought. Through the research project I 
assert the proposition that the thinking raised by art is essentially affective.  
 
Alain Badiou’s inaesthetics provides a theoretical guide. Although inaesthetics defines a 
reciprocal engagement between artistic practice and philosophical enquiry, the 
correlation of these disciplines is described from the vantage point of the philosopher 
and no examples from the area of contemporary art are provided within his thesis. 
Rather than repeating the procedures associated with traditional modalities of aesthetics 
that privilege the critic/philosopher, this research project provides a paradigm within 
artistic practice to explore how philosophical meaning is implicated through the 
development and enactment of artworks. 
 
 
 iii 
 
DECLARATION 
 
I certify that this thesis which I now submit for examination for the award of PhD is 
entirely my own work and has not been taken from the work of others, save and to the 
extent that such work has been cited and acknowledged within the text of my work. 
 
This thesis was prepared according to the regulations for postgraduate study by research 
of the Dublin Institute of Technology and has not been submitted in whole or in part for 
another award in any other third level institution. 
 
The work reported on in this thesis conforms to the principles and requirements of the 
DIT's guidelines for ethics in research. DIT has permission to keep, lend or copy this 
thesis in whole or in part, on condition that any such use of the material of the thesis be 
duly acknowledged. 
 
 
 
 
Signature __________________________________ Date _______________ 
 iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
I would like to extend my gratitude to my primary supervisor, Dr Mick Wilson, for his 
invaluable insight, encouragement and guidance throughout the research project and my 
second supervisor, Dr Tim Stott, for his relentless support and thoroughness in the final 
stages of the project. I would also like to thank the GradCAM team, who include Dr 
Elaine Sisson, Dr Lisa Godson, Martin Mc Cabe, Nollaig O’ Fionghaile and Aidan 
McElwaine.  
 
I would especially like to thank Simon Critchley for his willingness to collaborate on 
the research project, along with my friends and fellow researchers at GradCAM, whose 
expertise and generous spirit enabled me to realise the large-scale event-based art-works 
that were essential to my fulfilling this enquiry; they are Edia Connole, Thomas Mc 
Graw Lewis, John Buckley, Yvette Monahan, Sean Breithaupt, Simon Keating, Connell 
Vaughan and John Sherwin 
 
Finally, I would like to thank my fiancé John Bird and my friends and family, especially 
my sisters, Justine, Antoinette and Nicola, and my mother, Audrey Emoe, who provided 
me with the encouragement and support to help me complete this project.  
 
I dedicate this research project to my late father, Bob Emoe.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
 
TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS ........................................................................................ 3 
 
 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 5 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE: THE COMPLEX ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN CONTEMPORARY 
ART AND PHILOSOPHY ............................................................................................. 15 
1.0 Overview ............................................................................................................ 15 
1.1 Aesthetics and the Engagement Between Art and Philosophy ........................... 16 
1.2 The Troubling of Aesthetics in Art Practice....................................................... 20 
1.3 Contemporary Art as Post-Conceptual ............................................................... 27 
1.4 Asserting the Condition of Thought in Contemporary Art ................................ 30 
1.5 Summary ............................................................................................................ 37 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO: THE ENTWINEMENT OF ART AND PHILOSOPHY IN A POST-
CONCEPTUAL PRACTICE .......................................................................................... 39 
2.0 Overview ............................................................................................................ 39 
2.1 The Clear Apprehension of One’s Own Limitations and Mapping Nihilion ..... 40 
2.1.1 A Post-Conceptual Practice - An Entwinement of Art and Philosophy ...... 44 
2.1.2 A Post-Conceptual Practice - Engaging With Liminality ............................ 52 
2.2 Metaphysical Longings ...................................................................................... 59 
2.2.1 The Emergence of the Event as an Artistic Form ........................................ 62 
2.2.2 Enacting Other Spaces ................................................................................. 70 
2.3 Summary ............................................................................................................ 74 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE: INAESTHETICS AND THE REVELATION OF THOUGHT ... 77 
3.0 Overview ............................................................................................................ 77 
3.1 Badiou’s Event – Novelty, The Possibility of Truths and Setting the Conditions 
for New Regimes of Thought ...................................................................................... 79 
3.1.1 Inaesthetics – A New Relation of Philosophy to Art ................................... 84 
3.2 Intraphilosophical Effect – The Unnameable and Activating Thought.............. 89 
3.2.1 Romantic Conceptualism – A Poetic Treatment of Contemporary Art ....... 95 
3.4 Summary .......................................................................................................... 108 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: EXPLORING THE PHILOSOPHICAL CHARACTER OF ART 
THROUGH ENACTMENT.......................................................................................... 110 
4.0 Overview .......................................................................................................... 110 
4.1  The Research Project – Three Artworks as Events ......................................... 111 
4.1.1 Gatherings (Transitory Encounters)........................................................... 118 
4.1.2 Mystical Anarchism ................................................................................... 120 
4.1.3 Metaphysical Longings .............................................................................. 127 
4.2 The Research Project – Entwining Art and Philosophy Through Enactment .. 133 
4.3 Enacting Other Spaces – Staging and Mirroring the Tri-Partite Structure of 
Ritual ......................................................................................................................... 141 
4.4 The Artwork as an Open-Process - Inviting Thought and Affective Thought . 148 
4.5 Summary .......................................................................................................... 152 
 
 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 154 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................... 166 
 
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS .......................................................................................... 177 
 
APPENDICES .............................................................................................................. 178 
APPENDIX I: UN COUP DE DÉS, STÉPHANE MALLARMÉ ............................ 179 
APPENDIX II: MYSTICAL ANARCHISM BY SIMON CRITCHLEY (2009) .... 192 
APPENDIX III: A TASTE OF FAITH I (THE HELL WITHIN) BY EDIA 
CONNOLE & SCOTT WILSON (2012) .................................................................. 227 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
Figure 1: The Clear Apprehension of One’s Own Limitations (2003). ........................... 40 
Figures 2 & 3: The Clear Apprehension of One’s Own Limitations (2003) (detail)....... 41 
Figures 4, 5 & 6: The Clear Apprehension of One’s Own Limitations (2003) (detail). . 42 
Figures 7, 8 & 9: Mapping Nihilion (detail). .................................................................. 42 
Figure 10: Mapping Nihilion (2005). .............................................................................. 43 
Figure 11: Mapping Nihilion (detail). ............................................................................. 43 
Figures 12 & 13: The Clear Apprehension of One’s Own Limitations (2003) (detail). . 46 
Figure 14: Work in progress, mapping image onto a large sheet of gridded paper. ....... 48 
Figure 15: Published photograph: J.R. Eyerman, News Bureau California Institute of 
Technology – Mount Wilson and Palomar Observatories. ............................................. 48 
Figure 16: Emma Kunz at her worktable, Waldstatt, 1958. ............................................ 50 
Figure 17: Emma Kunz, Work No 086, n.d. .................................................................... 50 
Figure 18: Research/Working Notebook. ....................................................................... 56 
Figure 19: The Anticipation of the Nothing that I am Faced With (2006). ..................... 57 
Figure 20: The Searchers (2002). ................................................................................... 57 
Figure 21: Invitation in the VAI Broadsheet (Visual Arts Ireland). ............................... 60 
Figure 22 & 23: View from balcony and interior of Pallas Heights, Dublin 1. .............. 61 
Figure 24: Paper distributed to group during Metaphysical Longings ............................ 61 
Figures 25 & 26: Metaphysical Longings (2006). Site-specific installation (detail). ..... 62 
Figure 27: The Change of Heart (After Yves Klein) (2006). Photographic print. ........... 66 
Figure 28: The End is in the Beginning (2006). .............................................................. 67 
Figure 29: Approaches to Philosophy (2006). ................................................................ 68 
Figure 30: Comet (The Human Being is Death in the Process of Becoming) (2006). .... 68 
Figure 31: Research/Working Notebook ........................................................................ 72 
Figure 32: Hand-made mat of cashmere, moleskin, cotton (17 m  x  7 m)................... 115 
Figure 33 & 34 Research/Working Notebook .............................................................. 118 
Figures 35: Gatherings (Transitory Encounters) (2008). ............................................. 119 
Figure 36 & 37: Gatherings (Transitory Encounters) (2008). ...................................... 119 
Figure 38: Mystical Anarchism (2009). An unsanctioned midnight lecture with Simon 
Critchley, Glendalough, Co. Wicklow. ......................................................................... 122 
Figure 39: Mystical Anarchism (2012) A Taste of Faith hosted by Edia Connole, 
screening and public conversation with Simon Critchley ............................................. 123 
 4 
 
 
Figures 40: Menu, A Taste of Faith, Edia Connole and Scott Wilson .......................... 124 
Figure 41: Mystical Anarchism (2012). ........................................................................ 125 
Figure 42: Mystical Anarchism (2012). Conversation on the mat. ............................... 125 
Figure 43: The Closing of Mystical Anarchism (2012/13) (detail) ............................... 126 
Figure 44 & 45: Metaphysical Longings II. National Gallery of Ireland, Dublin. ....... 128 
Figure 46: Invitation to participate in Live@8 from Ruby Wallis. ............................... 129 
Figure 47: Introduction to Metaphysical Longings IV .................................................. 130 
Figure 48: Metaphysical Longings III. .......................................................................... 131 
Figure 49:Research/Working Notebook. ...................................................................... 132 
Figure 50 & 51: Metaphysical Longings V. .................................................................. 133 
Figure 52: Declan Clarke, Critchley on Ethics, Politics of Resistance in the 
Contemporary World, 2009 .......................................................................................... 134 
Figures 53 & 54: Shane Cullan, Critchley on Ethics, Politics of Resistance in the 
Contemporary World, 2009 .......................................................................................... 134 
Figure 55, 56, 57 & 58: Research/Working Notebooks ................................................ 136 
Figure 59: Mystical Anarchism (2011). Still from 30 min. film. .................................. 137 
Figure 60: Voodoo Wray set list. ................................................................................... 139 
Figure 61, The Great Ecstasy of the Woodcarver Steiner, 1975 (film still). ................ 140 
Figure 62 & 63: The Lab, Dublin City Council, Foley Street, Dublin 1. ..................... 143 
Figure 64 & 65: Research/Working Notebooks ............................................................ 144 
Figure 66: Mystical Anarchism (2009). ........................................................................ 145 
 
 
 
 5 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This enquiry seeks to address the complex engagement between art and philosophy by 
examining how philosophy comes into play in my post-conceptual art practice. The 
enquiry focuses on three specific artworks that exemplify my practice, Gatherings 
(Transitory Encounters) (2008), Mystical Anarchism (2009-2013) and Metaphysical 
Longings (2006-). These three event-based works constitute the research project and 
provide examples of contemporary art through which I explore its philosophical 
character. Peter Osborne, the art critic and philosopher has identified an “immanently 
philosophical character of contemporary art” and the consequent of whether 
“philosophical meaning of the work can be wholly abstracted from its material means”.1  
He asks,  “can the constitutive ambiguity characteristic of the deployment of philosophy 
within the artistic field ever be resolved?”2 Instead of seeking to resolve this 
“ambiguity” this enquiry addresses the complex engagement between the disciplines by 
asking; What is the relationship between art and philosophy in my post-conceptual 
practice? How might my artworks raise philosophical ideas and thought? What is the 
nature of this thought?   
 
This enquiry emerges from and is orientated by an ongoing post-conceptual art practice 
which is disclosed herein from the perspective of the artist/researcher. The thesis 
functions on a number of levels that are essentially linked, but are distinguished below 
in seven points to clarify the role of the thesis for the reader. (i) The thesis reveals the 
motivations for the enquiry by outlining how it emerged from art practice. (ii) The 
thesis functions to outline how the research project developed out this practice. (iii) The 
thesis presents the key terms of the enquiry, disclosing how terms such as entwinement, 
liminality and other space emerged and were employed in the research project. (iv) The 
thesis acts as a narrative to give detail on the research project as it unfolded. (v) central 
to this narrative is a depiction of how the primary questions of enquiry are addressed 
through the critical reflection on the three event-based works. My critical reflection is 
informed primarily by Osborne, Foster and Danto’s separate but converging readings of 
                                                          
1 Peter Osborne, "Art Beyond Aesthetics, Philosophical Criticism, Art History and Contemporary Art," Art History, 
March 2004, 7. 
2 Peter Osborne, “Conceptual Art and/as Philosophy,” in Rewriting Conceptual Art, ed. Michael Newman and Jon 
Bird (London: Reaktion Books, 1999), 61. 
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contemporary art and Badiou’s inaesthethics (discussed later). These particular readings 
are presented and analysed because they expand the enquiry from a specific focus on 
my own practice to a more general understanding of contemporary art. (vi) The thesis 
relates the key insights that emerged from this enquiry and presents how they contibute 
to the wider field of contemporary art discourse and aesthetics. (vii) The thesis presents 
what is to be gained by conducting an enquiry into contemporary art through  a post-
conceptual practice.   
 
The motivations for the enquiry are detailed in Chapter Two through a three reflective 
discussions on key works that were produced prior to embarking on the formal enquiry. 
These key works are two text-based drawings, The Clear Apprehension of One’s Own 
Limitations (2003) (hereinafter The Clear Apprehension…) and Mapping Nihilion 
(2006) and the event Metaphysical Longings (2006). This chapter also introduces the 
key terms of the enquiry: entwinement, liminality and other space. A reflective 
discussion on The Clear Apprehension… and Mapping Nihilion analyses how 
philosophy (primarily existential philosophy) is used in my art practice and how the 
particular engagement between artistic processes and philosophical enquiry performed 
in my practice differs from a liner engagement, where philosophy is deployed to 
interpret the meaning of the artwork post-facto or where philosophy informs the artwork 
so that it merely illustrates philosophical ideas. I use the term entwinement to define this 
dynamic, symbiotic engagement that I observe in my post-conceptual practice. I also 
detail how this entwinement of philosophy and art in practice causes me to think in a 
particular way and how this observation motivates me to explore how a post-conceptual 
art practice might provide a domain to engage with and raise philosophical ideas. This 
analysis introduces liminality as a key term of the enquiry, detailing how I use this 
anthropological term in my practice to engage with the existential question of being. 
Liminality stems from the Latin word liminal, meaning threshold and is used in ritual 
theory to designate a temporal, experiential and/or symbolic space that exists outside of 
and beyond normative structures.3 Liminality is regarded as “other” because it is 
                                                          
3 Arnold van Gennep, Les Rites of Passage (1909) is now recognised as a key thinker within ritual theory because of 
his identification of the tripartite structure of ritual centred on the liminal state. However he was not widely known, 
prior to Victor Turner’s re-introduction of liminality through his seminal text, The Ritual Process (1969) mainly 
because Emile Durkheim, the most prolific ethnographer who also espoused theories on ritual ostracised van Gennep 
from academic circles in France. For more on this please see Rosemary Zumwalt, “Arnold van Gennep: The Hermit 
of Bourg-la-Reine,” American Anthropologist (American Anthropological Association), 84, no. 2 (June 1982): 299-
313 
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understood to arise when normative structures are symbolically played with, suspended 
and transformed. 4 This analysis reveals how my engagement with liminality is crucial 
to the development of the research project because it informed an emergent concern 
with thought and experience and instigated a shift in my practice from the production of 
art objects to the enactment of event-based works.   
 
How the research project developed out of my practice is also detailed in Chapter Two. 
How the event evolved and became the primary methodology of the research project is 
detailed through an analysis of the first iteration of Metaphysical Longings in 2006. 
This analysis relates how the event offered an apposite artistic framework to develop 
works that foreground experience and thought on an inter-subjective level by shifting 
the site of production from the solitary realm of the studio to a more expansive and 
collective space. This analysis also details how the term other space informs the 
working definition of the research project and how my ambition to enact an other space 
through event-based works emerged out of my engagement with liminality in 
Metaphysical Longings. I introduce the term other space in the discussion on 
Metaphysical Longings to articulate a temporary, experiential and/or symbolic space 
that differs to the quotidian. Because this term has also recently been used 
metaphorically by Alberto Toscano to describe art and articulate its capacity to 
engender thought, it provides a working definition to reflect on the possibility of my 
event-based works to implicate ideas and raise thought.5   
 
The research project through consists of three event-based works, Gatherings 
(Transitory Encounters), Mystical Anarchism and later iterations of Metaphysical 
Longings. The thesis provides individual accounts of these works and reflects on how 
they seek to enact other spaces on an experiential and symbolic level through their 
engagement with liminality. These temporal artworks are predicated on a gathering of 
people together and foreground experience. Gatherings (Transitory Encounters) 
incorporates three events that include group meditation, an audio/visual performance 
and a screening of a documentary. These events were enacted over three evenings in 
June 2008. Mystical Anarchism and Metaphysical Longings do not take place over a 
                                                          
4 Colin Turnbull, “Liminality: A Synthesis of Subjective and Objective Experience,” in By Means of Performance, 
ed. Wila and Schechner, Richard Appel, (Cambridge University Press, 1990), 80. 
5 Alberto Toscano, “The Sensuous Religion of the Multitude, Art and Abstraction in Negri, ,” Third Text 23 no. 4 
(2009): 369-382. 
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specific time frame but were enacted over a protracted period of time. Mystical 
Anarchism designates a midnight lecture, a film (of which is accompanied herein), an 
event centred on the screening of this film and an installation. Mystical Anarchism was 
developed and realised in collaboration with the philosopher Simon Critchley. In this 
analysis I reflect on how the work sought to enact an other space where the 
philosopher’s thoughts on the “dividual” might be ‘felt’ or experienced.6 Metaphysical 
Longings designates an ongoing artwork that to date has consisted of six events centred 
on the practice of yoga nidra, (a technique of guided visualisation that is claimed to 
disengage the active, instrumental self or ego). Metaphysical Longings seeks to enact 
other spaces to explore the philosophical question of being on an experiential level.  
 
There is a paradox in giving Gatherings (Transitory Encounters), Mystical Anarchism 
and Metaphysical Longings single titles because each of these works are constituted by 
multiple iterations. However, this paradox articulates that these artworks are not 
autonomous artistic forms that are complete but that they are open processes that evolve 
through the different iterations and enactments that develop over time.7 The thesis 
outlines how the research project develops through the development and enactment of 
these three artworks as they unfold. 
 
The thesis outlines how the primary questions of the enquiry are addressed through 
critical reflection on the development and enactment of Gatherings (Transitory 
Encounters), Mystical Anarchism and Metaphysical Longings. While this is a practice-
based enquiry, specific theories on art and philosophy, detailed in Chapters One and 
                                                          
6 Critchley uses this term in Mystical Anarchism to describe the mystics involved in the Movement of the Free Spirit. 
A transcript of the paper Mystical Anarchism is provided as an appendix. 
7 Robert Smithson’s Spiral Jetty (1970) exemplifies this strategy of using a single title to designate multiple forms. 
The title Spiral Jetty designates the seminal land art piece, his essay reflecting on this work and the film documenting 
its construction at Salt Lake, Utah. Osborne draws specifically on this work, observing how this work exemplifies the 
transcategorical nature of contemporary art by encompassing a range of processes and disciplines. Osborne also 
reflects on the multiple iterations of Spiral Jetty to demonstrate the orientation of Smithson’s practice on process. 
This focus on process is also sustained in Hélio Oiticica’s post-conceptual practice. He articulates this when 
reflecting on the Parangolé’s, claiming the Parangolé’s do more than define “a series of typical works” in the form 
of the capes, banners and tents but articulate a “definitive formulation” that fuses together the “color [sic], structures, 
poetic sense, dance, words, photography … all the definitive principals formulated, including that of the 
nonformulation of concepts, which is the most important.” Like Smithson and Oiticica, I also approach my post-
conceptual practice as a process, a process of enquiry that is mirrored in the works that configure the research project. 
Like Oiticica, my process of enquiry cannot prescribe a specific concept or thought because it is also orientated 
around the experience of others. For more on this see: Peter Osborne, Anywhere or Not at All: Philosophy of 
Contemporary Art (London: Verso), 99-117. Oiticica’s statements are taken from his essay Position and Program, 
July 1966. It was first published in the catalogue for the exhibition “Aspiro ao Grande Labirinto” (Rio de Janeiro, 
1986), and republished in Guy Brett, Hélio Oiticica (Rotterdam: Witte de With; Minneapolis: Walker Art Center, 
1992). 100-105. 
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Three, respectively inform the development of the enquiry. Peter Osborne Arthur C. 
Danto and Hal Foster’s readings of contemporary art are presented in Chapter One to 
contextualise the questions that the enquiry seeks to address from an art historical 
perspective. These readings reveal how the question of the relationship between art and 
philosophy and the proposition that art is a domain for thought emerged out of 
developments in art practice that problematised the role of aesthetics for contemporary 
art. These converging analyses of the development of contemporary art through art 
practice are presented to substantiate my decision to conduct an enquiry into 
contemporary art through art practice. Osborne’s reading of “contemporary art as post-
conceptual” is also detailed to support my decision to conduct this enquiry through a 
post-conceptual practice.8  
 
This enquiry engages with a larger conversation surrounding the relationship between 
contemporary art and philosophy. Chapter Three details how this conversation 
surrounding the relationship between contemporary art and philosophy and the 
proposition that art is a domain for thought has been initiated in continental philosophy 
through Alain Badiou’s re-interrogation of aesthetics.9 This chapter reveals how Badiou 
proposes inaesthetics as “necessary” for contemporary art by analysing how inaesthetics 
asserts an alternate, reciprocal engagement between art and philosophy and how this 
new schema relocates thought from the external source of philosophy to the immanent 
space of art. 10 This chapter outlines how Badiou formulates inaesthetics as an alternate 
to speculative aesthetics, (a term he coins to designate the general reading of aesthetics 
as philosophy’s discourse on art) and his insistence that philosophy is not to interpret, 
but to reveal that art is “itself a form of thought”.11 The analysis presents how 
inaesthetics offers a theoretical guide to explore the nature of artistic thought. It through 
this schema that Badiou distinguishes the thinking in art from philosophical thought. 
(He maintains this regime of thought is “irreducible to philosophy” because he sees 
philosophy as “devoted to the invention of concepts alone”).12   
                                                          
8 Peter Osborne, “Contemporary Art is Post-Conceptual” (paper presented at: Fondazione Antonio Ratti, July 9th, 
2010), 19-30. 
9 For a general overview of the designate ‘continental philosophy’ see Richard Kearney, Modern Movements in 
European Philosophy, Second (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1994) and Simon Critchley, 
Continental Philosophy, A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
10 Alain Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, ed. Werner Hamacher, trans. Alberto Toscano (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 2005), 8. 11 Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 10. 
12 Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 9-19. 
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Chapter Three details how Badiou registers the “intraphilosophical effect” of art as a 
“special regime of thought” through his reflections on literary examples, in particular 
the poetry of Stéphane Mallarmé. Although the research project does not consist of 
poems, or indeed more generally poetry, I develop the argument that Badiou’s method 
of exploring the nuances of artistic thought through poetry enables me to reflect on the 
thinking that my event-based artworks may engender. I develop this argument through 
Jan Verwoert and Jörg Heiser’s curatorial project Romantic Conceptualism (2007) 
which re-evaluates conceptualism by aligning it with the romantic fragment (a poem 
exemplified by Novalis) and Peter Lamarque’s poetic treatment of conceptualism. For 
my analysis the proposition that specific artworks engender thought on a perceptive 
level reaffirms my provisional claim in Chapter Two that the thinking in art is bound 
with experience. The readings presented in Chapter Three are key to the enquiry 
because they develop my understanding of the nature of artistic thought and inform the 
insight that art invites thought. 
 
This enquiry engages with Badiou’s inaesthetics by examining the engagement between 
contemporary art and philosophy within my post-conceptual practice. This enquiry 
engages with inaesthetics from the perspective of art practice rather than from a purely 
theoretical perspective of the philosopher or art critic. The thesis demonstrates a 
‘performative contradiction’ in the way that it uses philosophy in a conventional manner 
to explore how philosophy is entwined into a post-conceptual practice and consequently 
through the enactment of the artworks.  For example, although I collaborate with 
Critchley in the artwork Mystical Anarchism, I do not collaborate with Badiou in any of 
my artworks. Critchley’s direct participation in the research project rather than Badiou 
is not an incongruity. This performative contradiction is crucial because it reaffirms that 
my practice is not centred on illustrating a specific philosophical system of thought such 
as, inaesthetics, but that is provides a domain to engage with thought. Inaesthetics 
provides a theoretical guide to explore how artworks like Mystical Anarchism offer a 
way of engaging with philosophical ideas in an extra-textual manner. Identifying this 
performative contradiction in the research project enables me as a researcher to 
distinguish the thinking that unfolds when one encounters and perceives art from a 
systematic way of thinking that is performed through the analysis of the research 
project. 
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The insights gained from my engagement with inaesthetics and art theory inform the 
critical reflection on the development and enactment of works that configure the reserch 
project. The purpose of this reflective aspect of the enquiry is not to evaluate the 
experience of those present at each art event as one would a focus group, but to 
contribute to an existing and expanding understanding of contemporary art by analysing 
how these examples of contemporary art might raise philosophical ideas and invite 
thought. Theodor Adorno’s method of self-reflective evaluation from a personal, 
subjective position is used to develop the enquiry. This aspect of the enquiry that 
reflects on the three event-based artworks is developed over three discussions in 
Chapter Four. The first discussion reflects on each event, analysing how artistic 
processes and philosophy becomes entwined through enactment. The second discussion 
focuses on the working definition of the research project, analysing how the works seek 
to enact other spaces. This discussion introduces the term staging. In theatre staging 
defines the use of temporary backdrops to create alternate, imaginary realms on an 
experiential and symbolic level. The term staging is used to define the process used 
throughout the research project to enact other spaces on an experiential and symbolic 
level. The analysis details how staging refers to the choice of location, the timing of the 
event, the mode of presentation, (for example the technique of guided visualisation used 
in Metaphysical Longings), the method of assembly and the use of props, (namely a 
large handmade mat measuring 17 metres by 7 metres that features in all three works) 
and how it also refers to the process used to mirror of the tri-partite structure of ritual in 
the enactment of Mystical Anarchism and Metaphysical Longings. The third discussion 
analyses how these artworks operate as open processes might invite thought on an 
experiential, perceptive and imaginative level. 
 
The four chapters present key stages of the enquiry from the perspective of the 
artist/researcher are summarised below.13 These chapters address the questions driving 
the enquiry that ask: What is the relationship between art and philosophy in my post-
conceptual practice? How might my artworks raise philosophical ideas and thought? 
What is the nature of this thought?  
                                                          
13Adorno maintains, “the aesthetic success is a function of the skill of the trained artist to awaken the residual 
contents.” For more see Marie-Noëlle Ryan, Towards a Critical Theory of Works of Art (University of Moncton, 
2007). 
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Chapter One contextualises the enquiry in a series of discussions that reveal the 
complex engagement between contemporary art and philosophy. This chapter focuses 
on Osborne, Foster and Danto’s readings of contemporary art to present and analyse 
how the interrogation of aesthetics was played out in art practice. A brief précis on 
aesthetics outlines how it emerged as a discourse of art in the late 18th century and how 
the general understanding of aesthetics as the philosophical discourse on art emerged. 
This discussion functions to disclose how this general understanding of aesthetics 
privileged philosophy as the site for thought. An analysis of Osborne, Foster and 
Danto’s readings of contemporary art reveals how developments in art practice asserted 
contemporary art as a domain for thought. An analysis of Osborne’s identification of the 
“philosophical character” presents the conceptual and the sensible/experiential aspect of 
contemporary art. This analysis of Osborne’s reading of contemporary art as post-
conceptual also functions to substantiate the research methodology of an enquiry 
through a post-conceptual practice.  
 
Chapter Two moves from an analysis of the field of art practice and art criticism to a 
reflection on my own post-conceptual practice. This chapter discloses how the enquiry 
emerges from and is orientated by my own ongoing art practice. This chapter focuses on 
three works, The Clear Apprehension…, Mapping Nihilion and Metaphysical Longings, 
to disclose how I engaged with existential philosophy in my practice and how I 
formulated the term entwinement as a key term of the enquiry. This chapter also 
introduces the anthropological term liminality, outlining how it informs the 
entwinement between artistic processes and philosophy by providing an entry point to 
engage with the existential question of being in my work. This chapter presents the 
provisional claim that the thinking raised by art is bound with experience. An analysis 
of Metaphysical Longings outlines how the event emerged as an artistic form that 
enabled me to extend philosophical enquiry to others in an extra-textual, experiential 
manner. The analysis of Metaphysical Longings also introduces the working definition 
of the research project to enact other spaces. 
 
Chapter Three moves from the field of art practice to philosophical enquiry. This 
chapter details how inaesthetics provides a theoretical guide to investigate the 
entwinement between art and philosophy that is sustained by my practice and to reflect 
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on the nature of artistic thought. As inaesthetics is informed by Badiou’s evental 
philosophy, a summary account of Badiou’s reading of event is presented. The term 
event cannot be used in an equivocal manner because it is also prevalent as a theme 
within philosophical systems of thought.14 Badiou’s event is very particular and this 
account outlines how his reading infers novelty as a radical transformation in thought. 
The word event is italicised when referencing Badiou’s philosophical project so as to 
differentiate it from my definition as an artistic form. This summary of Badiou’s event 
is presented to explain how this philosophical system relocates thought from the 
external space of philosophy to the immanent space of art. Moving from evental 
philosophy to inaesthetics, the discussion outlines how inaesthetics designates a new 
schema between art and philosophy, and how this “knot” between the disciplines is 
posited to reveal the thinking particular to art.15 The second discussion teases out what 
is meant by an “intraphilosophical effect” so as to engage with the specificity of artistic 
thought. While Badiou provides no definition of this term, I argue that this term 
suggests a philosophical character by inferring how an artwork raises philosophical 
ideas on an implicit level through the artistic form. I also draw on Jan Verwoert’s and 
Jörg Heiser’s revisionist readings of conceptualism through their curatorial project 
Romantic Conceptualism and Peter Lamarque’s poetic treatment of conceptual art to 
further investigate how art implicitly activates thought on a perceptive level. This 
chapter introduces a key insight that emerges from the enquiry, my proposition that art 
invites thought.  
 
Chapter Four presents the main body of the research project, three event-based 
artworks: Gatherings (Transitory Encounters), Mystical Anarchism and Metaphysical 
Longings. These artworks provide case studies through which I explore the entwinement 
between contemporary art and philosophy in my post-conceptual practice and explore 
how philosophical ideas might be implicated through enactment. I consider the insights 
relating to thought and experience that emerge through my engagement with 
                                                          
14 Badiou observes how event has become a common term for a large number of contemporary philosophers. He 
claims this has emerged through the event’s relationship to the notion of the Outside. While the philosophy of event 
forms the thought systems of Friedrich Nietzsche and Jean-François Lyotard and is associated with the later 
Heidegger and Derrida in his reading of a philosophy of différance (a deliberate misspelling of différence). Badiou’s 
event is configured in a different manner to these systems of thought. He clarifies his concept of event as novelty 
through his analysis of the Deleuzian event that is expounded in The Logic of Sense.  
Alain Badiou, “The Event in Deleuze,” Lacan.com, accessed March 5, 2008, http://www.lacan.com/baddel.htm 
15 Alain Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, ed. Werner Hamacher, trans. Alberto Toscano (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 2005), 3. 
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inaesthetics and art theory to reflect how my event-based artworks might invite thought. 
I reassert my propositional claim that the thinking raised by art is bound with 
experience, detailing how I develop the proposition that the thinking raised by these 
works is affective in nature. The term affect articulates a specific way of thinking that is 
bound up with the artistic form, the encounter with this form and the subjects’ 
experience. As affect is subject to a range of bodily sensations, it ensures that all senses, 
including the higher sense of perception that is activated through the encounter with the 
event-based works, and are thereby accounted for. This recognition of affect in the 
mediation of idea is the most significant insight to emerge from the research project 
because it affirms how art raises philosophical ideas in an implicit manner.  
 
This enquiry is distinguished by adhering to the protocols that proceed from art practice 
rather than those determined by the protocols of philosophers or art critics. I have 
throughout the research project endeavoured to maintain a candid and honest reading of 
these works so that this enquiry fulfils its task of contributing to the discourse on 
contemporary art and the development of contemporary aesthetics. The thesis concludes 
by relating five key insights that emerge from the enquiry. By detailing these insights 
the thesis seeks to disclose how an enquiry through a post-conceptual art practice can 
provide an appropriate and under-examined site to investigate the philosophical 
character of contemporary art.  
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CHAPTER ONE: THE COMPLEX ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN CONTEMPORARY 
ART AND PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
1.0 Overview 
 
This chapter contextualises the enquiry by analysing contemporary art through a series 
of discussions that focus specifically on its complex engagement with philosophy. The 
term contemporary art is a specific designator and this analysis focuses on three 
theorists’ separate but converging readings of contemporary art; the Marxist 
philosopher and art critic Peter Osborne, the art critic and theorist Hal Foster and the 
philosopher and art critic Arthur C. Danto. These theorists observe how the contestation 
of traditional aesthetics through developments in art practice informed a contemporary 
reading of art. By addressing the complex engagement between contemporary art and 
philosophy this analysis of contemporary art introduces the notion that art is a domain 
for thought. 
  
The first discussion provides a précis of aesthetics from its emergence as a 
philosophical discourse in the late 18th century. This précis draws on Paul Oskar 
Kristeller’s analysis of aesthetics and his more recent critic Jonathon Rée to outline how 
the general understanding of aesthetics as a philosophical discourse on art emerged and 
how this in turn privileged philosophy over art as the domain for thought.  
 
The second discussion focuses on Foster’s seminal essay “The Crux of Minimalism” 
and Osborne’s analysis of conceptualism to analyse how developments in art practice 
troubled aesthetics.16 This discussion details how the neo avant-garde (a term coined by 
Foster to designate minimal and post-minimal art practices that include pop and 
conceptualism) interrogated the modernist interpretation of art as an idealised form and 
consequently introduced the notion of art as a domain for thought.  
 
                                                          
16 Hal Foster, “The Crux of Minimalism” in The Return of the Real, The Avant-Garde at 
the End of the Century, (Cambridge/London, Massachusetts/England: The MIT Press, 
1996).  
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The third discussion focuses on Osborne’s reading of contemporary art as post-
conceptual to detail how post-conceptualism presents a new form of engagement 
between art and philosophy than that designated by traditional aesthetics. This 
discussion reveals what Osborne means by the  “philosophical character” of 
contemporary art by detailing four key insights that he identifies as the legacy of 
conceptual art that collectively designate a post-conceptual practice.17  This discussion 
contextualises the research project by presenting a post-conceptual practice and also 
substantiates my decision to conduct an enquiry into the condition of thought in 
contemporary art through a post-conceptual practice.  
 
The fourth discussion details how thought emerged as a condition for contemporary art 
through an analysis of Danto’s End of Art thesis. This discussion outlines how Danto 
configures his thesis that asserts the condition of thought in art in response to  Hegel’s 
End of Art thesis by relocating thought from the external source of philosophy to the 
immanent site of art.18  
 
 
1.1 Aesthetics and the Engagement Between Art and Philosophy 
 
This précis outlines how the general understanding of aesthetics as a philosophical 
discourse of art emerged as a particular relationship between art and philosophy. 
Because philosophy is understood to interpret art, this general reading of aesthetics 
locates thought in the realm of philosophy. The current interpretation of aesthetics as 
‘the philosophy of art’ is a comparatively recent configuration, established by Hegel in 
the early 19th century.19 The term aesthetics has repeatedly been misused, or rather used 
insufficiently, to describe the formal qualities of an art object. This conventional 
interpretation of aesthetics glosses over its complexity. Osborne identifies an ambiguity 
surrounding aesthetics. He maintains this ambiguity stems from the numerous 
interpretations that arose since its emergence from philosophy to a discourse in its own 
right in the 18th century. Osborne notes how the subjective nature of aesthetics, which 
will be outlined shortly, undermined its academic status and maintains that a desire to 
                                                          
17  Osborne, Anywhere or Not at All, 6. 
18 Arthur C. Danto, “The End of Art: A Philosophical Defense,” History and Theory (Dec. 1998), 135, accessed 
January 27, 2011, 16.  
19 This series of lectures was delivered in Berlin and compiled in 1835 by his publisher, Heinrich Gustav Hotho. 
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develop a more coherent discipline of academic worth led to the different interpretations 
of aesthetics since it first emerged as a genre of philosophical enquiry. Mario Perniola 
furthers this point by identifying “turns” that have occurred within the development of 
aesthetics since the late 18th century. He observes how interpretations of aesthetics 
emerged, and continue to emerge, through a series of ongoing ruptures within previous 
aesthetic categories.  
 
As the discourse of aesthetics is multifaceted and still evolving, it is necessary to look at 
Paul Oskar Kristeller’s analysis of how aesthetics became connected to art and also 
Jonathon Rée’s more recent pronouncements on Kristeller. Kristeller’s influential 
survey of the arts from antiquity to the 18th century reveals the emergence of art in its 
modern sense as coinciding with the emergence of aesthetics.20Philosophical reflections 
on beauty and art had been around in Western thought prior to the emergence of 
aesthetics. The Third Earl of Shaftsbury and the Scottish Enlightenment thinker Francis 
Hutcheson looked to Plato’s insights that connected beauty and morality to form their 
own theories.21 However, although Shaftsbury and Hutcheson are credited with writing 
on issues surrounding aesthetics, Kristeller proposes Alexander Baumgarten as the 
founder of aesthetics in its modern conception insofar as he conceived a general theory 
of the arts as a separate philosophical discipline. Kristeller observes that Baumgarten 
secured the term aesthetics from the Greek aisthãnesthai in his academic thesis 
Meditationes Philosophica (1735) (Reflections on Poetry) and his unfinished textbooks 
Aesthetica I (1750) and Aesthetica II (1758).   
 
Kristeller proposes Baumgarten as the founder of aesthetics in its modern conception 
Kristeller credits Baumgarten with reinvigorating the term aesthetics by focusing closely 
on its etymological meaning of “sensuous knowledge”, which, translated from the Greek 
means ‘perceive sensuously’. The enquiry into sensuous knowledge was further 
developed through J.G. Hamann in Aesthetica in Nuce, (1762). Baumgarten’s texts were 
used in an academic context to teach students how aesthetica “ought to be spoken or 
written about.”22 Kristeller notes that in the decades after 1760 interest in aesthetics 
                                                          
20 Paul Oskar Kristeller, “The Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History of Aesthetics,” in Aesthetics: A 
Comprehensive Anthology, ed. Steven M. Cahn (London: Blackwell, 2007). 
21 For more see The Third Earl of Shaftsbury and Francis Hutcheson Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty 
and Virtue (1725), written as two treatises; the subject of the first is aesthetics – Concerning Beauty, Order, 
Harmony, Design and the second morality – Concerning Moral Good and Evil. 
22 Rée, “The Aesthetic Theory of the Arts,” 58. 
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increased and courses were offered in universities on the subject and in literary criticism. 
However Baumgarten failed to develop this doctrine with reference to any of the arts 
other than poetry or eloquence. The composer Felix Mendelssohn criticised Baumgarten 
on this shortcoming and suggested that these aesthetic principles should be formulated 
so as to apply to visual art and music.  
 
Jonathan Rée describes how Baumgarten’s term aesthetics became connected with the 
fine arts. He identifies Gotthold Ephraim Lessing as re-launching Baumgarten’s term to 
refer not just to the discipline of ‘representing’ sensory matters in discourse, but as a 
theoretical attempt to connect the different bodily senses to the various fine arts, 
including the non-discursive arts that Baumgarten had failed to consider.23 Rée 
identifies Lessing’s Laokoön linking the bildende Künste - the ‘formative’ or plastic arts 
of sculpture and painting - with aesthetics.24 This link between the fine arts and 
aesthetics that we know today was further advanced by Kant’s comprehensive attempt 
to integrate the system of the five fine arts (which had recently been expanded from the 
previous three that were established during the Renaissance) with judgments of beauty 
and the sublime through his theory of sensory experience in The Critique of Judgment 
(1790).25  
 
Kant’s public and highly prolific response to Baumgarten’s thesis furthered the 
discourse, connecting it with the speculation of the nature of art. An acknowledgment of 
sensuous knowledge in Kant’s third critique complicates quantifiable scientific 
analysis. By positing the notion of “disinterestedness”, Kant’s critique increased the gap 
between the discourse of art and empiricism. Kant’s notion of “purposiveness without 
purpose” ran counter to the previous role of art and enabled a more complex 
understanding of the previous Platonic connection between beauty and the good.26 The 
subjective nature of a discourse on sensuous knowledge was not without issue as it 
complicated the straightforward Platonic interpretation of the didactic function of art.  
 
                                                          
23 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Laokoön; An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry (1766), trans. Edward Allen 
McCormick (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1984). 
24 Rée, “The Aesthetic Theory of the Arts,” 58 - 59. 
25 It is noteworthy that Kant rejected the whole idea of a theory of arts or artistic value in his first critique, The 
Critique of Pure Reason (1781). 
26 For more on this see Andre Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity, second (Manchester and New York: Manchester 
University Press, 2003), 2. 
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Rée distinguishes Hegel’s Lectures on Fine Art (posthumously published in 1835)  as 
instituting aesthetics as a philosophical discourse on art through his synthesis of Plato, 
Lessing and Kant’s philosophical conjectures.27 Hegel’s interpretation of aesthetics is 
key to establishing philosophy as the domain for thought because it asserts the Platonic 
conception of philosophy as the locus of truth. Although Hegel is associated with 
Romanticism through his contribution to The Oldest System Programme for German 
Idealism (1796), his End of Art thesis (which will be discussed in greater detail shortly) 
articulates his departure from the Romantic conception of art as the source of truth.28 
Although Hegel claims that art invites intellectual consideration, he maintains it is “not 
for the purpose of creating art again, but for knowing philosophically what art is”.29 By 
claiming the possibility of philosophy ‘knowing’ art, Hegel affirms the Platonic 
conception of philosophy as the locus of truth and places thinking within the sole 
jurisdiction of philosophy. Privileging philosophy as the domain for thought advances a 
hierarchical relationship between the disciplines. Under these terms the relationship of 
philosophy to art is that of interpretation.  
 
This very brief précis on aesthetics invariably glosses over more nuanced interpretations 
theorised by Kristeller and Rée. However, it is offered as an outline of how the 
conception of aesthetics as the philosophical interpretation of art emerged. To recap, 
Baumgarten is essentially accepted as proposing a theory of sensuous knowledge as a 
counterpoint to logic as a theory of intellectual knowledge. The interpretation of 
aesthetics as an enquiry of beauty and taste is generally associated with the British 
school, which includes Anthony Ashley Cooper, The Third Earl of Shaftsbury, Francis 
Hutchenson, who wrote Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue 
(1725) and later David Hume.30 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s seminal Laokoön: An 
Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry (1766) can be regarded as the first to link 
sensory knowledge with the fine arts. Following which Kant developed this link in his 
Critique of Judgment (1790). The development of aesthetics as philosophy’s discourse 
                                                          
27Rée, “The Aesthetic Theory of the Arts,” 58. 
28 It is acknowledged that this manifesto is handwritten by Hegel, however many consider the work to be that of 
Schelling. Please see Andrew Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity, second (Manchester and New York: Manchester 
University Press, 2003), 55. This statement can be found in Robert Kudielka, "According to What: Art and the 
Philosophy of the "End of Art," History and Theory, Dec. 1998: 87-101. 
29 Hegel’s Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Arts, trans. by T. M. Knox. Oxford; The Clarendon Press, 1975, 11. 
30 Francis Hutheson, Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725), n.p. 
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on art was firmly established by Hegel in his lectures which were posthumously 
published as his Lectures on Fine Art (1835).  
 
It is important to note that developments in philosophical thought and art practice, most 
notably literature, prompted further interpretations of aesthetics. For philosophers and 
poets associated with Jena Romanticism ideas relating to the emergence of subjectivity 
were bound with aesthetics. This position is articulated by the German politico-
philosophical manifesto The Oldest System Programme … which places the ‘aesthetic 
act’ as the ‘highest act of reason’.31 Although Hegel is understood to have contributed 
to this manifesto (along with Schelling and Hölderlin) his assertion of the Platonic 
conception of philosophy as the locus of truth departs from the Romantic notion of art 
as the ultimate bearer of truth.32  The Romantic notion of art as Absolute asserts art as a 
potential site for thought. The association between contemporary art and Romanticism 
derives from the fact that our understanding of art in its contemporary sense is informed 
by the conception of art advanced by Jena Romanticism.33  This association will be 
discussed in greater detail through an analysis of Romantic Conceptualism in Chapter 
Three.  
 
 
1.2 The Troubling of Aesthetics in Art Practice 
  
Looking back at the canon of art in the late 19th century/early 20th century, we see how a 
Hegelian conception of aesthetics as the philosophical interpretation of art was 
contested by practices associated with the early avant-garde, most notably Dada. 
Performances at the Cabaret Voltaire, Kurt Schwitter’s sound poems, (which he 
described as “psychological collages” and Duchamp’s ready-made) explicitly attacked 
the notion of aesthetics as the discourse of art. It was impossible to thematise Dada art 
                                                          
31 Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity, 2.  
32 Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity, 2.  
33 Osborne raised this point in a round table conversation held in NCAD in January 2014 with Declan Long, and PhD 
researchers Alison Pilkington, Rebecca O’ Dwyer and myself. No transcript of this informal discussion exists. 
However, this insight is captured in Peter Osborne, Anywhere or Not at All: Philosophy of Contemporary Art 
(London/New York: Verso, 2013). There is an issue worth flagging: although Mallarmé is not a Romantic poet, his 
poetry operates in a similar manner to the Romantic fragment in that it operates as an open process that requires, or 
‘demands’, the reader’s engagement. Like the Romantic fragment, Mallarmé’s poems have an indeterminate quality 
that requires the reader to complete these works through the faculty of perception and imagination. This issue will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three. 
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works and gestures through aesthetic categories, for instance, Duchamp’s Fountain 
(1917) resisted traditional aesthetic interpretation.34  
 
In his essay “The Crux of Minimalism” Foster observes how this attack on aesthetics re-
emerged in the late 1960s through minimalism. Foster’s analysis of the neo-avant-garde 
through minimalism informs his reading of contemporary art. Foster names this 
retroactive process of returning to previous artistic configurations as anti-aesthetic. 
Although the term anti-aesthetic undoubtedly acknowledges the early avant-garde 
(exemplified by Duchamp’s anti-aesthetic gesture of the readymade), Foster does not 
use this term to describe a position. He uses it to describe a practice that encourages 
more critical engagement with previous artistic forms and ideas from the field of art and 
theory. Foster formulates his contemporary reading of art by re-evaluating minimalism 
in relation to practices associated with the early avant-garde.35 Like Duchamp’s ready-
made, artworks defined as minimal, which were often fabricated in industrial factories, 
resisted interpretation as they did not comply with the aesthetic requirements of the 
idealised art form. Foster focuses on the practices of Robert Morris, Donald Judd and 
Tony Smith and observes how by disrupting the modernist reading of art as autonomous 
minimalist practices contested the relevancy of aesthetics. Morris and Judd’s practices 
also included critical writings on art upon which Foster draws in his analysis. He notes 
how Judd’s redefinition of the artistic form as a “specific object” complicates modernist 
aesthetic categories by undoing the modernist interpretation of art as an idealised 
autonomous form.36 Judd’s definition is logical when we learn that his works, like those 
of his fellow minimalists, were fabricated in an industrial factory.37 The departure from 
                                                          
34 As Stephen. C. Foster observes, “The fabrication of Schwitter’s collages is not simply a combinational task of 
fitting elements together; nor is it just an assembly of discovered materials. It is a more complex process of the 
constant reinvention and exploration of dialogues.”  Stephen C. Foster, “Event Structures and Art Situations,” ed. 
Stephen C. Foster (London: UMI Research Press, 1988), 277. 
35 Although the prefix ‘anti’ suggests the elimination of aesthetics, Foster hesitates to do this completely, claiming, 
“The adventures of the aesthetic make up one of the greatest narratives of modernity.”  Foster’s appreciation of the 
critical capacity of aesthetic enquiry aligns with Ranciére, who also registers aesthetics as not just a regime for 
identifying art, but one that “carries a politics, or metapolitics, within it.” Jacques Rancière, Aesthetics and its 
Discontents (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2009). Foster develops from Adorno, who considers “aesthetic as 
subversive, a critical interstice in an otherwise instrumental world.” However, claiming the criticality of aesthetics is 
illusionary, and responds to Antonio Gramsci’s critical demand for a new strategy of “interference”. Foster draws 
attention to the requirement for an expansion of the privileged aesthetic realm by identifying the emergence of new 
aesthetic experiences not readily thematised by conventional aesthetics, formulating anti-aesthetics to reactivate the 
space of aesthetics as a critical interstice. In his anthology, Foster presents anti-aesthetics as expanding the privileged 
realm by “signalling a practice, cross-disciplinary in nature, that is sensitive to cultural forms engaged in a politic (i.e. 
feminism) or rooted in the vernacular.” In this way anti-aesthetics does not close down but instead expands aesthetic 
enquiry so that it might capture more critical and multifarious forms of art practice. For more see Hal Foster, The 
Anti-Aesthetic, Essays on Postmodern Culture (London: Pluto Press, 1985). 
36  Donald Judd, “Specific Objects,” in Donald Judd: Early Work, 1955-1968 (New York: D.A.P., 2002). 
37 The company that fabricated Die (1967) had a sign that read, "You specify it; we fabricate it." 
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an overarching emphasis on the medium-specificity of the artwork that had been 
generally preserved since the late 18th century undermined formal traditional aesthetic 
categories that were no longer equipped to engage with Judd and his cohort’s “specific 
objects”. 
 
Foster analyses this complication of aesthetics by minimalism, observing how Morris 
viewed this as productive in his essay Notes on Sculpture, Parts I and II. Morris ends 
Part I claiming that the emergence of aesthetic terms that are not thematised by formal 
aesthetics potentialises a “new freedom” in artistic practice.38 This sense of freedom can 
be registered in the radical shift from previous artistic concerns instigated by minimalist 
practices. In Part II, Morris responds to Tony Smith’s comments on the scale of his Die 
(1968).39 By claiming “The object is but one of the terms in the newer aesthetic”, 
Morris shifts the priority from the art object to an emergent concern with the encounter 
as the subject/object dynamic.40 Foster points to Smith’s famous anecdote of his night 
ride on the unfinished New Jersey Turnpike published in Artforum in 1966, "The 
experience on the road was something mapped out but not socially recognized” where 
Smith articulates how this experience did “something for me that art had never done.” 
This emphasis on experience is reasserted when he states, “I thought to myself, it ought 
to be clear that's the end of art. Most paintings look pretty pictorial after that. There is 
no way you can frame it, you just have to experience it.”41 
 
By disrupting a visual bias associated with late modernism, the minimalist concern with 
experience instigated a radical shift away from a modernist reading of art as an idealised 
and autonomous form. As Rée notes, this bias creates a habit of seeing the world with a 
false kind of impassivity, “as if it was a kind of picture.”42 Foster reads this shift as 
informing the foundations for a contemporary reading of art. The minimalist emphasis 
                                                          
38 Robert Morris, “Notes on Sculpture Part II,” in Minimal Art, A Critical Anthology, ed. Gregory Battcock, 230-235 
(LA, California: University of California Press, 1996), 229-230. 
39 “Q. Why didn’t you make it larger so that it would loom over the observer. A. I was not making a monument. Q. 
Then why didn’t you make it smaller so that the observer could see over the top. A. I was not making an object. Tony 
Smith’s replies to questions about his six-foot steel cube.” Morris, “Notes on Sculpture Part II,” 229-230. 
40 Morris, “Notes on Sculpture Part II,” 232.  
41" Samuel J. Wagstaff Jr., “Talking with Tony Smith,” in Minimal Art, A Critical Anthology (Boston, , 
Massachusetts, 1968), 386 and Artforum, Dec. 1966, quoted in Robert Storr's essay, "A Man of Parts," in MoMA's 
catalogue of the Tony Smith exhibition  
42 Jonathan Rée examines the bias towards vision in his commentary on 20th century modernity. Rée looks to 
German philosopher Oswald Spengler’s theory of culture in Decline of the West (1918). Spengler notes the 
underlying principles differ from culture to culture and observes through the development of perspective that the 
principles in the West became oriented by vision. Jonathan Rée, “The Aesthetic Theory of the Arts,” in From an 
Aesthetic Point of View, Philosophy, Art and the Senses, ed. Peter Osborne (London: Serpents Tail, 2000). 
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on the subject’s experience over the formal qualities of work prompted minimalism’s 
most vocal critic, Michael Fried, to charge minimalism as the “negation of art”.43 Fried 
articulated how minimalism threatened the “disciplinary order in modern aesthetics.”44 
Fried coins the term theatricality to wager his claim that minimalism negates art because 
it denies the viewer a proper aesthetic experience by initiating an immediate encounter 
with their physicality. Foster reflects on Fried’s analysis that argues that these physical 
forms of engagement situate the viewer’s experience in a palpable presence of the here 
and now. Fried maintains that it is impossible to approach these artworks as complete 
because, he maintains, “the contingency of perception” undoes the “purity of 
conception.” Fried claims minimalism disrupts an idealised notion of art by identifying 
the “special complicity that a work exhorts from the beholder.”45 Although Fried coined 
the term theatricality as a term of derision, Foster observes how Morris reinterprets 
theatricality to define the overarching minimalist concern with the subject’s experience. 
Instead of approaching contingency as problematic, this quality was deemed productive 
because in the way that it relocated the act of thinking from the privileged domain of 
philosophy to the domain of the subject through their encounter with the work. Like 
Morris, Foster sees the value of this “dialectical moment” which returns the viewer to 
their own subjectivity in the way that it disrupts a transcendental idealised aesthetic 
experience. As he observes, “Thus far from idealist, the minimalist work complicates 
the purity of conception with the contingency of perception, of the body in a particular 
space and time.”46  
 
Foster also uses the term neo-avant-garde to designate conceptualism. This movement 
that developed out of minimalism further problematised traditional aesthetics. The 
conceptual mandate of Art as Idea that reassigned the role of the art object as a 
functionary to mediate idea radically undermined the hegemony of philosophy in 
aesthetics. The various processes associated with conceptual art practice, such as Joseph 
Kosuth’s use of philosophical enquiry, Art and Language’s archival practices and 
Robert Barry’s gestures in which thought was the primary medium demonstrated clearly 
how formal aesthetics lacked the critical resources to thematise these works which 
                                                          
43 Fried, Art and Objecthood: Essays and Review, 153. 
44 Foster, The Return of the Real, 40. 
45 Foster, The Return of the Real, 40. 
46 Foster, The Return of the Real, 40. 
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functioned primarily to mediate idea.47 In his essay “Art After Philosophy” Kosuth 
discusses how conceptual artworks demonstrate the separation between aesthetics and 
art. He presents his case by arguing that “art’s existence as a tautology which enables 
art to remain ‘aloof’ from philosophical presumptions.”48  
 
Osborne observes how conceptualism profoundly challenged aesthetics by introducing a 
new engagement between philosophy and art. Kosuth’s direct use of philosophy in One 
and Three Chairs (1965) complicates aesthetics by shifting the role of philosophy from 
the external realm to the internal domain of art, demonstrating an alternative role of 
philosophy from that of interpretation. Osborne describes how this seminal work One 
and Three Chairs literally performs Wittgenstein’s philosophical theories of language 
by presenting the relation between language, picture and referent. It is generally 
accepted that Kosuth’s “Art After Philosophy”, established the term conceptualism to 
define an artistic movement whose primary motivations were to “question the nature of 
art by presenting new propositions as to art’s nature.”49 Kosuth argues that the 
explication of philosophical ideas through presentation affirms the philosophical status 
of the artwork so much so that he claims “art is analogous to an analytic proposition.” 50  
 
Osborne draws attention to the difficulty of this relationship between art and philosophy 
that “verges on complete identification.”51 Although Kosuth makes the general claim 
that art is philosophy, Osborne observes that Kosuth’s understanding of philosophy is 
particular. Kosuth’s conceptual mandate rests on the principles of certain analytical 
philosophy, being derived directly from A.J. Ayer’s logical positivism.52  Osborne 
concedes the problem with a dependence of conceptual art upon a specific philosophical 
                                                          
47 Art and Language was a collaborative project developed by Michael Baldwin, Mel Ramsden, David Bainbridge 
and Harold Hurrell in 1968. This British conceptual collaboration drew on linguistic philosophy to examine the 
ideological presuppositions underlying art institutionalisation. They presented this enquiry through discussion and the 
exhibition of their archive of research material displayed as indexes and their journal Art and Language through 
which they formed a network with US conceptual artists such as Kosuth. 
48 Kosuth, Art After Philosophy After, 161. 
49 Osborne, “Conceptual Art and/as Philosophy,” 56. 
50  Joseph Kosuth, “Art After Philosophy,” in Conceptual Art: A Critical Anthology, ed. Alexander Alberro and Blake 
Stimson, 158-178 (Boston, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1999), 161. 
51 Osborne, “Conceptual Art and/as Philosophy,”58. 
Kosuth’s definition of conceptual art has also been questioned by critic Jörg Heiser. Heiser draws attention to the 
problematic of a canon that excludes from the conceptual art system anything that might complicate the logical, 
analytical mandate of art as idea. However, although Heiser identifies this shortcoming, he appreciates why certain 
conceptual artists such as Kosuth and Art and Language established such rigid tenets because the movement was 
vehemently contested from the outset. 
52Osborne furthers this argument by making an arguable claim that logical positivism is now “long discredited”. 
“Conceptual Art and/as Philosophy,”58.  
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system because it rules out the range of philosophical systems of thought such as 
ontology, phenomenology and existentialism which are within the framework of the 
continental tradition. 53  As Osborne notes, “After Wittgenstein, Kosuth assures us, 
‘continental philosophy need not seriously be considered’.”54 Kosuth’s position is 
therefore dependant on a tautological definition of art and dependant on a particular 
philosophy of logic. The problem with the dependence of analytical or strong 
conceptual art upon “specific (often highly problematic, but also inadvertently socially 
representative) philosophical standpoints” is its reduction to a particular reading of art 
and that his reading is based on a particular philosophical theory.55 For Kosuth, 
conceptual art is “an art that recognizes that ‘art’s “art condition” is a conceptual state’ 
in that the artistic form is “conceptually irrelevant to the condition of art.”56 Osborne 
interprets Kosuth’s proposition as a “regulative fantasy” because it collapses art’s 
identity as analytic propositions. Osborne argues that this conflation of art and analytic 
philosophy simultaneously introduces and forecloses the semiological character of 
visual art by “abstracting from all questions of medium, form, visuality, and materiality, 
while nonetheless continuing to pose them implicitly in his presumption of art’s 
difference from other forms of signification.”57  
 
Not all conceptual artists subscribed to this “exclusive” or “strong” reading of 
conceptualism that Kosuth advanced.58 Adrian Piper articulated her dissatisfaction with 
these restricted parameters by claiming, “If we have to be concerned with one particular 
concept to be a conceptualist, something’s gone badly wrong.”59 Although Piper 
                                                          
53 For more continental philosophy see Richard Kearney, Modern Movements in European Philosophy, Second 
(Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1994) and Simon Critchley, Continental Philosophy, A 
Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
54 Osborne, “Conceptual Art and/as Philosophy,” 58. 
55 Osborne, “Conceptual Art and/as Philosophy,” 57. 
56 Osborne identifies three main components that define Kosuth’s conceptualism, they are, “linguistic reduction, 
psychologism and the collapse of the distinction between art and criticism.” This collapse of the artwork and art 
criticism is exemplified by the artistic gestures of Art and Language, which “took the ultimate form of the attempt to 
efface the categorical difference between art and criticism in the polemical presentation of critical discourse as itself 
art, in the journal Art and Language.” 
Osborne describes how conceptualism sought to transfer the “cultural authority” of philosophy, upheld since the 18th 
century as the locus of meaning to the artwork. As outlined in Chapter One, in this way conceptualist practices 
developed the critique of aesthetics by their “wholesale rejection of the modernist paradigm” that was asserted by 
minimalism. Their departure from the principles of modernism, evidenced by mandate art as idea, extended the 
horizon of contemporary art by attesting the primacy of art for thought. By using more communicative and didactic 
artistic processes conceptualism undermined the hierarchical role of art criticism. However, Osborne describes the 
conflation of the discipline of art and the discipline of analytic philosophy as a “regulative fantasy”, observing how 
“exclusive” conceptual practices sought to uphold intellectual adequacy and retain autonomy  
57 Osborne, “Conceptual Art and/as Philosophy,” 59. 
58 Osborne, “Conceptual Art and/as Philosophy,” 49. 
59 Osborne, “Conceptual Art and/as Philosophy,” 55 – 56. 
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contests a strict conceptual reading of art as an analytical enterprise her practice sustains 
a rigorous engagement with philosophy. It is noteworthy that Piper, now philosopher, 
had little interest in the idea of an ontology of art.60 Although Piper’s practice does not 
adhere to Kosuth’s conceptual reading of art as analytical enterprise, her work provides 
a domain for thought. As Osborne notes, her artistic and philosophical interests are not 
invested in the philosophical conception of what art is but explore the “broader 
metaphysical notions of space, time and self-hood.”61 Like Kosuth’s One and Three 
Chairs (1965), Piper’s work, such as Funk Lesson (1982-84), raises philosophical 
questions, but unlike Kosuth, these questions are linked with philosophical traditions 
associated with the continental school of philosophy. By confronting issues of race and 
gender, Piper’s practice expands the ‘strict’ reading of conceptualism towards a post-
conceptual reading of art.  
 
Comparing Piper’s approach to philosophy with Kosuth’s reveals the nuances that 
delineate the multifarious relationships between art and philosophy. For example, 
Kosuth claims art as philosophy. Conversely, Art and Language read philosophy as art. 
The expansion of Piper’s practice into Kantian philosophy demonstrates the profound 
bind in her practice with philosophy. Piper considers herself as both an artist and a 
philosopher. An acknowledgment of Piper’s status as a professor of philosophy within 
the discursive space of contemporary art demonstrates how philosophy is acknowledged 
within the rubric of art. This is distinguished from her reception in domain of 
philosophy where her status as a conceptual artist is treated separate from her academic 
status by philosophy scholars. This symbiotic relationship between art and philosophy 
continues and recent contemporary practices, such as that of, Thomas Hirschhorn, 
demonstrate that philosophical enquiry is at the core of art practice. Hirschhorn works 
in close collaboration with the philosopher Marcus Steinweg to develop monumental 
installations that are dedicated to thinkers and philosophers. These works include 
Spinoza Monument (1999), Deleuze Monument (2000), Bataille Monument, (2002) and 
Gramsci Monument (2013).62  
                                                          
60 Although Piper is most widely recognised as a conceptual artist she is also a philosopher who has taught at 
Georgetown, Harvard, Michigan, Stanford, and UCSD. She became the first tenured African American woman 
professor in the field of philosophy in 1987. She was awarded the title of Professor Emeritus by the American 
Philosophical Association in 2011. 
61 Osborne, “Conceptual Art and/as Philosophy,” 55 – 56. 
62 These monuments have to date been constructed in areas of social housing with participation from the local 
community. 
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This analysis details how developments in art practice complicated a reading of 
aesthetics as the philosophical interpretation of art and relocated thought from the 
external domain of philosophy to the immanent space of art troubling of aesthetics 
through art practice. These developments in art practice are consequential to a 
contemporary understanding of art that asserts thought as a condition of art. 
 
 
1.3 Contemporary Art as Post-Conceptual 
 
When Osborne speaks of contemporary art he does not use the term contemporary as a 
chronological descriptor to define present artistic practices. Instead Osborne sees 
contemporary art as being premised on a “complex historical experience” that followed 
the destruction of the ontological significance of previous artistic conditions.63 Osborne 
maintains the term contemporary is one that imposes critical demands on art by 
asserting a continued interrogation of the meanings and possibilities of art that was 
initiated by conceptualism. By advancing contemporary art as post-conceptual, Osborne 
presents contemporary art as developing from the legacy of conceptualism. The four 
insights that Osborne observes as defining the conceptual legacy are detailed to 
elucidate how they collectively designate both contemporary art and a post-conceptual 
practice. These insights also reveal what identifies the “philosophical character” of 
contemporary art by presenting the complex bind between contemporary art and 
philosophy that this enquiry explores.  
 
The first insight Osborne identifies is the “ineliminability but radical insufficiency of 
the aesthetic dimension of the artwork.”64 By challenging the aesthetic definition of the 
artwork Osborne posits the conceptual legacy as instituting a conceptual aspect in a 
contemporary appreciation of art. However, the failure of conceptualism to completely 
eliminate the artistic form demonstrates how the inevitability of the artistic form and 
how the sensible aspect of form affect how we encounter works. Osborne captures this 
dualistic engagement that takes place through this encounter by describing 
contemporary art as the reflective mediation of concepts and affects. Although 
                                                          
63Osborne, Anywhere or Not at All, 48. 
64 Osborne, "Art Beyond Aesthetics,” 27. 
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conceptual art places emphasis on the idea, the reception of idea is ultimately 
communicated through a sensible medium.65 Osborne registers how post-conceptualism 
critically re-evaluates the notion of the dematerialised art object by acknowledging the 
inevitability of form and making use of the distinguishing features.66 Osborne’s first 
insight draws attention to the unavoidable sensible dimension of the artwork and that 
this aspect informs how ideas in art are mediated.  
 
The second insight that Osborne identifies in the legacy of conceptualism is the 
necessary conceptuality of art. As noted in the previous discussion, the conceptual 
mandate of art as idea, and the understanding of the artwork as functioning within the 
mediation of idea asserted the primacy of art for thought. However, rather than 
presenting thought as an analytical enterprise, as Kosuth promotes, Osborne’s 
observation of contemporary art as the reflective mediation of concepts and affects 
reinstates the sensible dimension of the work as playing a part in its conceptual 
framework. In this way, the philosophical character of contemporary art is not merely 
dependant on the philosophy that is employed, but on the manner in which it is 
employed through the formation and presentation of the artwork.  
 
The third insight that Osborne registers is the critical requirement of the anti-aesthetic 
use of aesthetic materials. This is a development from Osborne’s first insight by 
registering a “movement from an absolute anti-aesthetic to the recognition in post-
conceptualism of its own inevitable form.” This awareness of form, be it a text, 
utterance, gesture, object, etc further affirms how the sensible dimension cannot be 
overlooked because it plays a fundamental role in the conceptuality of the work.67  
 
                                                          
65 Lucy R. Lippard, Six Years: The Dematerialisation of the Art Object (New York: Praeger, 1973), 43. 
66 Sol le Wit advanced the conceptual mandate of Art as Idea in his “Paragraphs on Conceptual Art” (1967). The 
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67 Peter Osborne, “Contemporary Art is Post-Conceptual” (paper presented at: Fondazione Antonio Ratti, July 9th, 
2010), 11. 
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Osborne’s fourth insight is the post-conceptual awareness of the multifarious forms that 
constitute art. Osborne reflects on the numerous forms that constitute art to identify an 
essential “transcategorical” nature of post-conceptualism.68 The term transcategorical 
not only captures the range of forms and processes that constitute a post-conceptual 
practice, but also the range of disciplines that are now incorporated into the framework 
of contemporary art. To explain this quality Osborne reflects on Robert Smithson’s 
Spiral Jetty (1970), observing the title Spiral Jetty does not refer to a single, discrete art 
form, that is the artwork sited in the Salt Lake in Utah, but is also used to refer to an 
essay reflecting on this work and a film documenting its construction. Smithson’s 
gesture of using a single title to refer to multiple artistic forms does two things: it asserts 
the artwork as an open-process, by acknowledging a work that is constituted by multiple 
forms while inscribing ‘non-artistic’ disciplines within the framework and legacy of art 
practice.  
 
These insights that Osborne identifies within the legacy of conceptualism collectively 
designate post-conceptualism and accordingly contemporary art.  By acknowledging the 
problematic relationship between contemporary art and aesthetics, Osborne discloses 
the complexity of the “philosophical character” of contemporary art. Instead of positing 
aesthetics as redundant, Osborne sees the troubling of traditional aesthetics (as the 
philosophical interpretation of art) in the conceptual legacy as informing its 
contemporaneous status. By positing contemporary art as post-conceptual Osborne 
registers contemporary art as maintaining a complex (albeit contentious) relationship 
between art and aesthetics that was paradoxically sustained through its contestation by 
conceptual art. Acknowledging how the artistic form (be it object or non-object based 
temporary art forms such as conceptual propositions or events) informs one’s 
experience of art demonstrates that it could be deemed unproductive to completely 
eliminate some form of aesthetics that accounts for sensation from the framework of 
contemporary art. The inevitability of the artistic form prohibits a definitive rejection of 
aesthetics because sensory knowledge invariably comes into play in the reception of 
idea. Although Osborne does not explicitly identify thought per se, his insights gesture 
towards this condition by demonstrating how one engages with contemporary art. 
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1.4 Asserting the Condition of Thought in Contemporary Art 
 
Unlike Foster and Osborne’s analysis, Danto’s thesis explicitly asserts the condition of 
thought in contemporary art by positing that the essence of post-historical art is its 
primacy for thought. In this way Danto captures the insights from Osborne’s and 
Foster’s analyses in a single thesis. Like Foster and Osborne, Danto also responds to the 
question of aesthetics through a retrospective analysis of developments in art practice. 
By liberating art from the “philosophical disenfranchisement of art”, Danto repositions 
meaning from the external site of philosophy to the internal realm of the artwork.69 
However, this theoretical movement of distancing philosophy from art is not without 
issue, as some argue, his thesis performs a double movement that transforms art into a 
philosophical enterprise.70 Danto’s perceived conflation of art with philosophy 
reaffirms that the relationship between contemporary art and philosophy is complex.  
  
Although Danto does not use the term contemporary, his term post-historical, which 
describes post-minimal practices from the late 1960’s such as pop art and 
conceptualism, aligns with Osborne’s contemporary reading of art. Danto’s reading of 
art rearticulates to some extent what Osborne identifies as a transcategorical quality. 
The term post-historical articulates the conclusive fact that there are no longer any 
qualifications for art. Danto develops the term post-historical by reflecting on specific 
artworks that resist categorisation. For Danto Andy Warhol’s Brillo Box (1964) 
exemplifies this moment because of the impossibility to differentiate it from non-art 
objects. Without stylistic or philosophical constraints Danto proposes that the final 
moment in the meta-narrative of art has been marked. However, instead of refuting 
those that resist categorisation as the end of art and approaching the post-historical as a 
situation where the institution of art becomes dismantled, Danto argues that this 
resistance to philosophical interpretation reveals a new capacity for art – the potential 
for art to think itself.  
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In The End of Art thesis Danto asserts the primacy of art for thought in response to 
Hegel’s homonymous thesis. In order to explicate how Danto re-conceives the role of 
art within the historical narrative it is necessary to briefly outline how Danto revisits 
Hegel’s thesis of the “exaltation of philosophy over art” and the implications of this in 
relation to aesthetics and art.71  Danto’s thesis develops from Hegel’s philosophy of art 
to engage with the complex engagement between art and philosophy in his own zeitgeist 
and reassert thought within the domain of art.  
 
Hegel’s philosophy of art focuses on different forms of engagement between the 
disciplines of art and philosophy that inform his zeitgeist. Because Hegel’s philosophy 
of art identifies the various phases of art within its classification it is regularly 
interpreted as a history of art. However, Danto maintains that the real focus of Hegel's 
philosophy is not an analysis of the history of art, but a philosophical enterprise seeking 
to develop the conception of Geist. Hegel uses this term to define the capacity of self-
understanding, identifying art as an expression of Geist. Hegel’s End of Art thesis 
broadly focuses on the progress in self-understanding by examining the stages within 
the overarching narrative of art history. 
 
Hegel registers the adaptive nature of art by noting how the function of art changes over 
time. He identifies three different stages in the narrative of art history to present the 
emergence of self-understanding, classifying these as symbolic, classical, and 
romantic.72 Hegel’s associate Schelling had previously conducted a similar enterprise 
through his categorisation of the arts. The first stage, which Hegel identifies as 
symbolic, corresponds with Schelling’s identification of a Platonic category, as both are 
mimetic. The terms classical and romantic used in Hegel’s classification conform with 
Schelling’s use of these terms within his categorisation. Both philosophers read 
Aristotle’s classical stage as sustaining the cathartic capacity of art. Similarly, both 
philosophers conceive the romantic understanding of the faculty of art as a touchstone 
to or an embodiment of the Divine. Hegel identifies art’s “highest vocation” in 
                                                          
71  Arthur C Danto, “Hegel's End of Art Thesis,” in A New History of German Literature, ed. D.E. Wellbury and J. 
Ryan, 535-40 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2004), 6.  
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Romanticism because he observes these practices allow “man’s rational need to lift the 
inner and outer world into his spiritual consciousness as an object.”73  
 
Danto maintains that Hegel approached art as a “staging area in the epic of self-
knowledge”. 74 When Hegel talks about Romanticism, he maintains, “The impression 
they make is of a more reflective kind, and what they arouse in us needs a higher 
touchstone and a different test”.75 Hegel’s End of Art defines a new development of 
self-understanding in his zeitgeist.76 Hegel identifies an adjustment from the romantic 
relationship to art, articulating this in his Lectures on Aesthetics, which state, “Art no 
longer affords that satisfaction of spiritual needs which earlier ages and nations sought 
in it.”77 From Hegel’s statement it is clear that he no longer sees art as capable of 
developing Geist. Hegel develops this argument by claiming that, “The peculiar nature 
of artistic production and of works of art no longer fills our highest need. We have got 
beyond venerating works of art as divine and worshiping them.”78 By calling an end to 
art, Hegel declares philosophy as the sole discipline capable of a developed engagement 
with self-knowledge and more transcendental forms of thought.  
 
Danto interprets Hegel’s End of Art thesis as the “exaltation of philosophy over art” 
because it concludes the role of art within an overarching philosophical narrative.79 
Although Hegel is associated with Schelling and other German romantic philosophers 
and poets such as Schiller and Novalis, Hegel’s thesis identifies the limitations that he 
observes in art, maintaining a counter position to a romantic understanding of art as 
superior to philosophy. Hegel observes his zeitgeist as heralding a departure from a 
romantic understanding of art because of an emergent interest and preoccupation with 
taste associated with 18th century British aesthetics.80 Hegel distrusts this preoccupation, 
maintaining that it demonstrates a schism in the previous relationship with art, stating, 
“Taste is directed only to the external surface on which feelings play,” and continues, 
                                                          
73 George Wilhelm Frederick Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Arts, trans T.M Knox (Oxford: The Clarendon 
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75 Hegel, Aesthetics, 31 
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79 Danto, Hegel's End of Art Thesis, 6. 
80 Aesthetics as an enquiry of taste and beauty was advanced by British philosophers including David Hume, The 
Third Earl of Shaftsbury and Rev. Francis Hutcheson.  
 33 
“So-called ‘good taste’ takes fright at all the deeper effects of art.”81 As a consequence, 
Hegel believes art could no longer be conceived as a “touchstone” to the Absolute when 
treated as an object of study. Furthermore, by defining art as the “sensuous appearing of 
the Idea” Hegel positions art as inferior to philosophy because it is reliant on the 
sensuous and thus transient. In the Hegelian sense, only ideas and speculative 
philosophy can sever this connection and remain absolute.82 By drawing a conclusion to 
romanticism, Hegel posits art as a transitional stage within the history of self-
knowledge. Through this movement Hegel posits philosophy as superior to art by 
claiming philosophy as the only discipline capable to engage with transcendental forms 
of thought. Hegel defines his zeitgeist as “announc[ing] a new age of reason, in which 
thought is the substance of spirit.” 83   
 
Although Danto claims that one usually writes a narrative from a retrospective position, 
he observes Hegel’s philosophy as coexistensive. Like Hegel’s enquiry into art, Danto’s 
is also coexistensive as his philosophical defence of his thesis, titled After the End of 
Art, similarly “belongs to the same history that it analyses.”84 Like Hegel, Danto also 
defines the master narrative of the history of art as a series of eras identifying the first as 
one of imitation and the following constituted by ideology. Danto develops this by 
reflecting on his zeitgeist and observes that there are no longer any qualifications for art. 
By defining his zeitgeist as post-historical Danto presents the end of this particular 
historical narrative. However, rather than approaching the end of art as a nihilistic 
project (in relation to the domain of art) he does not read this end as one of closure. 
Instead he considers the post-historical as an end to art as it was previously configured, 
one that liberates art from the constraints set by the terms of the previous artistic 
configurations. If thought is the substance of spirit, as Hegel maintains, than the role of 
art within the historical narrative may not necessarily be concluded under the new terms 
of art. 
 
To explicate how the post-historical situation opens up the possibilities of art Danto 
looks to Warhol’s Brillo Box because it exemplifies an artwork that is impossible to 
                                                          
81 Hegel, Aesthetics, 34. 
82 Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity, 166. 
83 Hegel, Aesthetics, 31. 
84 To contextualise “The End of Art: A Philosophical Defense,” Danto references Hegel’s “great commentator” 
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differentiate from a non-art object. As Danto explains, “nothing need mark the 
difference, outwardly, between Warhol's Brillo Box and the Brillo boxes in the 
supermarket.”85 For Danto Warhol's Brillo Box defies aesthetic interpretation in the way 
that it complicates what qualifies as art. He articulates this simply by stating, “So what 
couldn’t be an artwork for all one knew? The answer was that one could not tell by 
looking.”86  Danto also looks to conceptual works, such as Piper’s participatory work 
Funk Lesson. This work took place over two years as a series of social events where the 
artist, who is of black extraction taught white people the moves and history of funk. 
Rather than offering a discrete form that might be readily interpreted through 
conventional aesthetic categories Funk Lesson problematises the nature of art and 
simultaneously complicates the role of aesthetics by introducing forms of activities such 
as dance lessons that might be more readily associated with everyday activities.  
 
Danto identifies a defining sense of disorder when describing the post-historical as a 
situation in which “anything goes.” However rather than approaching this “period of 
information disorder” in a pessimistic manner, Danto reflects on the emancipatory 
capacity of the post-historical moment.87 Through the artworks resistance to 
categorisation, Danto conceives the primacy of art for thought. Within the aesthetic 
entropy of the post-historical moment Danto identifies a single universal essence in the 
plurality of contemporary art. This is outlined in his philosophical defence of his End of 
Art thesis in 1999, which explains a contradictory aspect of seeing the “possibility of a 
single, universal concept” only when “extreme differences” were available in art.88 By 
reflecting on the multifarious categories of art Danto identifies a “single, universal 
essence of art.” Rather than seeking to entice the beholder with its “external surface on 
which feelings play,” Danto maintains the universal essence in the post-historical is 
precisely it’s capacity for thought.89 
 
Danto explains art’s primacy for thought by observing how specific artworks such as 
Marcel Duchamp’s readymade embody their own meaning. Although Duchamp’s first 
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readymade pre-dates the artworks that Danto uses in his configuration of the post-
historical, he references this seminal artistic gesture because it heralds a new dialogue 
between philosophy and art.90 In presenting objects that could not be determined by 
taste as good or bad, Duchamp’s readymade set the conditions that mark the 
redundancy of formal aesthetics. Danto reflects on this moment in art practice as the 
liberation of art because it can no longer be conceived under a metaphysical judisdiction 
of philosophy. Similarly, with Warhol’s Brillo Box, Andre’s Bricks and Piper’s Funk 
Lesson it is impossible to know the meaning of art insofar as appearances are concerned 
because “anything could be a work of art.”91Danto observes that this resistance to 
philosophical interpretation “liberates” art from “philosophical oppression” and in so 
doing asserts it’s primacy for thought.92  
 
Danto’s philosophical defence of his End of Art thesis published in 1998 claims, “[t]his 
is as much as philosophy can do for art – to get it to realise its freedom.”93 However 
many of Danto’s commentators claim his thesis can be read as transforming art into a 
philosophical enterprise. For example, Horowicz and Huhn claim Danto conflates art 
with philosophy. They argue that instead of contesting Hegel’s thesis as the “exaltation 
of philosophy over art” Danto’s thesis conversely inscribes philosophy within the realm 
of art by asserting that the philosophical concerns informing the readymade are 
inscribed within the work itself. 94  Instead of seeing this artistic gesture as a 
“philosophical liberation” they describe it as a form of “philosophical infection.”95 They 
claim that in departing from an aesthetic model, which places philosophy outside of art, 
it paradoxically reasserts philosophy within the immanent space of art.  
 
Forsey examines the double movement in Danto’s thesis in a comparative analysis of 
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art and After the End of Art. Forsey observes 
how in The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art Danto claims art becomes 
enfranchised when distanced from the constraining demands of philosophical analysis. 
                                                          
90As Danto states, “I owe to Duchamp the thought that from the perspective of art, aesthetics is in danger, since from 
the perspective of philosophy art is in danger and aesthetics the agency for dealing with it.” Danto, History and 
Theory, 20.   
91 Danto, After The End of Art, 13. 
92 Danto, “The End of Art,” 131.  
93 Danto, “The End of Art,” 134.  
Gregg Horowitz and Tom Huhn, The Wake of Art, Criticism, Philosophy, and the Ends of Taste (New York: 
Routledge, 1998).14.  
94 Forsey, “Philosophical Disenfranchisement in Danto's "End of Art",” 403. 
95 Horowitz and Huhn, The Wake of Art, 20. 
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In After the End of Art she maintains Danto reduces the artwork to a philosophical 
enterprise by describing art as “looking into the mirror and seeing philosophy as its own 
reflection.”96 Although these papers were published at the same time they were not 
considered in conjunction within the philosophical academic arena. Despite the apparent 
contradictions, Forsey maintains that Danto had intended that they be considered 
together, quoting Danto who claimed that these papers “form a natural narrative order 
as though they were chapters in a single book with an overarching theme.”97 Forsey 
suggests that these papers were disassociated from each other because they were 
assumed to be contradictory. Forsey’s analysis of these papers reveals that the 
engagement between art and philosophy in art practice is complex by identifying how 
Danto simultaneously conceives an ejection and integration of philosophy within his 
reading of art.  
 
There are different readings of the relationship between art and philosophy that conflate 
the discipline. In the previous discussion I identify three, they are Kosuth’s reading of 
art as philosophy, Art and Language’s reading of philosophy as art and Steinweig’s 
understanding that both are analogous. Similarly Danto’s thesis can be approached as 
conflating art with philosophy. The problem with Danto’s thesis for a contemporary 
reading of art is that he disavows experience from the realm of art by claiming that to 
find art’s meaning one has to “turn from sense experience to thought.”98  
 
By disavowing the role of experience in the reception of work and the formation of 
thought, Danto’s thesis can be approached as aligning with a “strong” or “exclusive” 
conceptual reading of art as an analytical exercise. As detailed previously Osborne 
raises the issue with an “exclusive” conceptual reading of art as an analytical enterprise 
because it closes down the possibility of art to engender thought on an experiential 
level. As outlined in the previous discussion Osborne’s observation of the difficulty in 
abstracting thought from the artistic form and Foster’s identification of the role of 
perception in the encounter with art demonstrates a link between thought and 
experience. These readings, coupled with my reflections on my post-conceptual practice 
                                                          
96 Forsey, “Philosophical Disenfranchisement,” 403. 
97 Forsey, “Philosophical Disenfranchisement, 408-409.   
98 Danto, After the End of Art, 14. 
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detailed in the following chapter present the counter argument that thought engendered 
by art that is determined by and dependant on experience.  
 
 
1.5 Summary 
 
By examining how developments in art practice instigated a radically new relationship 
between art and philosophy than the engagement designated by aesthetics, this analysis 
of contemporary art is presented to contextualise the questions that the enquiry seeks to 
address, namely, what is the engagement between contemporary art and philosophy, 
how might we approach the artwork as activating thought, and what is the role of 
experience?  
 
The précis on aesthetics provided at the start of this chapter does not seek to present or 
argue for a definitive framework for aesthetics but seeks to present how the discourse 
emerged and continues to evolve. This précis also aims contextualise the contentious, 
but constant, bind between art and aesthetics.  
 
Reflecting on the fraught and undeniable relationship between art practice and 
aesthetics through Osborne, Foster and Danto’s readings inform the development of the 
enquiry by addressing the complex engagement between contemporary art and 
philosophy. The discussions in this chapter reveal the impossibility of resolving this 
complexity, by detailing a tendency by some to conflate the two domains, and the desire 
by others to fulfil the impossible task of separating them. However, as detailed in this 
analysis, this ambiguous engagement between art and philosophy presents the 
possibility of art as a domain for thought.  
 
That art is a domain for thought is suggested by Osborne’s identification of the 
“conceptuality” of contemporary art, Foster’s recognition of perception within our 
encounter and Danto’s theoretical manoeuvre of relocating thought from the realm of 
philosophy to the domain of art.99 As noted, Danto’s disavowal of the role of experience 
in the reception of work and the formation of thought necessitates further investigation 
                                                          
99 Osborne, “Contemporary Art is Post-Conceptual,” 10.  
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into the experiential dimension and its potential bearing on thought which I undertake in 
the following chapter through an analysis of my post-conceptual practice.  
 
This analysis of the complex engagement between contemporary art and philosophy 
also ensures a more robust and informed analysis of my post-conceptual practice and 
the research project. By relating how aesthetics was interrogated through art and how 
the notion that art is a domain for thought was realised through art practice, this chapter 
also aims to substantiate the methodology of this enquiry through practice.  The 
following chapter focuses on my post-conceptual practice to examine the complex 
engagement between art and philosophy.  
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CHAPTER TWO: THE ENTWINEMENT OF ART AND PHILOSOPHY IN A POST-
CONCEPTUAL PRACTICE 
 
 
2.0 Overview  
 
This enquiry originates from a post-conceptual art practice and it is carried out through 
such a practice. The thesis presents the motivations for conducting this enquiry and 
details the questions driving the enquiry that ask: What is the relationship between art 
and philosophy in my post-conceptual practice? How might my artworks raise 
philosophical ideas and thought? What is the nature of this thought? 
 
This chapter reflects on three key artworks that exemplify my practice prior to the 
research project. There are broadly two parts to this chapter, each part containing an 
account of artworks and two reflective discussions. The first part focuses on the 
drawings The Clear Apprehension of One’s Own Limitations (2003) and Mapping 
Nihilion (2005). Two discussions detail my post-conceptual practice through these 
works. The first reflective discussion introduces the term entwinement, a key term of the 
enquiry to articulate the specific engagement between art and philosophy that is 
sustained by my practice. I reflect on my practice as a space for thought because it 
allows me to engage with philosophical ideas. In observing how the thinking 
engendered through my practice is specific I introduce the provisional claim that the 
thinking raised by art is bound with experience. The second discussion introduces the 
term liminality and describes how I use this anthropological term in my practice to 
engage with the existential question of being. I detail how this term provides sufficient 
latitude to reflect on the content of my work (the existential thought that informs the 
content of the work and representations of indeterminate states, such as black holes, star 
clusters, etc.) and the context of my work  (the experiential state that arises out of the 
activity of my practice). I outline how my engagement with liminality initiated an 
emergent concern in my practice with experience.  
 
The second part of this chapter focuses on the first iteration of Metaphysical Longings 
(2006). The first discussion reflects on this work to outline how the event developed 
from a subsidiary feature of my practice to an artistic form in its own right. 
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The second discussion discloses how the working definition of the research project 
evolved from the ambition to enact other spaces. I outline how I formulated this term by 
reflecting on the processes used in Metaphysical Longings that seek to enact a space of 
thought for others through a more direct engagement with liminality. I focus on two 
processes that are used in Metaphysical Longings to enact an other space: a technique 
of guided visualization that I borrow from the practice of yoga nidra and a process of 
staging. These processes that emerge out of my practice are described in detail because 
they are employed and developed in the subsequent event-based works that constitute 
the research project. 
 
 
2.1 The Clear Apprehension of One’s Own Limitations and Mapping Nihilion 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The Clear Apprehension of One’s Own Limitations (2003). 
Unframed drawing (43.5 cm  x  140 cm). 
 
The Clear Apprehension… is a long, narrow length of paper that is heavily rendered 
with intricate graphite marks using a .25 mm clutch pencil (Fig.1). This drawing 
comprises over seventy-five philosophical statements on the subject of being, existence 
and knowledge. These statements are carefully linked together in a mind map. This 
strangely rendered web of proclamations floats over a surface of tiny stars that appear 
from clusters of erratically rendered graphite marks. The name Husserl transcribed in 
the bottom right corner suggests a link with phenomenology (Fig. 2). The statement 
circling his name reads, “Most of his projects are concerned with picturing an ideal 
programme rather than with its execution.” This quote appears to be lifted from some 
form of introduction to phenomenology. Other statements that relate to phenomenology 
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and are more than likely quoted from Husserl’s writings, include, “There is no original 
root, no single basic concept but an entire field of original experience” and “We have to 
return to the world as it manifests itself in a primordial experience, we must endeavour 
to find a ‘natural’ world, the world of immediate experience” (Fig 3).100   
 
 
   
Figures 2 & 3: The Clear Apprehension of One’s Own Limitations (2003) (detail). 
 
 
Juxtaposed with these statements on phenomenology are others referring to truth and 
knowledge, existentialism, critical theory and eastern philosophy; for example, the term 
“Empirical knowledge” links to a statement that describes a psychological position, 
“The crises of disorientation.” This in turn links Baudrillard’s statement, “This is 
precisely the haemorrhage of reality, as internal coherence of a limited universe when 
its limits retreat infinitely,” taken from his essay “The Orders of Simulacra”, which then 
links to a retrospective anecdotal conjecture from an unknown source of the fallout of 
the atom bomb: “When they started doing experiments the scientists were wary that the 
atomic explosion would cause every atom to explode, like domino effect, and ultimately 
the whole world, nay universe, would be annihilated,” this statement links to another 
statement associated with Buddhist philosophy: “Part of the essence of being it appears 
is impermanence,” leading to an existential statement that floats in an empty space in 
the bottom right-hand corner that reads, “Why attempt to repair meaning when 
meaningless existence is guaranteed?” To counter this position a statement by the 
psychologist in Tarkovsky’s film Solaris reads, “but we need secrets to preserve simple 
                                                          
100 I cannot reference these quotes because their source was never recorded. I cannot locate them now because they 
have been transcribed incorrectly. This actuality is recorded and will be reflected on in the following discussion that 
analyses how my approach to philosophy through art practice differs from an academic approach to philosophy. 
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human truths (Fig. 4, 5, 6).101 The Clear Apprehension… appears incomplete - not only 
because it is presented unframed and pinned to the wall but also because the bottom 
right corner suggests that the task of transcription appears to have been abandoned.  
 
       
Figures 4, 5 & 6: The Clear Apprehension of One’s Own Limitations (2003) (detail). 
 
Mapping Nihilion is a framed drawing on a large 167 cm by 68 cm sheet of gridded 
paper (Fig. 10).  Like The Clear Apprehension … this drawing also is composed of 
erratic marks made by a .25 cm clutch pencil that depict a section of the universe. The 
drawing takes up only a third of the surface area of the paper. However, although the 
paper is predominantly empty the drawing of the universe is more complex than The 
Clear Apprehension… because it not only depicts stars but phenomena that include 
supernovas and black holes. A hand-drawn outline demarcates the drawing on three 
sides, but no line demarcates the top of the drawing, giving the impression of 
incompleteness.  This is enhanced by an empty space in the centre of the drawing that 
bears the trace of heavily rendered marks that appear to have been frantically erased. 
(Fig. 7, 8 & 9) 
 
 
     
Figures 7, 8 & 9: Mapping Nihilion (detail). 
 
                                                          
101 Stanislaw Lem and Fridrikh Gorenshteyn, Solaris, directed by Andrei Tarkovsky, 1972. 
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Figure 10: Mapping Nihilion (2005). 
Documentation of drawing in progress, artist’s studio, VCCA, Virginia, USA 
 
 
There is less text in Mapping Nihilion than The Clear Apprehension…, instead of 
seventy-five disparate statements this work features a single short paragraph that is 
carefully transcribed in a scroll in the bottom right-hand corner. This scroll has the 
appearance of those represented on early maps predating the 20th century. However, 
unlike captions on maps, which provide factual information, the caption on this scroll is 
a quote (Fig. 11). This quote is transcribed from a translation of Sartre’s Being and 
Nothingness (1969). A heavily pencilled dark blob obliterates the top edge of the scroll 
and partially covers some of the letters. 102  
 
 
 
Figure 11: Mapping Nihilion (detail). 
 
                                                          
102 The text in the scroll reads: “The Being by which Nothingness appears in the world must nihilate Nothingness in 
its Being and even so it still runs the risk of establishing Nothingness as a transcendent in the very heart of 
immanence unless it nihilates Nothingness in connection with its own being …” 
The text is recorded in this footnote as it appears in the drawing. Note the misuse of capital “N”. 
Jean-Paul Sartre, “The Origin of Negation,” in Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology, 
(Northampton: John Dickens & Co. Ltd., 1969), 23.  
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2.1.1 A Post-Conceptual Practice - An Entwinement of Art and Philosophy 
 
My post-conceptual practice is not centred on the production of works of art. I approach 
my practice as a way to engage with the question of being, a question that is also 
addressed through existentialism and phenomenology. I describe The Clear 
Apprehension and Mapping Nihilion artefacts because they attest to my endeavour to 
engage with philosophical ideas. In this way the drawings are best understood as an 
open process because they emerged out of a practice that is motivated by experimental 
forms of enquiry over the creation of ‘artworks’.103 This practice is distinguished by a 
multi-layered process encompassing drawing, reading and reflecting on philosophy. The 
tripartite process, of reading, rendering and reflecting can be approached as a symbiotic 
engagement where activities associated with art making and those associated with 
philosophical enquiry are equally weighted and necessary. I identify this particular 
engagement between art and philosophy in my practice as an entwinement.  
 
The Clear Apprehension… and Mapping Nihilion present a radically different 
engagement between art and philosophy that is designated by aesthetics. Philosophy is 
not deployed to interpret these works. Philosophy is implicit in their production. This is 
made explicit by the statements in each drawing and by the titles that are borrowed from 
philosophical texts. It is also important to note that philosophy does not merely inform 
the work. The Clear Apprehension … and Mapping Nihilion do not illustrate particular 
philosophical thoughts or ideas but attest to my working through particular 
philosophical ideas.  
 
This process of working through philosophical ideas is revealed in The Clear 
Apprehension… Although Husserl’s name features in The Clear Apprehension… this 
work does not systematically present or illustrate Husserl’s thoughts (Fig. 12) or 
provide a diagrammatic rendition of phenomenology. The expansive range of ideas 
encompassing phenomenology, existentialism, scientific thought and eastern philosophy 
                                                          
103 This understanding that process constitutes the artistic form is exemplified by Morris’s exhibition Continuous 
Project Altered (1969). Describing this work, Morris maintains that the “process becom[es] part of the work itself.” 
This notion of the artwork as a process has been described succinctly by Morris in his reflections of Continuous 
Project Altered Daily (1969), at Leo Castelli Warehouse Gallery, New York. He states, “As ends and means are more 
unified, as process becomes part of the work instead of prior to it, one is enabled to engage more directly in the world 
of art making…” Robert Morris, “Some Notes on the Phenomenology of Making: The Search for the Motivated”, 92, 
quoted in Jon Bird, “Minding the Body: Robert Morris's 1971 Tate Gallery Retrospective,” in Rewriting Conceptual 
Art, ed. Michael Newman and Jon Bird, 88-107 (London: Reaktion Books, 1999), 96. 
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further complicates matters. The Clear Apprehension… reveals a notable difference 
between the practice of making art and undertaking theoretical research, philosophical 
or otherwise. The sources of the seventy-five statements that feature in this work are not 
specified or referenced correctly as demonstrated by my inability to reference Husserl’s 
statements transcribed in the work (see footnote 102). It is important to record this 
because it demonstrates how my engagement with philosophy differs from an academic 
approach to philosophy that demands a strict practice of referencing. This omission 
demonstrates how an engagement with philosophy in my art practice differs from an 
engagement with philosophy in the academy, as it does not strictly adhere to the 
protocols associated with the discipline of philosophy. I have been unable to locate 
these two particular statements of Husserl’s because they have been transcribed 
incorrectly. In an academic context this lack of rigour would make the work redundant, 
however, within the domain of art this in fact plays a role in the operation of the work. 
Because The Clear Apprehension… was made almost ten years ago it is difficult to 
source the seventy-five quotes rendered on the page for this formal enquiry. There are 
other crucial aspects of work that distance it from a strictly academic or fully rational 
enterprise. Unlike an academic text the primary source material and secondary sources 
are given equal weight. For example, the statement reading, “With the consciousness of 
the death of God, the true world is revealed as fable” is not a direct quote of Nietzsche, 
but Simon Critchley’s analysis of Nietzsche’s interpretation of nihilism in Very Little 
… Almost Nothing (2004). The inclusion of quotes from films and my own sentiments 
complicates a clear reading of this work.  
 
Although covering a wide range of discourse seems an unconventional method of 
conducting philosophical enquiry, this approach allows me to immerse myself in a freer 
and more explorative mode of enquiry. My enquiry through practice is not carried out to 
prove a point, argue a philosophical position or stake my claim to a theory. Through my 
practice I seek to explore and consider our place in the world and the indeterminate 
nature of existence. The drawings attest to and emerge out of the tripartite process of 
reading, reflecting and rendering allowed me to distil ideas and develop my thoughts 
around the notion of being the and indeterminate nature of existence.  
 
I maintain, that this notion of indeterminacy that is bound up with the human condition 
and which I explore through my practice became manifest in the drawings as they 
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emerged. In order to engage with the existential question of being I devised a method of 
capturing key ideas by transcribing quotes and statements onto large sheets of paper. 
Capturing these abstract thoughts gave me sense of control by allowing me to reflect on 
them without the worry of their disappearing (as they would if I had confined them to 
memory). The more philosophy I read, the more apparent it became how little I actually 
knew. These drawings attested to my attempts to grapple and engage and with these 
philosophical ideas. 
 
In the case of The Clear Apprehension … giving these abstract thoughts a physical 
presence enabled me to reflect more deeply on the indeterminate nature of existence by 
aligning these statements with others. Through drawing I formed new associations that 
became manifest in the web-like structure. The drawing offered an alternate perspective 
from which to engage with the notion of indeterminacy by connecting ideas associated 
with phenomenology, existentialism and eastern philosophy. In this way, statements 
such as  “Human existence precedes essence” were literally linked with the claim that 
“The subject on the other hand is pure consciousness”(Fig. 13).104 The drawing 
provided a point of entry to reflect on the indeterminate nature of existence by 
juxtaposing ideas associated with phenomenology, existential discourse and eastern 
philosophy in a more immediate and physical capacity.  
 
    
 
Figures 12 & 13: The Clear Apprehension of One’s Own Limitations (2003) (detail). 
 
Phenomenology and existentialism are separate systems of philosophical thought. 
However they are linked in that existentialism is informed by and develops from 
                                                          
104 As noted in footnote 102 as I was not in the practice of referencing quotations, as say an academic scholar, I am 
now ten years later, unable to locate the source. This omission demonstrates how an engagement with philosophy in 
my art practice differs from an engagement with philosophy in the academy, in the manner that it does not strictly 
adhere to the protocols associated with the discipline of philosophy.  
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phenomenology. Phenomenology seeks to avoid presuppositions by locating the source 
of knowledge in the subjects’ experience. Existentialism is also centred on the agency 
of subject and through the premise that the individual is free establishes that there are no 
universal truths.105 During this period I was also developing my understanding of truth 
by looking to Eastern philosophy, focusing on the teachings of Jiddu Krishnamurti, who 
famously rejected the notion of truth.106 I was looking also to the teachings of the 
Buddhist scholar S.N. Goenka to develop my understanding of existence, through his 
interpretation of impermanence.107 This notion of impermanence and indeterminacy at 
the core of Buddhist thought can also be registered in the concerns of existentialism.  
 
The notion of indeterminacy is suggested by the reference to Sartre’s Being and 
Nothingness in Mapping Nihilion. Sartre’s complex articulation of being and 
nothingness confounded me in a similar manner to the notion of impermanence and 
indeterminacy that I perceived when contemplating the limitlessness of the universe. 
My uncertainty of Sartre’s existential conception of uncertainty mirrored the uncertain 
nature of the universe. This notion of indeterminacy is also articulated by the word 
‘nihilion’ that I borrow from Simon Critchley’s preamble “Travels in Nihilion” in his 
book Very Little … Almost Nothing (2004).108 Very Little … Almost Nothing outlines the 
central motivations of the philosopher’s meditation on death and his attempt to find 
meaning to human finitude. This book engages with nihilism through the philosophy of 
Nietzsche and Heidegger and writings of Blanchot and Beckett. The term nihilion 
articulated my experience of attempting to grapple with the philosophical question of 
being while providing an appropriate term to describe my chaotic drawing that depicted 
an expansive and vast universe.  
 
                                                          
105 See Kearney, “Phenomenolgy”, in Modern Movements in European Philosophy, 1-113. 
106 The Order of the Star of the East was founded in 1911 to proclaim the coming of the World Spiritual Leader J. 
Krishnamurti was made head of the order. On August 2, 1929 at the inauguration of the Annual Star Camp at 
Ommen, Holland, Krishnamurti dissolved the order before the three thousand members who had gathered. The 
following quote is taken from his speech: “I maintain that Truth is a pathless land, and you cannot approach it by any 
path whatsoever, by any religion, by any sect … Truth being limitless, unconditioned, unapproachable by any path 
whatsoever, cannot be organised; nor should any organization be formed to lead or coerce people along any particular 
path.” For more on the life and teachings of Krishnamurti see Mary Lutyens, Krishnamurti: the Years of Awakening 
(Massachusetts: Shambhala Publications, 1975), 272. 
107 This interest in yoga and meditation stems from my sustained practice of yoga and meditation since 1998. I had 
also been exploring Vipassanā meditation through the non-sectarian teachings of S.N. Goenka. Vipassanā meditation 
is performed in order to observe at the deepest level the constantly changing nature of the mind and body. S.N. 
Goenka describes anicca (impermanence) as fundamental to existence. He references the Bubble Chamber, an 
instrument that demonstrates how in one second a single atomic particle arises and vanishes.  
108 Simon Critchley, “Preamble: Travels in Nihilion,” in Very Little, Almost Nothing (New York: Routledge, 2004). 
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Mapping Nihilion was produced three years after The Clear Apprehension … while on 
residency at the VCCA, (Virginia Centre for Creative Arts), US. Prior to this research 
trip, I had developed a process of imagining the universe by drawing exploding comets, 
black holes and sections of the night sky as a way of approaching ideas of being and 
existence. My intention for the six-week residency was to dedicate myself to drawing 
the night sky using a systematic approach, placing myself in the same location each 
night to ensure an accurate representation. However, although I was based in the 
countryside there was so much light pollution that it was impossible for me to see any 
constellations. I found a tiny black-and-white photograph of the Milky Way (4cm x 9 
cm) and set myself a new task of mapping this onto a large sheet of gridded paper 
measuring 167 cm x 68 cm  (Fig. 14, 15).109 I used a magnifying glass to carry out the 
time-consuming and slightly absurd task. After some days I began to question my 
motives – what was the purpose of this work? What was the purpose of recreating an 
image that already existed? Annoyed at undertaking such a purposeless project I 
frantically began erasing the drawing, deciding it would be better to have a drawing of 
nothing. Erasing the heavy pencil marks was difficult and tiring and after a short period 
of time I stopped. On returning I was confronted by an ill-defined gap that ruptured the 
drawing to form a void (Fig. 7).  
 
 
       
Figure 14: Work in progress, mapping image onto a large sheet of gridded paper. 
Artist’s studio, VCCA, Virginia, USA. 
 
Figure 15: Published photograph: J.R. Eyerman, News Bureau California Institute of 
Technology – Mount Wilson and Palomar Observatories. 
 
 
                                                          
109 This image can be found in David Bergamini and the Editors of Time-Life Books, The Universe, ed. David 
Bergamini and the Editors of Time-Life Books (New York: Time-Life Books, 1973) 166. 
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Why present an unfinished drawing as a map, and why caption this ‘map’ with a literary 
quote relating to the ontological problem of being? Although the cartographic motifs 
lend a map-like appearance to this drawing, it is clear that Mapping Nihilion cannot 
serve the function of a conventional map because it lacks the necessary requirement of 
precision and exactitude. The hand-drawn lines, the roughly rendered depictions of 
stars, the erratic marks, the strange rupture in the centre of this incomplete drawing 
coupled with the fact that the ‘legend’ presents Sartre’s statement on nothingness 
renders this map ineffective. The fact that this drawing does not map a particular place 
enhances the irrational quality and Sartre’s quote intensifies the strangeness of a 
drawing that attempts to map such an indeterminate realm.    
 
Although Mapping Nihilion originally sought to map a physical space (the milky way), 
the juxtaposition of artistic processes and philosophical enquiry disrupts a clear reading 
of this work. Instead of producing a clear cartographic map, this drawing portrays my 
grappling with the scale of the universe coupled with the existential notion of being and 
nothingness. The sense of indeterminacy becomes revealed through the drawing’s 
execution. The unedited mistakes in Mapping Nihilion, the blot of the scroll, the erased 
marks and the naively rendered stars also undermine a sense of certainty. The rupture in 
the centre of the drawing can be read as presenting an interruption to the process, a 
hesitation to completing the work. However, that the work is incomplete is not a 
shortcoming, on the contrary, this quality lends to the logic of the work.  
 
I approach the unedited and incomplete quality of both Mapping Nihilion and The Clear 
Apprehension… as advancing the internal logic of these works - a logic that occurs 
through the process of art making itself. The drawings present the limitations of my 
personal enquiry of existential philosophy. The illogical web-like structure in The Clear 
Apprehension … also conveys a sense of disorder that articulates my grappling with this 
philosophical system of thought. I construe the pieces of text floating in an unfinished 
depiction of the universe act as symbolically representing forms (both planetary and 
abstract ideas) beyond my reach. The fact that the drawing stops in the right-hand 
corner of the work gives the impression that the task has not reached fruition, that there 
is more work to be done and that these thoughts need further development. The 
incompleteness of these works implicitly suggests the notion of indeterminacy that 
existentialism addresses.  
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My practice provides a domain or space where I can engage with philosophical ideas 
and questions. However, I differentiate the thinking that takes place in and through my 
practice from more analytical forms of enquiry by reflecting on the processes in my 
practice that lead me to think. Rather than presenting an idea that is developed through a 
system of logical analysis, my processes of reading and rendering over protracted 
periods of time generated a way of thinking that differed from rational thought 
processes. The curator Hendel Teicher describes a similar process through the practice 
of Emma Kunz (1892-1963) (Fig.16). Teicher raises the notion of “thinking through 
drawing”, proposing that Kunz generated her own form of thinking through this 
physical activity.110 It is significant that Kunz also approached her practice as a form of 
enquiry, a process of research and discovery. She describes this in her self-published 
books Miracle of Creative Revelation and New Methods of Drawing in 1953111 (Fig. 
17). By this Kunz was referring to the result of her combined process of action and 
contemplation, which resulted in complex geometrical forms.  
 
 
   
Figure 16: Emma Kunz at her worktable, Waldstatt, 1958. 
Figure 17: Emma Kunz, Work No 086, n.d. 
Drawing: Pencil, coloured pencil and oil pastel on graph paper. 
 
 
Similarly my process of action and contemplation, the transcription of philosophical 
statements coupled with the process of rendering stars allowed me to further 
contemplate and explore notions of being and existence. The process of rendering 
intricate stars, formed as tiny empty gaps between tiny pencil marks, carved out a 
                                                          
110 The subtitle of the exhibition is derived from the title of Kunz book. Catherine de Zegher and Hendel Teicher , 
eds., 3 x Abstraction, New Methods of Drawing, Hilma Af Klint, Emma Kunz, Agnes Martin, ed. (New York, The 
Drawing Centre and Yale University Press, 2005)  
111 de Zegher and Teicher, 3 x Abstraction,  129. 
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specific time where I could engage on a deeper level with philosophical thought. My 
compulsion to render vast tracts of the universe resulted in my working into the early 
hours of the morning. Kunz also worked through the night working to a state of near 
exhaustion in order to produce her drawings in a single session. Unlike Kunz I failed to 
complete my drawings in a single session. However, like Kunz, who regarded her 
practice as a means to channel energy, I also consider the active and contemplative 
attributes of the processes as absolutely necessary. This time consuming process of 
reading and rendering intricate text and stars enabled me to approach ideas relating to 
existence and impermanence in a more direct capacity by allowing me to experience a 
strange existential state of distance and remove. In a way, my practice carved out a 
temporality that not only gave me time for reflection and also induced me to think in a 
very particular way. The particularity of my thought was bound with my experiential 
state, inducing a more perceptive and imaginative form of thought. Although this way 
of thinking is not systematic, it is specific in the way that it unfolds in an indeterminate 
manner. 
 
Because these drawing directly reference philosophical ideas, they could potentially 
raise these ideas in others who might encounter these works. However because these 
ideas are presented in the context of a drawing they invariably encourage a different 
form of engagement with these ideas than an academic text. Because The Clear 
Apprehension … and Mapping Nihilion do not make clearly worked out arguments, as 
one would expect in an academic text. The juxtaposition of fragments of philosophical 
thought suspended in the night sky in The Clear Apprehension … and the caption on a 
map that allude to nothingness in Mapping Nihilion resists logical analysis. Instead of 
engaging with these works in a purely logic or rational way, these drawings require 
another form of engagement and require a different way of thinking. As noted above, I 
register that my art practice provides a space to think about philosophical ideas in a 
particular way. These insights gained from reflecting on my practice and my drawings 
prompt the question driving the enquiry that asks, how might an artwork offer a space to 
think about philosophical ideas and what would be the particularity of such thought?  
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2.1.2 A Post-Conceptual Practice - Engaging With Liminality 
 
As noted in the previous discussion, I use my practice to explore and engage with the 
indeterminate nature of existence. Liminality, as conceived in anthropology offered a 
valuable resource to engage with the existential question of being driving my 
practice.112 The discussion also outlines how this term provided enough latitude to 
reflect on the content of the work, (the philosophical ideas that I was recording and also 
the physical spaces that I was rendering) and my art practice in general.  
 
The French anthropologist Arnold van Gennep first used the term liminal in Les Rites 
de Passage (1909).113 Although there was a range of similar studies on ritual conducted 
during this period, van Gennep identified forms of ceremonial rites as marking 
significant transitions to the social status of individuals. Van Gennep observed these 
rites as both demonstrating and authenticating transformation in an individual’s status 
and proposed that embedded within the structure of the ritual is a systemic pattern that 
enacts and enables these rites of transition. Van Gennep identified the structure of the 
ritual as constituted by three stages: separation, segregation, and integration. This 
movement is affected by a particular moment that is made manifest in the ritual. Van 
Gennep identified this tri-partite structure as the liminal stage, the pivotal moment in 
ritual. Van Gennep marks the liminal stage as the crucial stage within the ritual by 
naming the stages before and after as pre-liminal and post-liminal. For example, in the 
case of a teenage boy undergoing rites to initiate him into adulthood, the pre-liminal 
designates the initial stage of ritual where the initiate is removed from the space of the 
everyday and the post-liminal stage, or final stage of ritual which facilitates the 
reintegration of the transformed individual back into the social order. As noted in the 
Introduction, the term liminal is derived from the Latin limnal, meaning threshold. 
Transgression is implied by this term that foregrounds some kind of departure or 
crossing over of boundaries. Van Gennep observed how key stages in ritual 
symbolically removed initiates from their everyday experience. This movement is 
mainly initiated through an intensification of experience. Because the liminal stage in 
                                                          
112 Tina Kinsella, “Deep Mapping the City: A Matrixial Topography of Liminality.” Accessed 21st November 2014. 
http://tinakinsella.wordpress.com/deep-mapping-the-city-a-matrixial-topography-of-liminality/  
113 Arnold Van Gennep, The Rites of Passage (London: Routledge, 2004). Van Gennep is now recognised as a key 
thinker within ritual theory because of his identification of the liminal. However, prior to Turner’s re-introduction of 
liminality van Gennep was not widely known, mainly because Emile Durkheim, the most prolific ethnographer, 
ostracised Van Gennep from the academic circle in France. For more on this please see Rosemary Zumwalt, “Arnold 
van Gennep: The Hermit of Bourg-la-Reine,” American Anthropologist (American Anthropological Association), 84, 
no. 2 (June 1982): 299-313. 
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ritual designates a temporal, symbolic, indeterminate state that exists outside of and 
beyond normative structures it is understood as “other”.114  
 
However, liminality did not gain currency in the field of anthropology and the wider 
cultural domain until the late 1960s. The Scottish anthropologist Victor Turner re-
introduced and elaborated liminality in The Ritual Process (1969).115 Turner introduced 
the term structure to designate the values and the normative mode of social interaction 
and the term societas to describe an interpretation of a standard form of community. 
“The first is of society as a structured, differentiated, and often hierarchical system of 
political-legal-economic positions with many types of evaluation, separating men in 
terms of ‘more’ or ‘less’.”116 As their respective counterparts he proposes anti-structure 
and communitas. Turner maintained the concurrent formation of anti-structure and 
communitas in the symbolic liminal stage. Turner observed that within ritual the 
participants undergoing the initiation rites are literally “stripped” of the vestiges that 
symbolically represent their position within society.117 Without physical trappings and 
through their collective display of an abandonment of status the participants unite to 
form a non-hierarchical social group. Communitas designates a communion of equal 
individuals. This disregard of status forms an anti-structure where normative social 
values no longer apply.118  Turner’s extension of the term communitas (which he had 
originally coined to designate participants undergoing ritual initiation in a tribal context) 
to specific groups within contemporary western society, such as the counter culture 
movement of the 1960s, extended the currency of the term liminality beyond 
anthropology to the wider field of socio-political and cultural theory. His interpretation 
of liminality as “betwixt and between” further extended the applicability of the term for 
                                                          
114 Colin Turnbull, “Liminality: A Synthesis of Subjective and Objective Experience,” in By Means of Performance, 
ed. Wila and Schechner, Richard Appel, (Cambridge University Press, 1990), 80. 
115 Victor Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (New Brunswick and London: Aldine 
Transaction, 1969). This publication is based on Turner’s fieldwork while living with the Ndembu tribe of North 
Western Zambia. 
116 Victor Turner, “Liminality and Community,” in Culture and Society, Contemporary Debates, ed. Jeffrey C. 
Alexander and Steven Seidman (Melbourne, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 148. 
117 Turner, The Ritual Process, 108 & 169. 
118 Turner maintained the concurrent formation of anti-structure and communitas in the symbolic liminal stage. 
Turner observed that within ritual the participants undergoing the initiation rites are literally ‘stripped’ of the vestiges 
that symbolically represent their position within society. Without physical trappings and through their collective 
display of an abandonment of status the participants unite to form a non-hierarchical social group. Communitas 
designates a communion of equal individuals. This disregard of status forms an anti-structure where normative social 
values no longer apply. Turner extended the term communitas (that he originally coined to designate participants 
undergoing ritual initiation in a tribal context), to specific groups within his own contemporary western society, such 
as the counter culture movement of the 1960’s. In this way Turner instigated the currency of liminality beyond the 
field of ethnography and anthropology to the wider field of socio-political and cultural theory. Turner, The Ritual 
Process, 96. 
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disciplines ranging from theatre studies, gender studies, sociology, geography, geo-
politics, etc., to interpret situations of indeterminacy.119  
 
The liminal has been instrumental within the area of performance art and performance 
theory.120 The theatre director Richard Schechner looked to Turner’s research and his 
development of liminality to thematise aspects of experimental theatre and later 
collaborated with Turner to explore the overlap between theatre and ritual. This 
collaboration resulted in the emergence of performance studies in the 1970s.121  
Performance art of the late 1960s / early 1970s can be positioned within the dialogue 
between performance studies and critical artistic practice. Emerging performance 
practices during this period which engaged directly with liminality are exemplified by 
Marina Abramovicz, Chris Burden and the Viennese Actionists: Günter Brus, Otto 
Mühl and Rudolf Schwarzkogler.122 By subjecting themselves to situations of danger 
and/or mutilation these practices are understood to induce trance like state through an 
intensification of experience. These gestures physically display a form of abandonment, 
presenting the body in an indeterminate state that Turner describes in ritual theory as 
“betwixt and between”.123 The term liminality articulated this state that was presented, 
                                                          
119 In the Foreword to The Ritual Process Roger D. Abrahams describes how Turner’s identification of “betwixt and 
between” states became a theoretical resource to describe other cultures. Turner, The Ritual Process, viii. The 
expansion of the term liminality to other areas of discourse is the subject of the conference Liminality and Cultures of 
Change, 2009, hosted by Cambridge University. This conference is dedicated to “the exploration of the liminality 
paradigm as a conceptual tool and theoretical perspective for grasping moments of transformation of social, political 
and cultural life (Harald Dr. Wyd, The Centre for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities, 
http://www.crassh.cam.ac.uk /page/333/february-liminality.htm. (May 31, 2011). Bjorn Thomassen’s recent typology 
also demonstrates the expansion of the term.  His typology outlines the different applications of liminality, through its 
conceptual foundation in anthropology to the understanding of it in relation to civilisation dynamics. He observes 
how the theoretical use of the term ranges from describing the individual to whole societies and polities. Bjørn 
Thomassen, The Encyclopaedia of Social Theory (London, USA: Routledge, 2006). The term liminal is now 
frequently used in the area of the social sciences to interpret situations of political/social flux (i.e. borders, war zones, 
refugee camps, etc.) and other more abstract spaces of online activity. For more on liminality in relation to war zones, 
refugee camps and borders, see Jasper Balduk, “On liminality, Conceptualizing ‘in-between-ness',” Master Thesis of 
Human Geography (Nijmegen, June 2008) and in relation to online activity and social networking M. Savin-Baden, 
“After the death of privacy: Liminal states and spatial identities” in Threshold Concepts Symposium (Ontario: 
Queen’s University, Kingston, 2008). 
120 For example see: Susan Broadhurst, Liminal Acts: A Critical Overview of Performance and Theory (London, New 
York: Cassell, 1999). 
121 Schechner set up the first department of Performance Studies at the New York University in 1970. 
122 For more on the theorization of the Viennese Actionists and liminality see Broadhurst, Liminal Acts, 99-109 
123 In the Foreword to The Ritual Process Roger D. Abrahams describes how Turner’s identification of “betwixt and 
between” states became a theoretical resource to describe other cultures. Turner, The Ritual Process, viii. The 
expansion of the term liminality to other areas of discourse is the subject of the conference Liminality and Cultures of 
Change, 2009, hosted by Cambridge University. This conference is dedicated to “the exploration of the liminality 
paradigm as a conceptual tool and theoretical perspective for grasping moments of transformation of social, political 
and cultural life (Harald Dr Wyd, The Centre for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities, 
http://www.crassh.cam.ac.uk /page/333/february-liminality.htm. (May 31, 2011). Bjorn Thomassen’s recent typology 
also demonstrates the expansion of the term.  His typology outlines the different applications of liminality, through its 
conceptual foundation in anthropology to the understanding of it in relation to civilisation dynamics. He observes 
how the theoretical use of the term ranges from describing the individual to whole societies and polities. Bjørn 
Thomassen, The Encyclopaedia of Social Theory (London, USA: Routledge, 2006). The term liminal is now 
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both on a physical and symbolic level through these performative gestures. 
 
Liminality is instrumental in my post-conceptual practice because it offers an additional 
perspective to engage with the notion of being, particularly the quality of indeterminacy 
that I had been exploring through philosophical enquiry. My interest in liminality 
developed out of an engagement with the philosophical category of the sublime.124 
Although the sublime experience and the liminal state are not interchangeable terms 
they both suggest an intensification of experience in the subject that is described as a 
state of suspension. This likeness in meaning is not unfounded as they share the term 
limnal in their etymology. How natural phenomena such as expansive night skies, vast 
oceans and magnificent mountain ranges induce a feeling of suspension and 
indeterminacy has been theorised in philosophy, primarily in the writings of Edmund 
Burke (1729-1797), scientist and physician Thomas Addison (1793-1860), and 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), who developed the category of the sublime by 
systematically linking it with an experiential state. Addison designates the sublime a 
feeling of terror and awe, neither one feeling nor the other but an unsettling amalgam of 
two distinct experiences. Susan Broadhurst’s elaboration of Turner’s notion of the 
liminal state as “betwixt and between”, as a moment when  “feelings close to disquiet 
and discomfort are experienced” can be read in close alignment with Addison’s 
description of the sublime experience.125 I am not trying to conflate the sublime with 
liminality. I am merely reflecting back on my practice during this period to outline how 
the research project emerged. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
frequently used in the area of the social sciences to interpret situations of political/social flux (i.e. borders, war zones, 
refugee camps, etc.) and other more abstract spaces of online activity. For more on liminality in relation to war zones, 
refugee camps and borders, see Jasper Balduk, “On liminality, Conceptualizing ‘in-between-ness',” Master Thesis of 
Human Geography (Nijmegen, June 2008) and in relation to online activity and social networking M. Savin-Baden, 
“After the death of privacy: Liminal states and spatial identities” in Threshold Concepts Symposium (Ontario: 
Queen’s University, Kingston, 2008). 
124 The sublime has been thematised in literary art forms and certain novels, for example, a paragraph from Thomas 
Hardy’s Tess of the D’Urbervilles (1892) informed my solos-show I Am Somewhere Here (2006), Temple Bar 
Gallery and Studios. This paragraph is printed on the pamphlet for the exhibition: “’I don't know about ghosts,’ she 
was saying, ‘but I do know that our souls can be made to go outside our bodies when we are alive.’ The dairyman 
turned to her with his mouth full, his eyes charged with serious inquiry, and his great knife and fork (breakfasts were 
breakfasts here) planted erect on the table, like the beginning of a gallows. ‘What--really now? And is it so, maidy?’ 
he said. ‘A very easy way to feel 'em go,’ continued Tess, ‘is to lie on the grass at night and look straight up at some 
big bright star; and, by fixing your mind upon it, you will soon find that you are hundreds and hundreds o' miles away 
from your body, which you don't seem to want at all.’” Thomas Hardy, Tess of the D'Urbervilles (London, Penguin 
Classics, 2003), 147. 
125 Turner, The Ritual Process, viii, 95, 107, 138.  
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Figure 18: Research/Working Notebook. 
 
 
Liminality provided a useful perspective to reflect on my work. The openness of this 
term enabled me to reflect on the content of my drawings in two ways. Firstly it allowed 
an additional entry point to engage with the indeterminate quality of the immeasurable 
universe that I was attempting to render in Mapping Nihilion and The Clear 
Apprehension…  Other works such as The Anticipation of the Nothing that I am Faced 
With, (Fig.19) a drawing of a postcard featuring a black hole and The Searchers (Fig. 
20), mountaineering expedition moving slowly towards a void could also be considered 
as depicting liminal zones. Liminality enabled me to thematise my work without closing 
it down to further interpretation. As noted above, the term liminal can be used to 
designate real and/or symbolic spaces. The threshold state defined as liminal provided a 
theoretical perspective to engage with the phenomena depicted in Mapping Nihilion and 
The Clear Apprehension…as real or imaginary realms. Secondly, liminality enabled me 
to reflect on the subjective state of indeterminacy that unfolded through my drawings. 
This subjective state was literally presented in the in the transcribed statements. It could 
also be registered in a less explicit manner in the drawings. For example The 
Anticipation of the Nothing that I am Faced With and The Searchers suggest liminal 
states on a symbolic level.  The black hole in the Anticipation of the Nothing that I am 
Faced With suggests the indeterminate state of subjectivity. The four mountaineers in 
The Searchers seem suggest this subjective state. Like the void in this drawing, these 
figures emerge as empty spaces surrounded by densely rendered intricate pencil marks.  
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Figure 19: The Anticipation of the Nothing that I am Faced With (2006). 
Drawing (14.5 cm x 11 cm), Mark Gary, private collection. 
 
 
Figure 20: The Searchers (2002). 
Drawing, (120 cm x 70 cm), University of the Arts Collection, London. 
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Liminality also provided a theoretical perspective to engage with my own experience 
and my art practice because it provided a term to thematise the particular temporality 
that my art practice carved out. Liminal states are understood as temporal experiences 
that are “other” than our everyday experience of time. The anthropologist Colin 
Turnbull describes liminality as “a timeless state of being ... that lies parallel to our 
‘normal’ state of being, or is perhaps superimposed on it, or somehow coincides or 
coexists with it.”126 Liminality is understood to subvert chronological time. This 
subversion of time can take place on an experiential level, for example the everyday 
experience of time might be stretched or compressed through altered states in the 
liminal stage of ritual and on a symbolic level where the notion of time itself becomes 
inconsequential. As noted in the accounts of Mapping Nihilion and The Clear 
Apprehension… the time-consuming process of conducting these enquiries that 
informed these works necessitated my working through the night into the early hours of 
the morning.  
 
Working over this protracted period of time induced a sense of disorientation and 
remove – the jangled feeling one gets with sleep deprivation or a hangover, prompting a 
disengagement of the active, instrumental self. Although my experience was less 
extreme than trance-like states associated with those undergoing initiation rites, 
Turner’s interpretation of liminal state as “betwixt and between” articulated a similar 
“in-between” experience I had when making these drawings.127 Engaging in this 
practice carved out a temporal space that was different to and in this way set apart from 
my quotidian experience. The realisation that an art practice might institute an other 
space as an alternate experience and temporality is crucial to the enquiry because it 
informs the working definition of the research project. 
 
How I used liminality as a term to reflect on my experience while in the process of 
making these drawings is significant to the development of the research project because 
it initiated a turning point in my practice from a concern with the object to a greater 
concern with experience and how the process of conducting this particular form of 
enquiry through practice affected me.  Reflecting on my experience provoked me to 
consider how a similar experiential state might invoke others to think about the 
                                                          
126 Turnbull proposes this interpretation of liminality in Turnbull, “Liminality,” 80. 
127 See footnote 6 
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indeterminate state of existence. Instead of producing artworks for others to reflect on I 
became more concerned with extending my enquiry into subjective experiential state so 
that others could partake. This emerging concern with experience instigated a shift in 
my practice, moving the activities from the solitary realm of the studio to a more 
expansive and collective space. My seeking to extend philosophical enquiry through the 
rubric of liminality to others marks a turning point in my practice that led to the 
emergence of the event. 
 
 
2.2 Metaphysical Longings 
 
I approach Metaphysical Longings as an open process because this event-based work 
encompasses four iterations. For clarity these are named Metaphysical Longings II, III, 
IV and V. This work features as one of the three artworks that constitute the research 
project. The original event was first enacted in Pallas Heights in March 2006. Pallas 
Heights (now named Pallas Contemporary Projects) was located in five disused flats on 
the fourth floor in a social housing complex in Dublin’s inner city.128 I was invited by 
the directors to produce work specifically for this space prior to its demolition. When 
developing Metaphysical Longings my primary aim was to initiate a liminal experience. 
The intention of this work was to create a site-specific installation that would capture 
liminality by presenting the results of a collective experiential state that could be 
described as liminal. The event Metaphysical Longings was developed as a 
meditating/drawing session to support the synonymous exhibition in the flat as a site-
specific installation. This installation would be configured by the drawings produced by 
the group who had participated in the collective act of meditation. The event 
Metaphysical Longings was developed so that others might experience a threshold, 
indeterminate state associated with liminality directly. Although the framework of the 
event that was developed to support the production of the installation, it also sought to 
extend my engagement with philosophical ideas on the notion of indeterminacy to 
others. An open call for participants was advertised in the VAI, inviting thirteen 
individuals to visit the flat and participate in this event at dusk129 (Fig. 21).  
                                                          
128 Pallas Heights, now Pallas Contemporary Projects, is an artist-run gallery and studios in Dublin. As this complex 
was due for demolition Dublin City Council offered this to artists/directors Brian Duggan and Mark Cullen. 
129 The add in the VAI read: “An invitation to experience the infinite. Engage in an evening of esoteric exploration 
and share your experience. This twenty-minute meditation session suitable for both seers and sceptics will be 
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Figure 21: Invitation in the VAI Broadsheet (Visual Arts Ireland). 
 
 
Rather than engaging with liminality on a theoretical level, Metaphysical Longings 
sought to extend my exploration of indeterminacy to a wider collective. Using 
techniques associated with yoga nidra, this event sought to furnish a collective 
engagement with liminality more directly through processes used to intensify an 
experience that is “other”. The demolition of the site could be seen from the balcony 
adjacent to the room where the event took place. In advance of the event, the room was 
prepared by covering the entire floor with blankets (Fig. 22, 23). There is no 
documentation of this event because it was essential that the participants could fully 
immerse themselves in the process. The process of psychic sleep would be under-mined 
if the group realised that they were being photographed, let alone being watched. It is 
also important to note, that at this time, I did not see the event as an actual artwork, but 
as one of the processes used to support the development of what I believed at the time 
was the “actual” artwork – the site-specific installation. Very soon after the enactment 
of this event I realised that this was in fact a work in it’s own right (which will be the 
focus of the following discussion). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
followed by a picture drawing session. Tea and biscuits will be served to enhance endeavour. This event will take 
place at Pallas Heights on: Wednesday 22 March 6.30pm – 7.30. For booking and more information please contact 
Clodagh on 01-4741444 / emoe@ireland.com. (As Pallas Heights is soon to be levelled, limited space and time is 
available, booking is essential). This event is organised in conjunction with the exhibition ‘Metaphysical Longings’, 
preview on Friday 24 March at Pallas Heights.   
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Figure 22 & 23: View from balcony and interior of Pallas Heights, Dublin 1. 
 
 
Following the forty-minute yoga nidra session the group opened their eyes, finding 
themselves in a room bathed in salmon pink light. They remained on the floor while I 
distributed tea, drawing boards and coloured pencils and sheets of paper that read along 
the top, ‘Share your Experience’ (Fig. 24. The group was asked to respond through the 
process of drawing. While making these drawings they chatted openly about their 
experience. These clusters of conversations became more intimate as people disclosed 
to one another their own personal understanding of their being in the world. As the 
room got darker I lit candles and when the group were eventually ready to leave at 
nightfall I thanked them for coming and collected their drawings.  
 
 
 
Figure 24: Paper distributed to group during Metaphysical Longings. 
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The exhibition Metaphysical Longings as a site-specific installation opened three days 
later. The downstairs room in the flat where people had gathered three day previously to 
practice meditation and create drawings remained untouched. The blankets remained 
covering the floor. The drawings that were produced by the group were presented in a 
room upstairs. I presented these drawings as a series of slides projected on an old-
fashioned screen using a defunct slide projector (Fig. 25). The room was filled with 
mismatched chairs (borrowed from a nearby school) rendering the room inaccessible to 
an audience. The audience were required to encounter this work through a chink in the 
door (Fig. 26).  
 
 
   
Figures 25 & 26: Metaphysical Longings (2006). 
Site-specific installation (detail). 
 
 
 
2.2.1 The Emergence of the Event as an Artistic Form 
  
Metaphysical Longings marks a pivotal moment in my practice, where the event shifted 
from a supplementary feature of my practice to become an artistic form in its own right. 
Prior to embarking on the formal enquiry in 2008, I considered the event as 
supplementary to my practice, organising the event to support the exhibition of 
artworks. These events fulfilled a didactic role, offering further insight to the 
motivations and intentions of the work from the perspective of the artist. For example, 
events such as a public conversation with artists participating in the show I Am Here 
Somewhere, Project Space, IMMA (which ran concurrently with my solo exhibition I 
Am Somewhere Here at TBGS), functioned to provide the audience with further insight 
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into the concerns and intentions motivating my work.130 Such events are now a standard 
and are regarded as an essential feature within the overarching structure of a 
contemporary art exhibition. This is demonstrated by series of talks and seminars that 
feature within the scheduling of exhibitions, from artist-run spaces to large-scale 
biennials. It is also noteworthy how the presence of philosophers in large-scale biennials 
has proliferated globally over the last twenty years.131 
 
Recent art practice demonstrates a crossover between the event (discursive, didactic or 
otherwise) and the artwork.132 This is also exemplified by early post-conceptual 
practices, such as Piper’s Funk Lesson, and Helio Oiticica’s Parangolés (1964-1968) 
(2006) which uses dance to convey their message and both works deal with inclusivity 
by directly confronting issues surrounding race, gender and class. To recap, Funk 
Lesson was a series of social events where the artist, a woman of black extraction taught 
white people the moves and history of funk. Similarly, Parangolés repositioned the 
samba (a form of dance associated with carnival and the lower strata of Brazilian 
society) from the favella to the institutional, bourgeois space of the museum.133 Instead 
                                                          
130 I Am Somewhere Here, Project Room, IMMA, March 2014. Participating Artists: Anna Barham, UK, Naomi 
Bishop, Australia, Colin Crotty, Ireland, Vera Lossau, Germany, Camilla Lyon, UK, Belen Uriel, Spain, Tom 
Wolseley, UK. The Press release reads: 
“I am Here Somewhere, Clodagh Emoe’s current solo show at Temple Bar Gallery and Studios, articulates the 
inherent desire to succumb to the void whilst exposing the constraints, both physical and mental, of the human 
condition. I am Somewhere Here is a direct response by some of Clodagh Emoe’s peers to this show and their 
dialogue on themes that pertain to the notion of the void. Naomi Bishop’s paintings of observatories highlight the 
desire to connect with the unknown, while Colin Crotty’s work is concerned with memory and perception. Intrigued 
by nostalgic and idealistic senses indicative to that found in certain 20th century literature he establishes associations 
between the “parochial tale” and the classic novel. Belen Uriel’s photography and video work reference the sublime 
by capturing on film the dissipating landscape. By referencing the formal beauty of modernist architecture Camilla 
Lyon places emphasis on the often failed ideals that they represent. Anna Barham’s installation and sculptural objects 
enable for multiple possibilities, and for a bleeding between; relations seem to evolve in time. Tom Wolseley 
combines different media to make visible the linguistic manoeuvres he finds necessary to define himself, while Vera 
Lossau’s work could be understood as a dutiful awareness of self which is a persistent joy of enquiry into 
nothingness.” 
131 This has been observed by Osborne, who claims that there has been a “resurgence of interest in explicitly 
philosophical discourses about art over the last decade” by way of “a more affirmative turn towards the conceptual 
resources of the post-Kantian European tradition.” Osborne, "Art Beyond Aesthetics,” 8. This is also explored by the 
critic Dorethea Von Hentelmann, see essay “ The Rise of the Exhibition,” in Aesthetics and Contemporary Art, ed. 
Armen Avanessian & Luke Skrebowski, 249 (Berlin: Strenberg Press, 2011). p.178. 
132 The use of this discursive framework is demonstrated explicitly by works such as Cinema–in–the-Round (2008), 
the video lecture by Mark Leckey; Museum Highlights (1989), in which Andrea Fraser staged a tour of the 
Philadelphia Museum of Art; and Joseph Beuys’ Organization for Direct Democracy (Cinema–in–the-Round 
describes the relationship between object and image through film, television and video and featured in Leckey’s 
Turner prize winning exhibition Industrial Lights and Magic. By subverting the structure of the guided tour Fraser’s 
Museum Highlights performs institutional critique by encouraging the visitor to re-think the museum. For 
Organization for Direct Democracy Beuys established an information office that was open to initiate conversations 
on a range of topics including politics and art. Through this performance Fraser encourages the audience to re-think 
the museum.) For other examples of discursive practices see Curating the Educational Turn, ed. Mick Wilson and 
Paul O' Neil (Open Editions, 2010).  
133 The critic Anna Dezeuze observes, “The irruption of the poor into the bourgeois atmosphere of the museum 
caused such a scandal that the director had them evicted.” Anna Dezeuze, “Tactile Dematerialization, Sensory 
Politics, Hélio Oiticica’s Parangolés”, Art Journal, 63, no.2, Summer 2004, p.59. 
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of presenting the Parangolés as art works for exhibition, Oiticica invited dancers from 
Mangueira favella to wear these strangely fabricated capes and dance the samba for the 
opening of the exhibition Opinão 65, at the Museum of Modern Art in Rio.134 Although 
dancing the samba might not on the face of it seem to raise issues of inclusivity, 
Oiticica’s gesture of inviting this ostracised group to the privileged, bourgeois space of 
the museum and the counter decision of the director of the museum to evict the dancers 
raises issues of hegemony, control and inequality in a non-didactic manner. 
 
In 2006 I began to consider how the event might be used to frame and perform an 
enquiry in a non-didactic manner.135 As part of my solo show I Am Somewhere Here I 
developed a stargazing event with Astronomy Ireland on the rooftop of Temple Bar 
Gallery and Studios. The event Losing Ourselves sought to provide a space where the 
audience might engage with the philosophical category of the sublime which informed 
the works in the exhibition. I Am Here Somewhere was primarily informed by the 
aesthetic category of the sublime. My enquiry developed through these works to focus 
on the void, linking notions of nihilism and the unknown. This exhibition consisted of 
works that included The Change of Heart (After Yves Klein) (2006), a re-enactment of 
my attempting Klein’s famous Leap into the Void (1969); The End is in the Beginning 
(2006) (Fig. 28), a video piece documenting my fraught attempts to climb over walls; 
The Approach, a collage depicting a configuration of stars burnt into pages from a first-
edition publication; Approaches to Philosophy (1932) by J.F. Wolfenden and Comet 
(The Human Being is Death in the Process of Becoming) (2006), an etching of a comet 
that was projected to fill the gallery wall.136 (Figs. 27 - 30) reveal the entwinement of art 
and philosophy in my practice explicitly. The subtitle of Comet (that also captions the 
image of the comet, that was projected onto the wall from an etching on lens of the 
                                                          
134 Parangolés are textile-based structures that are designed to be worn and activated by the wearer. Parangolé is a 
slang Portuguese term that translates as spectrum of ideas and events related to “idleness, a sudden agitation, an 
unexpected situation, or a dance party.” Gilles Dezeuze, “Tactile Dematerialization, Sensory Politics, Hélio Oiticica’s 
Parangolés,” 59. 
135 Losing Ourselves exemplifies the internal logic in art and how meaning becomes enacted through process. It is 
worth noting that the stargazing session did not take place on the rooftop as intended, as there was ninety-five per 
cent cloud cover on the scheduled night. Instead, David Moore, the founder of Astronomy Ireland (not to be confused 
with the renowned astronomer Sir David Moore), presented a slide show projecting photographic documentation of 
the planets and stars in a studio space in TBGS. How the event unfolded as a substandard stargazing session 
articulated the physical restraints inhibiting awe-inspiring or transcendental forms of experience. 
136 The caption “The Human Being is Death in the Process of Becoming” that featured in this piece is a direct quote 
of Critchley’s relating to his reading of nihilism through Heidegger. Like Mapping Nihilion this work is also 
informed by Critchley’s publication Very Little Almost Nothing (2004). It is worth noting my engagement with 
Critchley’s philosophical thought in my practice prior to embarking on the formal enquiry was through my reading 
his works. Through my developing events as art works, my engagement with this philosopher was furthered through 
our direct collaboration on Mystical Anarchism.  
 65 
projector) is a quote borrowed from Critchley that summarises his analysis of 
Heidegger’s notion of being. The event Losing Ourselves aimed to draw out the ideas 
informing the work through suggestion rather than explicate the meaning of the works. 
Although I did not consider the event Losing Ourselves an artwork, my gesture of titling 
the event like one would an artwork indicates a developing awareness of the 
significance of the event and my realisation of its potential to do more than operate as 
an addition to, or a support mechanism for an exhibition.  
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Figure 27: The Change of Heart (After Yves Klein) (2006). 
Photographic print. 
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Figure 28: The End is in the Beginning (2006). 
Video, looped with sound (still). 
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Figure 29: Approaches to Philosophy (2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30: Comet (The Human Being is Death in the Process of Becoming) (2006). 
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As noted at the start of the discussion, Metaphysical Longings marks a pivotal moment 
in my practice where I became aware of the event as an artistic form. Metaphysical 
Longings developed the experimental and participatory approach that was used in the 
event Losing Ourselves. As outlined the original intention of Metaphysical Longings 
was to support the production of a series of drawings that would document a liminal 
experience. These drawings would be used to produce a site-specific installation. As 
noted in my reflections on the drawings, the notion of indeterminacy and impermanence 
that I was seeking to comprehend through my practice was simultaneously engendered 
on an experiential level through the process of working over a protracted period of time. 
In this way, making these drawings induced an experiential state that seemed 
disengaged from my everyday experience, a feeling of indeterminacy or “in-
betweeness” that I came to associate with forms of meditation, particularly the 
meditative practice of yoga nidra. The task of Metaphysical Longings was to turn this 
process on its head in an attempt to induce in others a similar experiential state through 
yoga nidra and to capture the outcome of this experience in a series of drawings.  
 
The premise of these drawings was to capture and present a liminal state as experienced 
by each individual who had practiced yoga nidra. For example the feeling of losing 
oneself that a person is said to experience practicing psychic sleep is indicated in the 
drawing by the black disembodied hands (Fig. 25). However, although many images 
were evocative, I realised the impossibility of fully capturing a liminal experience on 
paper. This insight informed my decision to present these drawings at a remove, in a 
space that could not be fully accessed. On reflection I realised that the event proved a 
more appropriate framework to allow others engage with liminality than my previous 
method of presenting my interpretation of liminality through drawings, because it 
provided a more dynamic and immediate framework for others to engage with 
liminality. The event offered a more dynamic and immediate framework by furnishing 
the possibility of experiencing a meditative state poised between sleep and wake 
through the practice of yoga nidra. However, I also realised that the event was a more 
appropriate form to capture a particular experience, than a series of drawings presented 
in the form of a site-specific installation. The event offered an artistic form that, albeit 
temporarily, captured liminality by enacting a space that furnished experiences one 
would associate with this threshold state. I realised what was most compelling was not 
the outcome, but the event itself.  
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2.2.2 Enacting Other Spaces   
 
Through Metaphysical Longings I sought to extend my engagement with philosophical 
thought to others by engaging with liminality. However, rather than engaging with 
liminality on a theoretical level, Metaphysical Longings sought to engage with 
liminality directly by initiating a temporality that is other to the everyday experience. 
This discussion presents how I formulate the working definition of the research project 
that seeks to enact an other space by describing the processes used in Metaphysical 
Longings to initiate an alternate temporality on an experiential and symbolic level.  
 
Specific processes are used in Metaphysical Longings to initiate an alternate temporality 
where others may engage with liminality directly. I focus on two, the technique of 
guided visualisation that I borrow from yoga nidra, and a process I have come to term as 
staging. In ritual theory, the liminal state is understood as an experiential state that 
moves beyond the structured realm of the ego. Forms of meditation associated with 
yoga nidra are also understood to disengage of the active, instrumental self or ego. Yoga 
nidra was developed by Swami Satyananda Saraswati as a technique to attain 
transcendental levels of consciousness and awareness. Yoga nidra is translated as 
psychic sleep and designates trance and other meditative states not constituted by 
sleeping and dream work. Teachers and practitioners claim psychic sleep is beyond or 
subtler than the imagery and mental process of the waking and non-lucid dreaming 
states. Psychic sleep trains the mind to become aware of the movement as the 
emergence and subsequent disappearance of specific thoughts, feelings and experiences. 
Through guided meditation the physical body is relaxed in order to activate 
consciousness, heighten awareness and in turn disengage the ego. This movement from 
the structured realm of the ego to an unstructured sub-conscious state occurs through an 
intensification of experience. It is claimed that practicing yoga nidra induces a greater 
sense of engagement and being with the world because it temporarily disengages a 
preoccupation with the self through an intensification of experience. 
 
I propose the meditative processes used in Metaphysical Longings can be registered as 
enacting an other space in the way that they initiate an alternate temporal experience for 
the practitioners. Metaphysical Longings employs the technique of guided visualisation 
associated with yoga nidra to lead to this disengagement with the self, refocusing the 
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attention from quotidian concerns that consume the mind through processes that re-
focus the awareness to the breath. Focusing on the breath relaxes the body and, in so 
doing, the mind. This process of letting go encourages the participant to enter into an 
alternate state of consciousness. Because psychic sleep is a meditative state that cannot 
be attained through regular sleep, the instruction “Do Not Sleep” is stated by the 
disembodied voice of the yogi throughout the session.137  In this way yoga nidra keeps 
consciousness active, creating an alternate experiential state where new forms of 
thought can unfold. Following this preliminary stage of the process of guided 
visualisation a series of instructions were given to the group to retrace their memory and 
consciousness backwards from the time of the present to first waking. This process of 
travelling back through time is performed in the mind of the participant by reflecting on 
the feelings experienced and the thoughts that arose over a specified time frame. By 
stating, “The past is part of time and time is part of your mind,” the voice invokes the 
capacity to initiate an alternate temporality.138  
 
The process of enacting “other” temporalities is furthered by the yogi’s instructions to 
visualise specific places and objects. Instead of engaging with these sets of instructions 
in a strictly cognitive and logical manner these forms can only be encountered through 
feeling, awareness, emotion and imagination. This raises the possibility of these 
temporalities to encourage ways of thinking about our being in the world on a 
perceptive level. Engaging with the notion of being through meditative processes 
radically differs from a philosophical approach that would require a lucid thought. 
Metaphysical Longings sought to offer a temporal other space for a group to gather and 
collectively re-engage with their being in the world through the collective activity of 
lying down together and practising meditation.  
 
                                                          
137 For this first iteration of Metaphysical Longings I used a recording from a yogi that I had on tape cassette.  
138 It is also interesting that the ancient Greeks had two words for time: chronos and kairos. While the former refers 
to chronological or sequential time the latter signifies an alternate temporality, an ‘in-between’ moment. Kairos 
implies a moment in which something significant might occur. For more on this see Giorgio Agamben, The Time 
That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans (California: Stanford University Press, 2005), 64.  
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Figure 31: Research/Working Notebook 
 
 
By revealing the possibility of an alternate way of being in the world, Metaphysical 
Longings can also be seen to initiate an other space on a symbolic level.  As outlined, 
yoga nidra re-shifts the focus from the individual to the collective or ‘dividual’ through 
the meditative process that is understood to disengage the ego.  Critchley coins the term 
‘dividual’ to articulate a shift in emphasis from the individual to the collective.139 His 
focus on the ‘dividual’ differs from the focus on the individual that is endorsed by the 
dominant political framework of liberal democracy.  
 
This notion of the ‘dividual’ that can be engaged with through the meditative processes 
used in the work is also played out through the presence of the collective. It is generally 
accepted that sharing an experience can enhance a sense of collectivity. This sense of 
collectivity became manifest in the dynamic following the groups’ participation in yoga 
nidra. This transformation to the dynamic amongst the group of strangers became 
apparent in the body language, as they remained reclining together on the mats, and the 
                                                          
139 Critchley uses this term in Mystical Anarchism to describe the mystics involved in the Movement of the Free 
Spirit. A transcript of the paper Mystical Anarchism is provided in the appendix of this thesis. 
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intimate conversations that opened up amongst the group. While the group were 
drawing they openly discussed their experience, not only the sensations they perceived 
during the meditation, but other experiences relating to their own personal lives. In this 
way Metaphysical Longings can also be seen to initiate an other space, albeit 
temporarily for the thirteen strangers that had gathered together. 
 
Staging designates the second process used in Metaphysical Longings to initiate an 
other space. I use the term staging to define the processes that institutes interplay 
between content and context. As noted in the Introduction, the term staging in theatre 
implies the use of temporary backdrops to create alternate, imaginary realms. Although 
Metaphysical Longings is not a performance, its enactment ultimately involves what the 
performance theorist Paul Thom observes as a “performance setting – a space set apart 
from the space of everyday life.”140 Thom also identifies the “performance occasion – a 
period of time structured for the purpose of that performance.”141 I have come to use the 
term staging to describe a process that acknowledges and plays with these particular 
elements, i.e. the location and the timing of the event. The process of staging in my 
work is not to transform the appearance of a space but to enact an other space on an 
experiential and symbolic level, and in so doing furnish interplay between content and 
context. The location plays a key role in how this work is encountered, experienced and 
potentially thought. My decision to enact this event in a flat that would soon cease to 
exist enhanced the symbolic meaning of the work, further implicating the notion of 
transience and impermanence on a subliminal level. The timing for Metaphysical 
Longings was also a crucial factor and it was purposefully scheduled to take place at 
6pm so that it would conclude at dusk. Enacting this work during the ‘magic hour’ also 
operates on a symbolic level, a particular moment when something significant might 
happen.142 This strategy of enacting the event at dusk also enhanced the experiential 
aspect of the work – on waking the group found themselves in a room that had been 
                                                          
140 David Davies, Philosophy of the Performing Arts (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011) 174. 
141 Davies, Philosophy of the Performing Arts, 174. 
142 The ‘magic hour’ is described by the cinematographer Nestor Almendros as, "a euphemism, because it's not an 
hour but around 25 minutes at the most. It is the moment when the sun sets, and after the sun sets and before 
nightfall. The sky has light, but there is no actual sun. The light is very soft, and there is something magic about it.” It 
is clear the significance of this moment when Almendros observes that, “It limited us to around twenty minutes a day, 
but it did pay on the screen. It gave some kind of magic look, a beauty and romanticism." Arnold Glassman, Todd 
McCarthy, Stuart Samuels (1992), "Visions of Light: The Art of Cinematography". Kino International. The ‘magic 
hour’ was used as a cinematic device in Days of Heaven (1978) directed by Terrance Mallick, who worked in close 
collaboration with the cinematographer Nestor Almendros and modelled the filming using little or no studio lights, a 
pared-back technique not used since the silent movies of the 1920s. 
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radically transformed by the peach glow from the setting sun. Techniques of staging 
were also employed to prepare the space for the event. This modest intervention of 
covering the entire floor of the room in blankets operates on a practical and symbolic 
level by demarcating a space for a collective gathering.  
 
The possibility of Metaphysical Longings to initiate an other space on an experiential 
and symbolic level is key to the development of the enquiry because it reveals how an 
artwork might raise philosophical ideas in a non-didactic manner. This insight suggests 
how an artwork could potentially engender thought while allowing me to reflect on the 
thinking that might be raised through this work and how it differs from a way of 
thinking associated with the discipline of philosophy as it is academically practiced. As 
outlined, the meditative process rules out certain ways of thinking associated with the 
academic practice of philosophy, such as theory building and argumentation demanding 
less rational, more perceptive and imaginative forms of engagement. I also observe how 
the process of staging used in the enactment of Metaphysical Longings informs how the 
work is encountered and perceived.  These insights support my provisional claim that 
the thinking raised by art is bound with experience. 
 
 
2.3 Summary 
 
The reflective discussions on my early work contextualises the enquiry by proving an 
entry point into my post-conceptual practice. The first part of this chapter presents the 
motivation for my undertaking an enquiry into the philosophical character of 
contemporary art. Through this discussion I introduce and explain the term entwinement 
that I use to describe the engagement between the domains of art and philosophy in my 
practice. By presenting The Clear Apprehension… and Mapping Nihilion as artefacts 
that reveal my engagement with philosophical enquiry I clarify how I approach my 
practice as offering a temporal space for thought. A discussion focusing on liminality is 
offered to introduce the term liminality as it was first conceived in the field of 
anthropology, how this term extended into other fields of practice and how I employ 
this term in my practice as a alternate perspective to engage with the existential question 
of being. I outline how my engagement with liminality introduces a new concern in my 
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practice with experience and motivates a desire to extend a space of thought to others on 
an experiential level.  
 
The second part of the chapter presents the foundations of the research project and 
describes how the event emerged as a framework that enabled me to extend my 
engagement with philosophical thought to others and concurrently enabled others to 
engage with liminality more directly through actual experience. Through a reflective 
analysis I describe the processes used in Metaphysical Longings to initiate an 
experience that could be defined as a liminal state. I reflect on how these processes 
might raise the philosophical notion of being.  
 
These discussions invariably demonstrate that the process of reflection is integral to my 
practice and accordingly the research project. It is worth noting that registering the 
motivation for the enquiry and the development of the research project is only possible 
when there is distance from the work. It is important to stress that my decision to use 
the event as the framework to explore the philosophical character of contemporary art 
by examining the engagement between contemporary art and philosophy and 
investigating how artworks implicate and potentially activate philosophical thought not 
a concerted decision but emerged through my practice. These decisions, which are 
registered in this chapter, were not made in a definitive manner but rather emerged in an 
intuitive way through the process of making and presenting work. This differentiates the 
methodology of the research as explorative in that it does not strictly adhere to a linear 
form of pre-planning. As demonstrated through the lineage of my work, the 
development of the research project was not planned in advance of embarking on the 
formal enquiry but rather emerged and unfolded out of and through the practice. This 
insight is significant to the enquiry because it reveals that the thinking raised through a 
post-conceptual practice follows a similar process of unfolding.  
 
By describing how philosophical enquiry, liminality, event, experience and thought are 
all integrally linked within my practice this chapter contextualises the research project 
as the development and enactment of event-based works that seek to enact other spaces. 
Although my practice reveals an entwinement of artistic processes and philosophical 
enquiry, the processes used in the enactment of Metaphysical Longings are not those 
readily associated with the discipline of philosophy. The enactment of Metaphysical 
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Longings presents the possibility of raising philosophical ideas implicitly in a non-
didactic, nuanced manner in the manner that it is determined by and dependant on the 
artistic form of the event. This insight is key because it informs a provisional claim that 
the thinking raised by art is bound with experience.  
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CHAPTER THREE: INAESTHETICS AND THE REVELATION OF THOUGHT 
 
 
3.0 Overview 
 
This chapter is organised in three parts to present how inaesthetics provides a theoretical 
guide to explore the philosophical character of art. This exploration is undertaken by 
investigating the possibility of art to implicate and activate a particular form of thought. 
Although Badiou does not identify a philosophical characteristic in art, through 
inaesthetics he registers art (via the poem) as “itself a form of thought”.143 Because 
Badiou recognises this form of thought as specific, in that it is “inseparable from the 
sensible” and that it “grants itself the right to the inexplicit”, inaesthetics provides a 
theoretical guide to explore the capacity of art to implicate thought, without conflating 
the domain of art with that of philosophy.144  
 
My reading of inaesthetics is predominantly informed by Badiou’s Handbook of 
Inaesthetics (1998), a series of his papers and secondary readings that disclose how 
inaesthetics reveals the thinking raised by art.145 The first part of this chapter provides 
an account of inaesthetics, outlining how it designates a new schema between art and 
philosophy that is against speculative aesthetics and proposes to reveal thought in art. 
Speculative aesthetics is a term Badiou uses to designate the Hegelian model of 
aesthetics as philosophy’s discourse on art.146 Because this reading of aesthetics infers 
the interpretative role of philosophy in relation to art, philosophy is understood as the 
locus of truth and accordingly the bearer of meaning. Badiou’s radical reappraisal of the 
role of philosophy is outlined in a brief account of evental philosophy, his overarching 
system of thought that establishes the theoretical foundations of inaesthetics. It is 
important to note that Badiou’s philosophical reading of event as novelty is different to 
my reading of event as a term that designates a specific type of artistic form. However, 
                                                          
143 Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 19. 
144 Ibid. 
145 My research also focuses on Badiou’s papers, including Philosophy and Desire, presented in Sydney in 1999 and 
Fifteen Theses on Contemporary Art, 2003, presented at the Drawing Centre, New York. I also look to commentaries 
on Badiou’s evental philosophy and inaesthetics by Peter Hallward, Gabriel Riera, Sam Gillespie, Jean-Jacques 
Lecercle, Alberto Toscano and A. J. Barlett. 
146 To read more about speculative aesthetics see Ellie During. During argues that inaesthetics fails to undermine 
speculative aesthetics, claiming inaesthetics essentially performs the same task as what it is claimed to resist, see 
During, E. (2005). How Much Truth Can Art Bear (M. Wilkens, ed.) Polygraph, 17 (The Philosophy of Alain 
Badiou), 143-155.  
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although both readings differ, it is essential to analyse Badiou’s event because it informs 
inaesthetics by asserting the possibility of artistic truths. Although this enquiry is not 
seeking to explore artistic truths it is necessary to clarify how Badiou asserts the 
possibility of artistic truths to engage with the primacy of art for thought. The 
discussion explicates how Badiou’s evental philosophy asserts the primacy of art for 
thought through a re-conception of philosophy so that it may be conditioned by art, and 
not vice-versa. Through evental philosophy Badiou relocates thought from the external 
site of philosophy to the immanent space of art. Moving from evental philosophy I 
outline how Badiou formulates inaesthetics as a new schema to engage with the 
condition of thought in art. These discussions that constitute the first part of this chapter 
function to substantiate my decision to use inaesthetics as a theoretical guide for the 
enquiry.  
 
The second part of this chapter presents an explorative analysis of the term 
intraphilosophical effect, a term that he asserts in the epigraph. This task is not without 
difficulties because Badiou does not provide a definition of this term. Instead he 
discloses its meaning through his reflections on the poetry of Mallarmé in the 
Handbook.147 Although the research project does not consist of poems, I maintain that 
Badiou’s method of registering the intraphilosophical effect of the poem as an 
“operation” that activates the “sensory perception of a regime of thought” can be 
deployed to explore how thought may be engendered through the event-based works 
that constitute the research project.148 This is mainly because our general reading of art 
in its contemporary sense is informed by the Romantic conception of the poem.149 I 
support the applicability of this method by looking to Osborne who maintains that our 
general reading of art in its contemporary sense is informed by the Romantic conception 
of the poem.150 I also look to Heiser and Verwoert curatorial project Romantic 
Conceptualism that deploys a similar method through their poetic treatment of 
conceptualism.151 Just as Badiou reflects on the “operation” as an open process in 
                                                          
147 Badiou focuses on Mallarmé’s Un Coup de Dés [The Throw of the Dice] (1897) and L’Apres-midi d’un Faune, 
[The Afternoon of the Fawn] (1876). He also looks to the writings of Rimbaud, Celan, Milosz, ben Rabi’a, Rimbaud 
the novels of Pessoa and the plays of Samuel Beckett.  
148 Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 19. 
149 Osborne, "Art Beyond Aesthetics, Philosophical Criticism, Art History and Contemporary Art," 22. 
150  
151 Verwoert also asserts the position that our general reading of contemporary art is informed by what he terms as the 
“event of Romanticism”. Verwoert names it as such because he reads the artistic and philosophical discourse of 
Romanticism around 1800 as the “threshold to the modern age –.” Verwoert, Romantic Conceptualism, Romantic 
Conceptualism, ed. Ellen Seifermann and Christine Kintisch. (Germany: Kerber Verlag, 2007), 165-175. 
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Mallarmé’s poem, Verwoert performs a similar poetic analysis, revealing how specific 
conceptual artworks similarly “operate” as an open process that activates thought.152 (It 
is worth noting that Verwoert’s revisionist reading of conceptualism reveals Novalis’s 
use of the term “operation’” anticipates Mallarmé.) Romantic Conceptualism is 
significant for this enquiry because it presents the possibility of art to invite thought 
while supporting my provisional claim that the thinking raised by art is bound with 
experience. I outline how this revisionist reading asserting experience within the 
mediatory process of conceptualism and in so doing opens up a narrow reading of 
conceptualism as a “purely logical inquiry [sic.]” by focusing on Verwoert’s reflections 
on Robert Barry’s conceptual propositions and Heiser’s interview with Susan Hiller. I 
also look to Peter Lamarque’s poetic treatment of conceptual art to develop my 
proposition that the thinking raised by art is perceived through the encounter. These 
insights are brought to bear in the following chapter in the analysis of the event-based 
works that configure the research project.  
 
 
3.1 Badiou’s Event – Novelty, The Possibility of Truths and Setting the Conditions 
for New Regimes of Thought 
 
Because the event is a prevalent theme within philosophical systems of thought, this 
term cannot be used in an equivocal manner. While the philosophy of event forms the 
philosophical systems of Friedrich Nietzsche, Jean-François Lyotard, the later work of 
Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida’s philosophy of différance (a deliberate 
misspelling of différence). Badiou’s event is configured in a different manner to these 
systems of thought. Badiou describes how the event has become a common term for a 
large number of contemporary philosophers, identifying this in Heidegger as ereignis 
and in Wittgenstein’s understanding of “the world as everything which happens.”153 
Badiou’s event departs from these readings by articulating a point of interruption, 
describing the structural dimension of the event as novelty, through the appearance of 
the supernumerary term. Badiou’s interpretation of event as novelty is predominantly 
informed by Gilles Deleuze.154 Deleuze interprets novelty as the emergence and 
                                                          
152 Verwoert, Romantic Conceptualism, 174. 
153  Badiou, “The Event in Deleuze,”  
154 For more on Deleuze’s event see Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, ed. Constantin V. Boundas, trans. Mark 
Lester and Charles Stivale (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969). 
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enactment of new forms through which we engage and think about the world. Deleuze 
designates event as the appearance of things in the world. Under these conditions the 
framework of the world is conceived to generate novelty, and thus the source of event. 
Badiou’s commentator, Sam Gillespie observes that Badiou’s reading of novelty departs 
from Deleuze in relation to locating the emergence of these forms. Badiou inverts the 
source of the Deleuzian event and locates it outside of the “contemporary world”.155 
This is because Badiou maintains a steadfast conviction that the contemporary world in 
its current neo-liberal configuration is “hostile to truths.” 156  
 
It is necessary to address the complex issue of truths because this underlies Badiou’s 
event. It seems extraordinary to encounter a contemporary philosopher adhering to a 
notion of truth following developments in post-modern thought. However, Peter 
Hallward argues that Badiou’s adherence to the concept of truth is not “merely nostalgic 
commitment,” but is more radical in its resolve to respond to the condition of our 
times.157 To explain, Badiou’s adherence to truth is not an adherence to totality, because 
it sustains the post-modern position that there is no absolute and singular Truth.158 
Instead Badiou adheres to a notion of truths. By acknowledging the possibility of truths, 
Badiou presents a new reading of philosophy that departs from the three orientations 
(traditions) that he identifies in contemporary philosophy. Badiou identifies these as 
hermeneutic, analytic and post-modern and proposes that underlying each is a concern 
with meaning. Badiou claims the hermeneutic orientation centres on meaning through 
its focus on the interpretation of being and affiliates this orientation with German 
Romanticism and the work of Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamar.159 Badiou 
                                                          
155 Sam Gillespie, The Mathematics of Novelty, Badiou's Minimalist Metaphysics (Melbourne: re.press, 2008), 14. 
156 Ibid 
157 Peter Hallward, “Introduction,” in Think Again: Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy (London/New York: 
Continuum, 2004), xxiv. 
158 Like Jean-François Lyotard, Badiou registers the impossibility of a single construct to reconcile the “plurality of 
registers and language in thought [and] in action.”. Badiou acknowledges “… the post-modern orientation holds the 
aim of philosophy to be the deconstruction of the accepted facts of our modernity. In particular post-modern 
philosophy proposes to dissolve the great constructions of the nineteenth century to which we remain captive – the 
history of the historical subject, the idea of progress, the idea of revolution, the idea of humanity and the ideal of 
science. Its aims show that these great constructions are outdated, that we live in the multiple, that there are no great 
epics of history or of thought; that there is an irreducible plurality of registers and languages in thought as in action; 
registers so diverse and heterogeneous that no great idea can totalize or reconcile them. At base, the objective of post-
modern philosophy is to deconstruct the idea of totality – to the extent that philosophy itself finds itself de-
stabilised.” Alain Badiou, Infinite Thought, Truth and the Return to Philosophy, ed. Oliver Feltman and Justin 
Clemens, trans. Oliver Feltman and Justin Clemens (London/New York: Continuum, 2005), 32. 
159 “The hermeneutic orientation assigns philosophy the aim of deciphering the meaning of being, the meaning of 
being-in-the-world, and its central concept is that of interpretation. There are statements, acts, writings and 
configurations whose meanings are obscure, latent, hidden or forgotten. Philosophy must be provided with a method 
of interpretation that will serve to clarify this obscurity, and bring forth from it authentic meaning, a meaning which 
would be a figure of our destiny in relation to the destiny of being itself.” Badiou, Infinite Thought, 32. 
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maintains that the rules of meaning are the predominant concern of the analytic 
orientation, seeing this emerging out of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Rudolf Carnap’s 
theories on language.160 Badiou identifies the concern with meaning in the post-modern 
orientation through Jacques Derrida and Jean-François Lyotard’s contestation of the 
Grand Narrative.161 Because Badiou claims these philosophical traditions centre on 
meaning, he argues contemporary philosophy in each of its guises performs a departure 
from a “truth-orientated philosophy” to a philosophy that becomes a meditation on 
language, an enquiry into “techniques of utterances and sites for enunciation.”162 The 
problem with this departure from the classical ideal of truth for Badiou is that 
philosophical problems become grammatical problems. According to Badiou, this 
emphasis on language implicitly debilitates thought.163 The commitment to the 
possibility of event and its capacity to transform the current socio-political situation 
demonstrates Badiou as an interventionist thinker.164 From this position, Hallward 
argues Badiou’s evental philosophy as offering a new philosophical system to engage 
with the contemporary condition.165 
 
Although Badiou’s reading of the contemporary world appears nihilistic, his adherents 
claim evental philosophy offers a system to re-engage in a more optimistic and 
ultimately more proactive level with the contemporary world.166 Badiou deploys the 
mathematical term the “state of the situation” to designate what is permitted 
representation in the world.167 The state of the situation articulates what is presented or 
                                                          
160 “The analytic orientation holds the aim of philosophy to be the strict demarcation of those utterances which have 
meaning and those which have not. The aim is to demarcate what can be said and what it is impossible or illegitimate 
to say. The essential instrument of analytic philosophy is the logical and grammatical analysis of utterances, and 
ultimately of the entire language … the central concept is not the interpretation, but the rule.” Badiou, Infinite 
Thought, 32. 
160 Badiou, Infinite Thought, 37. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Jean-Jacques Lecercle, “Badiou's Poetics”, Think Again, Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy, ed. Peter 
Hallward (London, New York: Continuum, 2009), 208. 
163 Badiou seeks to resist the linguistic turn demonstrated in the analytic school by Wittgenstein or the continental 
tradition by Heidegger through hermeneutics in which language determines enquiry as in Badiou’s opinion “… 
language is not the absolute horizon of thought.” Badiou, “The Desire for Philosophy.” 
164 This form of intervention is evidenced by Badiou’s understanding of philosophy as the space of revolt, claiming 
that “the desire of philosophy implies a dimension of revolt: there is no philosophy without the discontent of thinking 
in its confrontation with the world as it is.” In order to activate this point of interruption and to sustain the task of 
revolt in philosophy there needs at least one unconditional requirement - the necessity for the “reconstruction or re-
emergence of the category of truth.” Badiou, Infinite Thought, 36-37 and Hallward, Think Again, Alain Badiou, xxiv.  
165 Hallward, Think Again: Alain Badiou, xxiv. 
166 Riera, Alain Badiou, Philosophy and its Conditions, 2. 
167 Badiou draws on Cantor’s mathematical axioms to define how the emergence of truth originates from within the 
“state of the situation” (but not yet registered) to transform it. The axiom of the void articulated in Cantor’s set theory 
is fundamental in the formation of Badiou’s conjectures on ontology. It is important to outline that the void is not 
identical to nothingness; rather, the axiom of the null set demonstrates that although appearing empty, the empty set 
has a property that can be identified as designating a set to which no elements belong. In short, the dualistic aspect of 
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what can be represented in the world as it is configured, while concurrently 
acknowledging the forms such as thought that are not yet represented. This 
mathematical term defines the presentation of sets and the structural relations that 
validate their presentation.168  Badiou borrows this term to articulate what can be 
presented in the world as it is socially and politically constructed. Through this term, 
Badiou concurrently acknowledges the forms (be they physical entities in space or 
temporal abstract ideas) which are not represented. In this way Badiou’s event differs 
from the Deleuzian event through its emergence within gaps that are not registered by 
the “state of the situation”. In relation to art, Badiou claims the state of the situation 
endorses and maintains formulaic artistic configurations.169 These formulaic artistic 
configurations conform to standardisation that Badiou maintains is indicative of the 
regulative forces of the global market. Badiou links this flattening of culture with the 
loss of political agency because, he argues, the proliferation of generic artistic forms 
represses the development of more critical forms of practice and thought through 
exclusion and repression. Badiou articulates the state of the situation in the Handbook 
by claiming, “there is only one politics, or as they say, ‘there is no alternative’.” 170 
  
However, rather than accepting that there is no alternative, Badiou engages with this 
challenge by presenting the possibility of truths as moments of confrontation with the 
“state of the situation.”171 Bearing witness to these forms not yet represented requires a 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the void advanced in set theory as a “universally included set that belongs to no one in particular” asserts a “radical 
infinity beyond all possible proofs of construction.” Within set theory the void or null set {Ø} designates the gaps 
that are not registered by the state of the situation. As the null set can be thought and located within the state of the 
situation, inconsistency of this state is demonstrated. This radical infinity beyond all possible proofs of construction 
enables an understanding of the emergence of the event as the presentation of the void which had been previously 
prohibited by the state of the situation. The event as truth procedure enables this ever present but prohibited void to 
emerge through its recognition. The event points to the inconsistency within a situation held together and through its 
enactment marks a rupture that enables the emergence of a previously imperceptible truth. In this way an event is 
understood as the supplementation of apparition (l’apparaître) outside of the state of the situation transforming it by 
overturning a given state of affairs. Badiou, Infinite Thought, 36-37 and Gillespie, The Mathematics of Novelty, 14 
168 What is distinctive about Badiou’s system of thought is not only an adherence to the possibility and actuality of 
truths, but his use of mathematics to conceive of truths. Badiou refers to mathematics as the place of ontology 
because he argues it as sustaining an objective enquiry into being. Badiou identifies mathematics as offering technical 
and conceptual tools to register the inconsistencies in how the contemporary world is presented.  Mathematics 
provides the resource to engage and elucidate the anomaly articulated by the state of the situation and to conceive of 
the emergence of truth as transforming this state.  
169 He articulates this, claiming, “The name ‘culture’ comes to obliterate that of ‘art’.” Alain Badiou, Saint Paul, The 
Foundations of Universalism, trans. Ray Brassier (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 12. 
170 Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 52. Badiou’s sentiment is also articulated by the term capitalist realism. 
Fisher’s publication is is aptly subtitled …is there no alternative? Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism: Is There No 
Alternative? (UK: Zero Books, 2009). Fisher re-appropriates the term capitalist realism from Michael Schudson, who 
coined the term in the mid 1980s to describe the realism of advertising as advancing the lifestyle of individual 
consumerism over social integration and the betterment of community. Fisher co-opts this term to describe the 
overriding sense of resignation with the current socio-political situation.  
171  Alain Badiou, “Aristotle Book II Being: Excess, State of the Situation, One/Multiple, Whole/Parts, or Î/Ì,” Being 
and Event (London: Bloomsbury Continuum, 2007). How Badiou conceives this concept is explicated succintly by 
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new way of thinking. This new way of thinking is precisely how Badiou conceives 
novelty. Novelty suggests a critical and transformative position because it challenges 
the limitations to thought by re-thinking and engaging with the contemporary world. By 
locating novelty in the point of interruption Badiou registers truths to rupture existing 
knowledge. A.J. Bartlett describes how this break with doxa performs novelty by setting 
the conditions for new regimes of thought.172 Bartlett describes how Badiou’s event 
presents the link between the possibility of truths and the capacity to engender thought 
by identifying truths as evental sites that witness and re-think the world. Badiou sees 
evental sites as points of interruption that radically reconfigure previous forms of 
thought.  
 
Badiou locates evental sites in mathematics, politics, art and love because in each of 
these sites Badiou observes the possibility to radically reconfigure previous forms of 
thought. Although my enquiry is focused on art and not maths, politics or love, it is 
necessary to register that Badiou treats these four non-philosophical fields as evental 
sites, because it presents philosophy in a radically new way. The significance of this for 
the enquiry is that under Badiou’s system of thought, philosophy can no longer be 
regarded as the domain of truth, since philosophy “deals with truths it does not 
produce.”173 By registering the truths in mathematics, politics, art and love Badiou 
overwrites the privileged realm of philosophy as the locus of truth. Under these terms 
philosophy cannot impose meaning on the artistic form because it may only operate as 
the “go-between in our encounters with truth.”174 Badiou outlines, if philosophy is to 
contest the state of the situation “philosophy must examine the possibility of a point of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Riera. Riera, Alain Badiou, Philosophy and its Conditions,11. 
172 Badiou elucidates novelty through his reading of the Pauline event. Although Badiou is a confirmed atheist he 
draws on the conversion of St. Paul to describe how a truth procedure interrupts the order of knowledge by attaching 
itself to the void within a situation. In the case of the Pauline event, the void of the situation is revealed as Christ’s 
resurrection, a fable or myth becoming the truth for an emergent community sustained by St. Paul’s fidelity to this 
truth in his Messianic vocation. The universal address of St. Paul reveals an inconsistency in the state of the situation 
in relation to community, through the previous separation of Jew and non-Jew. This inconsistency is reversed in the 
Pauline event by St. Paul’s inclusive address to all. Badiou registers novelty in the Pauline event through the 
acknowledgement of an indiscernible multiplicity.  
173 Under these conditions philosophy can never be the source of the event, but functions to expose the truths as the 
‘void’ of the situation which was previously hidden. A useful way to demonstrate an event in art is by looking to the 
critic Thomas Hess, who observes that “abstract art has always existed, but until this century it never knew it 
existed.” This observation demonstrates how philosophy can be seen to operate under the condition of art.  Rather 
than imposing meaning on abstract art through interpretation, the philosophical role is that of registering the 
emergence of an artistic truth through the event of abstract painting. By identifying the event of abstract painting 
Hess’s analysis also demonstrates how a truth procedure emerges – not as or through a single artwork but through the 
accumulation of these ‘forms’ as configurations. Art and philosophy are thus interlinked through the enactment and 
recognition of truth as a regime of thought that transforms the previous situation. Hess, Abstract Painting, 131 quoted 
in Danto, History and Theory, 127-143. 
174 Riera, Alain Badiou, Philosophy and its Conditions, 69. 
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interruption” so that thought can “extract itself from this circulation and take possession 
of itself once again.”175 As outlined in the overview the task of my enquiry is not to 
examine the truth in art, but to explore the condition of thought in art. In advancing 
artistic truths Badiou’s evental philosophy advances the primacy of art for thought. This 
insight plays a determining role in Badiou’s configuration of inaesthetics. 
 
 
3.1.1 Inaesthetics – A New Relation of Philosophy to Art  
 
“By ‘inaesthetics’, I understand a relation of philosophy to art that, 
maintaining that art is itself a producer of truths, makes no claim to turn 
art into an object for philosophy. Against aesthetic speculation, 
inaesthetics describes the strictly intraphilosophical effects produced by 
the independent existence of some works of art.”176 
 
 
Inaesthetics presents a radically new engagement between art and philosophy that 
departs from speculative aesthetics. As outlined in Chapter One the troubling of 
aesthetics in art practice was instrumental in the development of a contemporary 
reading of art because it initiated the emergence of thought as an essential condition of 
art. Why might this departure from aesthetics be important to Badiou and how does this 
bear on the condition of thought in art?  
 
Badiou claims the critical value of inaesthetics because it ensures the revelation of new 
regimes of thought, presenting inaesthetics as a philosophical project that departs from 
the task of defining art. By positing inaesthetics “against speculative aesthetics” Badiou 
confronts the problematic relation between contemporary art and aesthetics. By stating 
inaesthetics “makes no claim to turn art into an object for philosophy” Badiou registers 
a new task for philosophy that overwrites philosophy’s interpretative role. Badiou 
positions inaesthetics against speculative aesthetics because he sees this schema as 
imposing a false truth on art. Badiou configures inaesthetics as a new schema that 
                                                          
175 Badiou, Infinite Thought, 29. 
176 Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, Epigraph. 
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disrupts this imposition and sustains a new engagement between the domains so that 
philosophy instead reveals the truths engendered in the way that art thinks.177  
 
Badiou uses the metaphorical term “knot” to define inaesthetics. He configures 
inaesthetics as a schema that sustains reciprocity between art and philosophy. He 
formulates this schema in response to three previous schemata that are, didactic 
(platonic), classical (Aristotelian) and Romantic (hermeneutic). Badiou identifies these 
schemata as designating particular relationships between art and philosophy, claiming 
they sustain “closure” because they are lacking the resources to reveal truths. Badiou 
maintains that these schemata further undermine the fulfilment of new regimes of 
thought by imposing a false truth on art. Badiou’s three schemata follow Hegel’s stages 
or categories.178 Like Hegel Badiou defines each schema by the relationship of art to 
philosophy, using Hegel’s categories (although he uses the term didactic to designate 
Hegel’s symbolic stage). It is worth noting that Badiou makes no reference Hegel. I 
venture this omission of Hegel is not an oversight on Badiou’s part, but rather an 
ineffective strategy to distance inaesthetics from a Hegelian aesthetics.  
 
Badiou maintains that contemporary art cannot be approached philosophically through 
the previous schemata because they prohibit reciprocity between art and philosophy 
which is essential for the possibility of engendering of thought.179 According to Badiou 
the didactic and classical schemata undermine arts primacy for thought by privileging 
philosophy as the site for thought. Badiou outlines how this occurs in the didactic 
schema that is informed by a Platonic understanding of art as a form of mimesis. Rather 
than reading art as an imitation of things, i.e. a form of representation, the Platonic 
understanding of art is that it is an imitation of truth itself. Under these conditions art is 
not the locus of truth but as a semblance of truth. “The charm of the semblance of truth” 
indicates a false truth, and as a false truth art must be placed under the control of 
philosophy.180 This suspicion of art is articulated by the explicit rejection of art from 
                                                          
177 Toscano claims, “Badiou’s approach is committed both to declaring the autonomy of artistic procedures (poetic or 
literary, cinematic or theatrical) and to registering what he calls their “intraphilosophical effects.” (See the epigraph 
to this volume)” Alberto Toscano, “Introduction” Handbook of Inaesthetics, ed. Werner Hamacher, trans. Alberto 
Toscano (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2005), x. 
178 Danto, Hegel’s End of Art Thesis, 7. 
179 He describes the current cultural situation as one of “saturation and closure”, referring to the proliferation of 
artistic forms that delineate and restrict the cultural horizon. Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 2 & 8. 
180 The platonic gesture of excluding art from the polis of his idealised Republic demonstrates Plato’s suspicion of art. 
Plato’s suspicion is indicative of how he interprets art in relation to truth. Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 2. 
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Plato’s Republic. Plato rejected art because he maintained truth emerges from the 
rigorous process of reasoning founded on first principles of philosophy. Badiou outlines 
how the classical schema undermines art’s primacy through the Aristotelian 
development of Platonic understanding of art as mimetic. In the classical schema 
Aristotle subverts Plato’s suspicion of art as threatening the first principles of 
philosophy by advancing art as providing a cathartic function. As truth is not immanent 
to art, the classical emphasis on verisimilitude renders art beyond suspicion. The 
Marxist philosophy of language, Jean-Jacques Lecercle reflects on Badiou’s inaesthetic 
reading of the poem. Lecercle articulates how speculative aesthetics sustains the 
classical emphasis on verisimilitude by observing, “The poem is no longer a source of 
knowledge but has become the object of the theoretical gaze of the philosopher, on a par 
with natural phenomena, and no longer concerned with truth but only verisimilitude.”181 
Under the didactic and classical schemata artistic forms require interpretation from an 
external source because artistic truths are neither singular nor immanent. Badiou 
maintains that the didactic and classical schema cannot ensure the revelation of new 
regimes of thought because they do not recognise truth as immanent or singular to art.  
 
Lecercle observes that the Romantic schema corresponds with Badiou’s understanding 
that artistic truth is immanent. The Romantic schema, defined as the age of poets or the 
“literary absolute” is associated with philosophical aesthetics of the late 18th century, 
and has remained dominant to date.182 According to Badiou, Heidegger’s hermeneutic 
philosophical system of thought centres around a Romantic conception of the poem 
being the “natural site for authenticity and the disclosure of being and Truth.”183 
However, as a philosopher who seeks to register truths, the Romantic belief that art is 
site of Absolute Truth is unsustainable for Badiou because it prohibits the possibility of 
truths in the alternate non-philosophical fields of mathematics, politics and love.184 In 
his Manifesto for Philosophy (1999) Badiou describes Romanticism as a moment when 
philosophy becomes “sutured” to only one of its conditions.185 Badiou maintains this 
restricts philosophy from the free play that is required in order to “define a regime of 
passage, or of intellectual circulation between the truth procedures,” in the additional 
                                                          
181  Lecercle, Badiou’s poetics, 210. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Ibid 
184 Alain Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy, ed. Norman Madarasz, trans. Norman Madarasz (New York: Suny, 
1992), 12. 
185 Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy, 12 -14. 
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non-philosophical fields that condition philosophy. He further states that, “the most 
frequent cause of such a blockage is that instead of constructing a space of 
compossibility … philosophy delegates its functions to one or another of its conditions, 
handing over the whole thought to one generic procedure.”186 Badiou maintains that 
philosophy must be “de-sutured” from the poem to ensure its free circulation so that the 
emergence of truths, be they artistic, mathematical, political or amorous, can be 
registered by philosophy.187  
 
Inaesthetics offers a new schema that re-configures philosophy so that it may 
conditioned by art. By maintaining a quality of compossibility, inaesthetics sustains the 
immanence of truth in art in the Romantic schema, while re-asserting the presence of 
truths in the non-philosophical fields.188 Badiou borrows the term compossibility from 
the philosophical system of the mathematician and philosopher Gottfried Leibniz (1646-
1716). For Leibniz, compossibility describes a situation that permits the existence of 
properties or elements without one suppressing the other. Badiou deploys the concept of 
compossibility to define the reciprocal engagement between philosophy and art that 
underpins inaesthetics. Badiou argues that because inaesthetics sustains a free 
circulation of meaning between art and philosophy, it furnishes possibility of the 
revelation of new regimes of thought. By departing from a one-sided engagement where 
philosophy’s task is to interpret art, inaesthetics ensures philosophy may reveal the 
meaning that is implicit to art.  
 
How does Badiou as a philosopher sustain reciprocity between the disciplines? 
Although Badiou reflects philosophically on the poetry of Mallarmé, he maintains that 
he avoids interpretation through inaesthetics. Instead of imposing meaning on the 
artistic form Badiou seeks to reveal the thinking that Mallarmé’s poetry generates. 
Badiou claims that by departing from a one-sided engagement where philosophy’s task 
is to interpret art inaesthetics ensures philosophy instead reveals the meaning that is 
implicit to art. Badiou identifies syntax as the crucial operator in Mallarmé’s practice, 
                                                          
186 Riera, Alain Badiou, Philosophy and its Conditions, 69. 
187 Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy, 12. 
188 An enquiry into the revelation of mathematical, political and amorous truths are for another day. For more on the 
revelation of truths in these three non-philosophical fields please see Badiou, Infinite Thought, Truth and the Return 
to Philosophy.  
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focusing on this to reflect on the thinking engendered by art, while avoiding falling into 
the trap of interpretation.  
 
Although Badiou maintains a forthright refusal of speculative aesthetics, Badiou’s 
commentator Ellie During claims that Badiou’s claim is problematic. During argues that 
Badiou’s treatment of metaphor in the Handbook demonstrate the act of interpretation. 
Badiou identifies these metaphors in Mallarmé as “the Constellation, the Tomb, or the 
Sawn” and in Rimbaud as “the Christ, the Worker, or the infernal Groom.” In Chapter 
9, “Being, Existence, Thought: Prose and Concept”, Badiou focuses on metaphors that 
include the dim, the shade, the void and more visceral forms such as the skull, the 
clenched eyes, ooze, the old woman, the man and the child in the French translation of 
Samuel Beckett’s “testamental text” Worstward Ho (1983).189 Although Badiou claims 
these metaphors reveal “a network of thought or shorthand of the question of being,” 
During argues this explanatory process seems uncomfortably proximate to forms of 
interpretation that Badiou rejects, arguing that the inevitability of speculation within 
aesthetics and the wider discourse of philosophy is reaffirmed by Badiou’s tendency to 
partake in this inevitable procedure.190 While accepting During’s observation that 
Badiou’s conjectures on the poem could be argued as interpretative, it is clear from 
Badiou’s reading that he does not seek to explicate meaning. By reading the poem as 
“organis[ing] a consistent dispositive in which the role of the poem is to engineer the 
sensory [sensible] presentation of a regime of thought: subtraction and isolation for 
Mallarmé, for Rimbaud,” Badiou does not seek to interpret but seeks to articulate how 
the poem operates in the way that it raises thought. Inaesthetics provides a theoretical 
framework to support a rigorous enquiry into the philosophical character of 
contemporary art by giving further insight into how thought might be activated through 
our encounter with the artistic form.191 During’s observation nevertheless provides a 
cautionary guide for the enquiry to avoid a potential risk of slipping into interpretation. 
Attending to this risk ensures that this enquiry is not undermined by explicating the 
                                                          
189 Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 89. 
190 During argues that the inevitability of speculation within aesthetics and the wider discourse of philosophy is 
reaffirmed by Badiou’s tendency to partake in this inevitable procedure. For more see During, “How Much Truth,” 
143-155.  
191 Although in some cases his conjectures on the literary configuration of the poem could be argued as interpretative, 
specifically in relation to his treatment of the metaphor, it is clear in Badiou’s discussion on the metaphors that he 
reads these metaphors in Mallarmé and Rimbaud as “organiz[ing] a consistent dispositive in which the role of the 
poem is to engineer the sensory [sensible] presentation of a regime of thought: subtraction and isolation for 
Mallarmé, presence and interruption for Rimbaud.” Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 20. (The original and English 
translation of this concrete poem is provided in the Appendix.) 
 89 
meaning of the artistic forms that configure the research project, but remains focused on 
its task to explore how philosophical thought is raised through enactment. 
 
 
3.2 Intraphilosophical Effect – The Unnameable and Activating Thought  
 
Although Badiou does not identify a philosophical character of art as Osborne does, I 
maintain that his identification of an “intraphilosophical effect” of art suggests this 
characteristic in the way that it reveals how art raises thought implicitly.192 Although 
Badiou conceives artistic thought as specific and irreducible to philosophy, this form of 
thought possesses philosophical attributes through its potential to raise philosophical 
ideas on a perceptive level. By outlining how Badiou formulates the intraphilosophical 
effect of art as a “special regime of thought” this discussion teases out how Badiou 
conceives art to activate thought.  
 
The task of explicating what Badiou means by the term “intraphilosophical effect” is 
not without difficulties. This is inferred in the first chapter of the Handbook, which 
states, “Most of the consequences of this thesis remain veiled and it demands from us a 
considerable labour of reformulation.”193 Although Badiou uses this term in the 
epigraph to the Handbook, he provides no definitive explanation for the term. My task 
is therefore explorative in nature and I undertake this by considering how Badiou 
“registers” this effect in the poem by conceiving the poem as an “operation”, an artistic 
form that sustains an open-process in the way that it presents itself “via the linguistic 
power of a possible thought.”194 I mirror Badiou’s process in this analysis by seeking to 
“register” how he conceives the “intraphilosophical effect” of the poem. Through my 
analysis I observe how Badiou presents the poem as a specific regime of thought by 
reflecting on its inherent quality of indeterminacy and how this quality asserts a 
resistance to interpretation. I observe how it is by resisting interpretation that the poem 
                                                          
192 Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 9. 
193 Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 10. 
194 This method of registering informed by Badiou’s translator, Alberto Toscano, who states, “Badiou’s approach is 
committed to both declaring the autonomy of artistic procedures (poetic, literary, cinematic or theatrical) and to 
registering what he calls their ‘intraphilosophical effect’.” Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, x.  
“via the linguistic power of a possible thought.” Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 18. 
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fulfils its “operation” because it necessitates, or in Badiou’s lexicon, “demands” 
engagement.195 
 
Through his reflections on Un Coup de Dés (The Throw of the Dice) (1897), Badiou 
discloses how the indeterminate quality of this poem ensures its operative dimension by 
asserting a resistance to interpretation. When reflecting on this poem Badiou states “it is 
only there, in its powerlessness, that a truth is stated”.196 Although this enquiry is not 
focused on the exploration of truths, Badiou understands these truths as the emergence 
of new regimes of thought. This is because truths perform novelty by causing a rupture 
to existing knowledge. Badiou observes the complexity of artistic truths, and 
accordingly, the emergence of new regimes of thought as inherently difficult to register. 
Because truths perform novelty, Badiou maintains they are unnameable.197 However, 
Badiou maintains that it is the task of philosophy to register this unnameable. As 
Lecercle observes, “For language is always, at first at least, the language of the 
situation, in which the event cannot be named, in which the truths that follow from the 
event cannot be formulated. And yet the unnameable event must be named.”198 Badiou 
succinctly names this indeterminate quality in the poetry of Mallarmé as the 
unnameable.  
 
Badiou reflects on the unnameable in the work of Mallarmé by referencing his claim 
that “there must always be enigma in poetry.”199 He considers the enigma of Un Coup 
de Dés as the disclosure of this indeterminate quality, identifying it in this poem as a 
pure notion constituted in “the moment of this dissolution.”200 For Badiou, the 
unnameable is the enigmatic nature of the poem that preserves a guarantee that 
language can neither constitute nor poetically validate, quoting from the poem, “a rock, 
false manor immediately evaporated, in a mist that imposed limit on its own infinity.” 
Badiou identifies the task of the poem is to disclose the unnameable and maintains to 
fulfil this task the poem must “break and reconstruct language.”201 Badiou observes 
                                                          
195 Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 29. 
196 Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Badiou's Poetics, Vol. 4, in Think Again, Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy, ed. 
Peter Hallward (London, New York: Continuum, 2009), 211. 
197 The truths are unnaable because they designate the ‘void’ of the situation which was previously hidden. See 
footnotes 167 and 173.  
198 Lecercle, Badiou's Poetics, 211. 
199 Lecercle, Badiou's Poetics, 23. 
200 Lecercle, Badiou's Poetics, 29. 
201 Lecercle, Badiou's Poetics, 211. 
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how machinations of the poem achieve this twofold movement in its attempt to strive 
towards the limits of language. Lecercle reflects on Badiou’s claim, observing the 
“powerless nostalgia of the poetic idea” is a failure of language to attend to the task of 
fully articulating the poetic idea. Paradoxically, the failure of language to articulate the 
idea is precisely where the value of the poem lies because it suspends meaning. By 
suspending meaning the poem initiates a radically new regime of thought. Lecercle 
explicates this by observing what is “demanded of the poem, in order for it to condition 
philosophy” is a resistance to the “charm and incitement of fiction, image and narrative 
… which all too readily makes sense and thereby fosters interpretation.” To reaffirm 
this point Lecercle maintains that the poem should “choose truth which does not make 
sense in meaning.”202  
 
As a philosopher of language Lecercle is aware that many of his associates would deem 
his reading of the poem as moving towards a point where it “vanishes into mere 
gibberish.”203 Lecercle’s analysis instead confirms Badiou’s strategy of negation. He 
does not see Badiou’s treatment of the poem as a radical performance of grammatical 
enunciation but observes how Badiou registers Mallarmé as a striving towards silence. 
Lecercle advances the productive aspect of this strategy of negation, by describing how 
Badiou registers the unnameable essence of the poem by focusing on its “s syntactical 
machinations.”204 By syntactical machinations Badiou infers a shift from the 
conventional interpretative treatment of the poetic metaphor as singular elements in the 
poem to a more immersive engagement with the “operation” of the poem, a term 
Mallarmé uses in his reflections when defining the poem.205 Lecercle maintains that by 
disturbing the poem, the syntactic machinations suspend meaning and thus permit the 
poem to fulfil its “operation” by activating thought.206  
 
                                                          
202 Ibid. 
203 Lecercle, Badiou's Poetics, 213. 
204 Badiou reflects on these syntactical machinations in Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 70.  
205 Lecercle describes how Badiou registers syntactic machinations in the temporal nature of the poem by the terms 
vanishing and cancellation in the content of the poem and the term foreclosure within the poetic structure. The 
vanishing marks the absence of the event in the site of its emergence. Badiou identifies this in the absence of the 
word “shipwreck” (le naufrage) – that which names the event, but does not appear. Instead the event is revealed 
through a series of metonyms that include vanishing, cancellation and foreclosure. Cancellation infers the mark of 
undecidability of the event as the vanishing of the shipwreck that becomes cancelled in the poem, while foreclosure 
suggests the act of making absence of the “slightest trace.” Lecercle, Badiou's Poetics, 213. 
206 Lecercle describes the productive aspect of this strategy in negative theology. He also sees this strategy of 
negation in psychoanalysis through Lacan’s conception of the Real that might only be approached through its 
negative description. Similarly, Lecercle identifies a similar strategy of negation in Badiou’s truths in that they are 
unnameable, undecidable and indiscernible. 
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By claiming, “There are revolutions in language as there are in society. Mallarmé is the 
name for this new operation of the poem,” Lecercle rearticulates Mallarmé’s refusal to 
rehearse formulaic artistic presentation that would hinder the enactment of new regimes 
of thought.207 Badiou’s commentator J.A. Bartlett also reflects on Badiou’s reading of 
the poem in relation to his overarching system of evental philosophy. He also observes 
the productive aspect of Badiou’s strategy of negation in his reading of the poem as the 
“edge of the void.” Badiou’s reading of the poem articulates a form of  “thought whose 
intelligibility owes nothing to the regime of existing knowledge.”208  Bartlett observes 
how this break with doxa performs novelty by setting the conditions for new regimes of 
thought.  
 
In relation to contemporary art, the potential in art to interrupt dominant meaning and 
break with doxa has also been asserted and articulated by Morris in his essay “Notes on 
Sculpture Part I”. Morris articulates this break with doxa in practice by differentiating 
the motivations of the iconographer (the practitioner) with the iconologist (the 
interpreter). Morris observes that “…the iconographer who locates shared elements and 
themes has a different ambition than the iconologist, who, according to Panofsky, 
locates a common meaning.”209 As Morris outlines, the iconologist’s concern with 
confirming and establishing the dominant meaning is at odds with the concern of the 
iconographer as practitioner.  Rather than locating common meaning, the process of the 
practitioner reveals novel, uncommon meaning. In this way Morris asserts how 
common or dominant meaning can be interrupted through art practice.  Setting the 
conditions that can interrupt meaning is understood by Bartlett as critical, because it 
challenges the limitations to thought by engendering a new way of thinking and a new 
way to engage with the world.  
When reflecting on art (via the poem), indeterminacy does not denote inadequacy 
because it is through this quality that the poem fulfils its task to activate thought. To 
reiterate, Badiou articulates how an indeterminate quality in Mallarmé necessitates 
engagement when he states, “Mallarmé’s poem does not ask to be interpreted, nor does 
it possess any keys. The poem ‘demands that we delve into its operation’.”210 The 
                                                          
207 Lecercle, Badiou's Poetics, 211. 
208 J.A. Bartlett, “Conditional Notes on a New Republic,” in The Praxis of Alain Badiou, ed. A.J. Bartlett and Justin 
Clemens Paul Ashton (Melbourne: re:press, 2006), 217. 
209 Robert Morris, “Notes on Sculpture Part I,” in Minimal Art, A Critical Anthology (LA, California: University of 
California Press, 1995), 223. 
210 Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 29. 
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“demand” that Mallarmé identifies takes place in the encounter. The encounter with the 
poem provokes the reader to delve into its operation. Badiou observes how thought is 
activated by stating, “the enigma lies in this demand … not in order to know what it 
means, but rather to think what happens in it.”211 The necessity that each of us must 
configure our own thought is asserted by Badiou’s observation of the poem that: “No 
one is its master, but everyone can come to be inscribed within it.” For Badiou, the 
value of Mallarmé’s poem is precisely because it is subtracted from the “impasse of the 
master.” 212  By suspending authorship, the poem permits us to forgo the singularity of 
meaning, by replacing this with the thinking of this thought. 
 
For Badiou, the significance of this unnameable quality in the poem is that it sets the 
conditions for the emergence of new regimes of thought by activating a form of thought 
that escapes the existing regime of knowledge. This form of thought that is activated by 
the poem escapes knowledge because it cannot be qualified, quantified or fully 
determined. This is inferred by Mallarmé’s request that one must proceed with words 
that are “allusive and never direct.” Because of its refusal to be determined Badiou 
names this form of thought unthinkable.213 He develops this further by naming the 
poem unthinkable thought. 214 In this way the poem places a ‘demand’ on the reader by 
necessitating them to think, but in a manner that is different to the thinking that takes 
place through reason, logic or analysis.  
 
Because the operation of the poem can only be fulfilled through the encounter, the 
specificity of thought is determined by the subject’s experience of the artistic form, be it 
a poem or, in the case of the Metaphysical Longings, the groups encounter in a soon to 
be demolished flat. This form of thought differs to reason, logic or analysis because it is 
bound with experience in the way that it is determined by the subjects’ engagement with 
the artistic form. The experiential nature of this thought is articulated by Mallarmé’s 
definition of the poem as “a happening of l’Idée in the sensible itself.”215 This is further 
affirmed by Badiou’s claim that “art is the process of a truth and this truth is always the 
truth of the sensible.”216 For Mallarmé, this is not the representation of the sensible. The 
                                                          
211 Ibid. 
212 Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 56. 
213 Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 134. 
214 Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 19. 
215 Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 29. 
216 Badiou, Fifteen Theses on Contemporary Art, 166. 
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sensible is what manifests as poetic thought. Rather than considering the poem as a 
sensible form of idea, affixing a specific idea through linguistic representation, the 
poem designates a process or an activity of thought. By identifying how Mallarmé 
conceives his poems as the transformation of the sensible into a happening of the idea, 
Badiou asserts the poem as an open process that takes place in the moment of the 
encounter. Badiou’s reading of the poem as an operation is aligned with a general 
contemporary reading of art as an open-process that is explicated in Chapter One in my 
analysis Foster’s notion of the “birth of the viewer” and through my analysis of my 
post-conceptual practice that is presented Chapter Two. My observation that the 
thinking in art is bound with experience, which is presented in Chapter Two, is also 
iterated by Badiou, who describes the encounter with the poem as “the sensory 
perception of a regime of thought” and, accordingly, enactment of thought as 
“inseparable from the sensible.”217  
 
It is remarkable that Badiou does not draw on contemporary art when registering the 
“intraphilosophical effect”. As outlined in Chapter One, developments in art practice 
that led to a contemporary reading of art perform this transformative movement, of the 
sensible into a happening of the idea, as demonstrated by the conceptual understanding 
of the artistic form as mediating idea.  In addressing this omission I identify a 
correspondence between Badiou’s reading of the poem and the poetic treatment of the 
conceptual proposition in Romantic Conceptualism, Verwoert and Heiser’s revisionist 
reading of conceptualism. Verwoert and Heiser alignment of the Romantic fragment (a 
poem exemplified by Novalis) with conceptualism supports my decision to explore the 
capacity of contemporary art to raise thought through Badiou’s reading of the poem. It 
could be argued that my aligning Romantic Conceptualism with inaesthetics is 
problematic because it differs from Romanticism. However, as noted in the first part, 
although inaesthetics differs from Romanticism by asserting the presence of truths the 
non-philosophical fields, both schemas essentially sustain the immanence of truth in art 
and assert the primacy of art for thought.218 I argue that this difference is 
inconsequential to my exploration into possibility of an artwork to engender thought.219  
.  
                                                          
217 Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 19. 
218 For more on mathematical, political and amorous truths  see Alain Badiou, Being and Event (London: Bloomsbury 
Continuum, 2007) and Badiou, Infinite Thought, Truth and the Return to Philosophy, 32. 
219 Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 9. 
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3.2.1 Romantic Conceptualism – A Poetic Treatment of Contemporary Art  
 
Romantic Conceptualism provides a context in art practice to develop my exploration of 
the condition of thought in contemporary art, particularly through a post-conceptual 
practice, precisely because this re-interpretation of conceptualism more readily aligns 
with a post-conceptual reading of art. Romantic Conceptualism is a curatorial project by 
Jan Verwoert and the curator Jörg Heiser. This exhibition was first presented at 
Kunsthale Nürnberg, Nuremberg, in 2007 and later that year at the BAWAG 
Foundation, Vienna. The exhibition featured the work of twenty-three artists, including 
Bas Jan Ader, Robert Barry, Ross Birrell, Lygia Clarke, Didier Courbot, Tacita Dean, 
Felix Gonzalez-Torres, Tomislav Gotovac, Rodney Graham, Henrik Hakansson, 
Mathilde ter Heijne, Susan Hiller, Douglas Heubler, Kollsktive Aktionen, Louise 
Lawler, Yoko Ono, Kirsten Pieroth, Allen Ruppersberg, Frances Stark, Jan Timme, 
Andy Warhol, Laurence Weiner and Cerith Wyn Evans. Verwoert and Heiser’s 
curatorial project informs the development of the enquiry by allowing me to further 
explore how thought is activated by contemporary art. 
 
Although the coupling of Romanticism with conceptualism is an unlikely theoretical 
manoeuvre, Verwoert maintains his unorthodox alignment between conceptualism and 
Romanticism opens up “our view of a specific historical event-continuum.”220 By 
describing conceptual art as Romantic, Verwoert and Heiser present an alternative to 
Kosuth’s rigid definition of conceptual art as “the intention, position, legitimation and 
institution of art.”221 Rather than focusing on the implications of art as idea (as the state 
of play art and its discourse) that motivates Kosuth’s proposition, Verwoert and 
Heiser’s curatorial project focuses on the mediation idea through the artwork. By 
                                                          
220 Verwoert defines Romanticism and conceptualism as events. Although it is undeniable that Verwoert’s reading of 
artistic moments as events is informed by Kosuth, who engages with this conception of novelty in “Art After 
Philosophy” when referencing Duchamp’s ready-made as an artistic event, I venture Verwoert’s engagement with 
Badiou. Although he claims that he “can’t stand reading Alain Badiou”, in a recent article “Friends of Foes” in 
Frieze, March 2010 Verwoert’s interpretation of event as “something has happened which changes everything” and 
his observation of difficulty in fully realising the significance of the event and that its significance is revealed 
retrospectively, demonstrates his unavoidable engagement with Badiou’s thought. Just as I note and overlap between 
inaesthetics and Romanticism in relation to their shared assertion of the primacy of art for thought, I feel it important 
to register the overlap in Verwoert’s thought with Badiou’s.   
221 From the onset of his essay, Verwoert cautions the reader that Romantic Conceptualism is “significantly vague”; 
however Verwoert validates his re-interpretation of conceptualism by claiming the term conceptualism itself is 
equally vague. Verwoert maintains the surrealist poet and critic Guillaume Apollinaire had used it some fifty years 
earlier. Although it is generally accepted that Kosuth’s “Art After Philosophy” established conceptualism as a term 
that defined the motivations “to question the nature of art by presenting new propositions as to art’s nature,” the 
fluxus artist Henry Flynt is recognised as first introducing the term “concept art” to designate art composed as ideas 
as early as 1960. Verwoert, “Impulse Concept Concept Impulse,” 165-175; Kosuth, “Art After Philosophy”. 
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exploring the dynamic process between the subject and the artistic form, Romantic 
Conceptualism avoids a rehearsal of conceptualism as institutional critique which 
ultimately results in a reading of conceptualism’s critical legitimacy as “failure”.222 This 
reading rests solely on conceptualism’s inability to challenge and transform the 
apparatus of the art institution.223 Instead, by focusing on delineation of art as a 
proposition that Kosuth advanced Verwoert engages with artistic gestures as actual 
propositions, opening up Kosuth’s mandate of art as idea to reconsider the conception 
of art as idea.224  
 
The significance of Romantic Conceptualism for this enquiry is that by reconfiguring 
the notion of art as idea, it introduces a more comprehensive notion of thought. As 
noted in Chapter One, rather than disbanding completely with form, a post-conceptual 
acknowledges the role of the artistic form within the mediation of idea. Verwoert and 
Heiser’s re-interpretation of conceptualism as Romantic provides a theoretical position 
to develop a reading of the condition of thought in contemporary art by identifying 
conceptual artworks that are bound to the strictures of  “analytical”, “exclusive” or 
“strong” conceptualism art that advance the mediation of idea as a purely analytical 
enterprise.225 By presenting specific conceptual works that initiate emotion within the 
mediatory process Romantic Conceptualism opens up a narrow reading of 
conceptualism as a “purely logical inquiry [sic.]” by acknowledging experience as 
fundamental to this dynamic.226  
                                                          
222 Alexander Alberro and Blake Stimson, ed., Conceptual Art: A Critical Anthology (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 
1999).  
223 Verwoert observes that Kosuth, like many other conceptual artists and critics, retrospectively regarded the 
conceptual project as a failure. In his essay Intention(s) (1996). Kosuth describes the failure of conceptual artistic 
gestures to shift the relations of power from critics, gallerists, curators and other representatives of the external world 
to the artist. Blake Stimson observes that conceptualisms most sympathetic and perceptive critics tend to evaluate the 
conceptualism as a ‘failure’.  Stimson is most likely referring to Benjamin Buchoh’s essay “Conceptual Art 162-169: 
from Aesthetics of Administration to the Critique of Institutions, 1989” (published, among others, in Critical 
Anthology). Verwoert, “Impulse Concept Concept Impulse”, 174. 
224 How Verwoert read the proposition as an open form of appeal through the work of Robert Barry differs 
considerably from Kosuth’s understanding of the proposition as a theoretical enterprise into the enquiry of art. “Art 
After Philosophy” (1969), as a theoretical exercise of the enquiry of art is in essence performing a similar function to 
Morris’s “Notes On Sculpture I, II, III,” (1965), outlining the motivations of his work and practice. Although 
Morris’s Notes question the nature of art, he does not articulate this motivation explicitly. Kosuth on the other hand 
makes this explicit by claiming, “Being an artist now means to question the nature of art.” This quote is taken from a 
statement that Kosuth cites from a previous auto-interview published earlier that year in Arts Magazine. While 
establishing the mandate art as idea Kosuth’s document also presents the idea of art as the motivating enquiry of 
conceptualism as he outlines “Artists question the nature of art by presenting new propositions as to art’s nature.” In 
investigating what art might potentially be, the conceptual artwork as proposition expanded the theoretical enquiry 
from a subsidiary enterprise to constitute the work itself. Kosuth, Art After Philosophy.  
225 Osborne uses these terms to describe a rigid conceptual reading of art as an analytical enterprise. He identifies this 
predominantly in the conceptual practices of Joseph Kosuth and the British group Art and Language. Osborne, 
“Conceptual Art and/as Philosophy”, 65. 
226 Lippard, Six Years, 5. 
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In Heiser’s Introduction to the exhibition in the accompanying catalogue, he draws 
attention to the problematic of a canon that excludes from the conceptual art system 
anything that might complicate the logical, analytical mandate of art as idea by noting 
how the many practitioners were “subjected to repeated restrictions” to ensure key 
players, primarily white, western and male, dominated the field.227 Heiser argues 
Romantic Conceptualism contributes to the canon by opening up a restricted reading of 
conceptualism. He identifies curatorial projects that also expand readings of 
conceptualism, such as Lucy Lippard’s 1973 group show, c 7500, which disproved the 
widespread assumption that women did not make conceptual art, and the landmark 
exhibition Global Conceptualism, Points of Origin 1950-1980, Queens Museum of Art, 
New York/Walker Arts Centre, Minneapolis, 1999- 2000. As noted in Chapter One, 
Osborne also raises the problematic of adhering to the parameters of conceptualism as 
an analytical enquiry, identifying a tendency in “exclusive” conceptual art to conflate 
artistic thought with analytic philosophical enquiry.228 Heiser’s revisionist reading of 
conceptualism reveals an overlooked fact that the majority of conceptual art 
practitioners did not adhere rigidly to the “strong” conceptual parameters of art as an 
analytical enquiry.  
 
In her interview with Heiser in the accompanying exhibition catalogue Susan Hiller 
discusses her dissatisfaction with the boundaries imposed from within the parameters of 
conceptualism.229 Hiller identifies a dogmatic tendency in conceptualism to posit art as 
a cognitive exercise informed by rational logic, outlining the conceptual insistence of 
the artwork as an analytic proposition. However, she maintains that many practitioners 
                                                          
227 It is important to note that Heiser appreciates why certain conceptual artists such as Kosuth and Art and Language 
defined the tenets of the movement from the onset. The mandate of art as idea affirmed and established the 
conceptual position that was vehemently contested from the outset. Jörg Heiser, “Opening Remarks,” in Romantic 
Conceptualism, ed. Ellen Seifermann and Christine Kintisch. (Germany: Kerber Verlag, 2007a) 
228 Osborne, “Conceptual Art and/as Philosophy,”58. 
Kosuth’s definition of conceptual art has also been questioned by critic Jörg Heiser. Heiser draws attention to the 
problematic of a canon that excludes from the conceptual art system anything that might complicate the logical, 
analytical mandate of art as idea. However, although Heiser identifies this shortcoming, he appreciates why certain 
conceptual artists such as Kosuth and Art and Language established such rigid tenets because the movement was 
vehemently contested from the outset. 
229 Hiller is defined as both a conceptual and a post-conceptual artist. She refers to this precarious positioning of her 
oeuvre, and describes it as 'paraconceptual’. By paraconceptual Hiller means just sideways of conceptualism and 
neighbouring the paranormal. This implies a devalued site of culture where women and the feminine have been 
conversely privileged. She claims in the hybrid field of paraconceptualism neither conceptualism nor the paranormal 
are left intact ... as ... the prefix 'para' symbolises the force of contamination through a proximity so great that it 
threatens the soundness of all boundaries." Susan Hiller, “About”, accessed September 15 2012, 
http://www.susanhiller.org/about.html  
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did not adhere rigidly to the parameters of conceptual art as an analytical enquiry.230 
Hiller also draws attention to the dominant role of white male artists in conceptualism 
and maintains they promoted a reading of conceptual art as an unemotional enquiry. 
Hiller reads the self-reflexive proposition as limiting subject matter to “what’s already 
in language” and maintains for her generation of women (and other non-white artists) 
that this was “not what we wanted to say.”231 Hiller articulates how her conceptual 
practice problematises the conceptual insistence of the artwork as an analytic 
proposition by reflecting on the critical reception of her work, Dedicated to the 
Unknown Artist Between 1972-1976. This work displaying her collection of hundreds of 
postcards depicting rough seascapes from the British Coast was criticised by Art and 
Language as being “too visual”. Hiller maintains had these images been black and white 
rather than colour, this criticism may not have been levelled. She claims this work 
problematised a straightforward conceptual interpretation because it did not adhere to 
the language of conceptualism, in which the black-and-white image was accepted. 
Hiller’s observation inadvertently demonstrates an indisputable sensible dimension 
within strict conceptual art.  
 
Post-conceptualism acknowledges the sensible aspect, critically re-engaging with the 
post-medium condition on new grounds. It is important to iterate that this appreciation 
of the artistic form does not designate a modernist return to a prioritisation of form, but 
rather acknowledges the sensible dimension within the reading of the work. Rather than 
an exclusive conceptual reading of art that denies experience, Romantic Conceptualism 
acknowledges the sensible dimension within the reception of idea, positing the sensible 
and experiential quality as essential to the way one thinks through art. Verwoert and 
Heiser observe how Hiller, Piper and other conceptual artists such as the Brazilian 
conceptual artists Helio Oiticica and Lygia Clarke, opened up “new possibilities in art” 
by departing from the strict parameters laid out by the conceptual mandate of art as 
idea. These practices extended the horizon of conceptualism by asserting emotion, 
imagination and perception within the artwork’s mediatory process.232 
                                                          
230 Benjamin Buchloh also claims the difficulty in attempting a retrospective survey of conceptualism due to the 
impossibility of historicising the movement under a single, distinct definition, describing conceptual art as a 
“complex range of mutually opposed approaches.”  Benjamin H. D. Buchloh, “Conceptual Art 1962-1969: From the 
Aesthetic of Administration to the Critique of Institutions,” October (The MIT Press) 55 (Winter 1990): 105-143. 
231 Jörg Heiser’s interview with Hiller in “A Romantic Measure,” in Romantic Conceptualism, ed. Ellen Seifermann 
and Christine Kintisch. (Germany: Kerber Verlag, 2007b) 
232 LeWitt articulates his appreciation of less rational forms of knowledge by acknowledging the process of intuition 
in his Paragraphs. LeWitt’s claim that “Ideas are discovered by intuition” inadvertently compromised Kosuth’s 
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The emphasis on emotion and imagination underpins Verwoert and Heiser’s poetic 
treatment of the conceptual proposition. In the essay “Impulse Concept Concept 
Impulse” Verwoert focuses on these attributes to reflect on the communicative function 
of conceptualism. Verwoert draws on the Romantic fragment, a poetic form developed 
by Novalis. Unlike the classical pursuit of the finite, Romanticism sought the infinite. 
By definition a fragment is part of something whole that is not present. The Romantic 
fragment designates a finite part of an infinite whole. The Romantic pursuit to embody 
the infinite informed this poetic form that departed radically from previous poetic 
configurations which adhered to structure. Through reductive processes the Romantic 
fragment sought to express the infinite. Romanticism is distinguished by the emphasis 
on the imagination, because of it seeks to move beyond the confines of reason and 
engage with the infinite. Heiser also registers a tendency shared by conceptualism and 
Romanticism to prioritise the “fragmentary and open over the systematic and 
conclusive” and maintains this indeterminacy asserts the impulse to imagine.233  
 
Verwoert reflects on the communicative function of certain conceptual works by 
aligning Novalis’s reading of the artistic form with conceptualism. Verwoert observes 
how the impulse to imagine is implied by Novalis’s definition of the poem as an 
“operation”. Verwoert observes how this term distinguishes the poem as an open 
process, a process that transfers the realisation of the work from the jurisdiction of the 
artist to the subject within the encounter, citing Novalis’s claim that “the true reader 
must be an extension of the author.”234 Novalis claim demonstrates the proximity of a 
Romantic and a contemporary reading of art because it anticipates a developing concern 
in contemporary art with the role of the viewer and the understanding that a work is 
contingent on the perception of the viewer.235 Verwoert draws attention to this 
                                                                                                                                                                          
understanding of art as an analytical enterprise by introducing a more perceptive interpretation of the thinking in art. 
This departure from thought processes bound to reason and logic more readily associated with exclusive 
conceptualism is further iterated in the first of LeWitt’s thirty five rules, “1. Conceptual artists are mystics rather than 
rationalists. They leap to conclusions that logic cannot reach.” LeWitt, “Paragraphs,” 79.  
233 Jörg Heiser, “Moscow, Conceptualism, and After” Alphabet, accessed November 10 2011, 
http://www.marcellosimeone.com/blog/2012/04 
234 Verwoert, Romantic Conceptualism, 165-175. 
235 Foster coins the term the birth of the viewer in his essay “The Crux of Minimalism”, to articulate his 
contemporary reading of art. This understanding of a work being determined by the subject who engages with the 
work as opposed to the author or critic was advanced around this period in the field of literary criticism by Roland 
Barthes. In his essay ‘The Death of the Author’ (1967). Barthes proposed literary criticism as forced projection of the 
ultimate meaning on a work. Barthes maintains that there can be no ultimate meaning bestowed on a piece of 
literature as one could infer an ultimate explanation for it. He maintains that the proliferation of meaning in language 
coupled with the unknowable state of the author’s mind renders interpretation impossible. Barthes approaches the 
notion of the ‘knowable text’ from a political perspective claiming this to demonstrate the delusion of the grand 
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communicative function in conceptualism by observing how they, like the romantic 
fragment necessitate engagement for their realisation.236 As Verwoert notes, “its 
supposed intangibility can be made seem tangible for the moment, and in the same 
moment it can be made to question whatever appears everyday and tangible by opening 
it up towards an abstract idea.”237  
 
Verwoert responds to a number of conceptual and post-conceptual works to describe 
how they similarly assert the fragmentary and open through reductive processes. For the 
purpose of examining how thought is implicated in work, I focus on Verwoert’s poetic 
reading of Robert Barry’s conceptual propositions because thought constitutes the 
essential medium of these works. Verwoert reflects on Barry’s Inert Gas Series (1969), 
All the Things I Know but of Which I am not at this Moment Thinking – 1:36 PM June 
15 (1969), and Prospect ’69. Although Prospect ’69 is not in the exhibition Romantic 
Conceptualism, Verwoert discusses this work in the essay that accompanies the 
exhibition in the catalogue. Verwoert focuses on these three works to describe how 
Barry’s reductive process extends the work from a fixed form to an open process.238  
Inert Gas Series consists of framed photographic documentation and short, succinct 
descriptive texts. Inert Gas Series, Krypton consists of three colour photographs and 
typewritten text that reads, “From a measured volume to indefinite expansion. On 
March 3rd 1969, in Beverly Hills, California one liter [sic.] of krypton was returned to 
the atmosphere.” Inert Gas Series, Helium consists of a slide, a black-and-white 
photograph and catalogue page: “Inert Gas Series, Helium. Sometime during the 
morning of March 5th 1969, 2 cubic feet of helium will be released into the 
atmosphere.” All the Things I Know but of Which I am not at this Moment Thinking – 
1:36 PM June 15, an artwork that is simply the presentation of this statement printed 
directly onto the gallery wall. Prospect ’69 was commissioned for the Kunsthalle 
                                                                                                                                                                          
narrative dominant in Western culture. He furthers his claim maintaining that completing the text with ultimate 
meaning renders it more marketable and thus conforming to the idealogy of western capitalism. 
236 Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 29. 
237 Verwoert, Romantic Conceptualism, 165-175. 
238 Novalis's first fragments were published in 1798 in the Athenäum, a magazine edited by the Schlegel brothers. 
The importance of the fragment to Romanticism is outlined by Schegel, who claims, “Many of the works of the 
ancients have become fragments. Many modern works are fragments as soon as they are written.” S. Sophie Thomas, 
“The Fragment: Towards a History and Poetics of a Performative Genre, 2004, Camilia Elias, Review,” Hyperion, 
III, No. 3, 208. 
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Düsseldorf gallery. However, this work did not appear in the physical space gallery but 
was presented in the accompanying catalogue.239 It reads,  
 
 
  Q. What is your piece for Prospect ’69? 
A. The piece consists of ideas which people will have from reading 
this interview. 
Q. Can this piece be shown? 
A. The piece in its entirety is unknowable because it exists in the 
minds of so many people. Each person can really know only that part 
which is in his own mind. 240 
 
 
Verwoert registers Barry’s formal reduction of artistic form by observing his artistic 
gestures “do no more than write a text on the wall or send it as a postcard, or to carry 
out a simple symbolic action and show a photo or short film about it”.241 For example, 
Barry’s gesture of releasing the invisible medium of gas into the desert literally opens 
up the artistic form by extending the spatial dimension of art to a temporal one. When 
describing Inert Gas Series Barry describes how it “continues to expand forever in the 
atmosphere, constantly changing.”242 Verwoert reflects on the indeterminate nature of 
this work, describing it as an “impulse for an open process of change in which it is 
realised, but simultaneously also dissolves.”243  
 
In the previous discussion formulate my reading of the “intraphilosophical effect” as 
the capacity of art to activate thought. I formulate my reading of this elusive term by 
observing Badiou’s registration of an unnameable quality. Although Verwoert does not 
use the term unnameable, his romantic reading of Barry’s work reveals this particular 
                                                          
239 The structure and intent of Prospect ’69 is comparable to Lawrence Weiner’s Statement of Intent, 1968, which 
also features in Romantic Conceptualism. 
The artist may construct the piece. 
The piece may be fabricated. 
The piece may not be built. 
Each being equal and consistent with the intent of the artist and the decision as to condition rests with the receiver 
upon the occasion of receivership. 
Lawrence Weiner, Statement of Intent, 1968, in Romantic Conceptualism, ed. Ellen Seifermann and Christine 
Kintisch. (Germany: Kerber Verlag, 2007). 
240 Blake Stimson, “The Promise of Conceptual Art,” in Conceptual Art, A Critical Anthology, ed. Blake Stimson 
(Cambridge, London: MIT Press, 1999), xxxxviii. 
241 Verwoert, “Impulse Concept Concept Impulse,” 167. 
242 Robert Barry, Romantic Conceptualism, ed. Ellen Seifermann and Christine Kintisch. (Germany: Kerber Verlag, 
2007), 131. 
243 Barry, Romantic Conceptualism, 169. 
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quality. Novalis’ describes the poetic operation as one that is “still unknown”.244 By 
correlating Barry’s conceptual propositions with the Romantic fragment to reveal how 
they activate thought. What is significant about Barry’s propositions is that although he 
uses the strategies that appear to transfer information in a succinct manner, his work 
delivers very little in the way of information. Instead Verwoert claims his works are 
saturated with meaning. The sophistication of Barry’s propositions is that their 
simplicity presents something that is difficult to define that is meaningful. This 
unnamable quality is suggested by Barry when asked why he was reticent to explain 
how his work functions.  
 
 
I think there is an aspect of the unknown to all of our activities, and 
attempting to ex-plain it, takes away from what it’s about. I find that 
explanations are very incomplete. I’m still struggling with the mystery of 
art. The more I think about it, and the more I think I know something 
about this process that I’m engaged in, the more I realize that I don’t.245 
 
 
Barry’s reflections articulate the unlikelihood of his propositions to transfer a single 
discrete idea because they are unresolved. Verwoert observes how this provokes each of 
us to conjure up our thoughts, he explains, “The idea is actualized through an “appeal” 
to its recipients to realise it within their own thoughts.”246 Like the Romantic fragment 
Verwoert registers Barry’s work as an operation that necessitates thought precisely 
because very little is disclosed. Rather than approaching All the Things I Know … as 
cool or detached, Verwoert claims this work operates on an emotional level by 
registering an “appeal” from this work to the percipient to enter into this philosophical 
quandary.247  
 
Similarly, Prospect ’69 does not generate a single common idea but rather sets the 
conditions in which disparate forms of thought might be engendered each time the work 
is encountered. Verwoert observes how the presentation of Prospect ’69 in the 
catalogue extends the artistic form beyond the confines of the gallery space, while 
simultaneously extending the thinking beyond the jurisdiction of the artist. In this way 
                                                          
244 Verwoert, Romantic Conceptualism, 165-175. 
245 Robert Barry, interviewed by Peter Eleey, Conceptual Radio, Flash Art no. 279 (July-September 2011), 169. 
246 Verwoert, “Impulse Concept Concept Impulse,” 165-175. 
247 Ibid. 
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Prospect ’69 operates like the Romantic fragment in the way that it frees up thought 
towards a collective process and in the way that it invites the viewer to “formulate ideas 
in an open, fragmentary way.”248  I use the term invite in a conscious manner because, 
being less forceful than the term “demand” (that Badiou uses in his reading of 
Mallarmé) it acknowledges the possibility that thought might not be activated. In his 
analysis of the performance event David Davies’ also observes that a performer cannot 
be certain that their audience is in actual fact paying attention.249 He identifies how 
performances are designated by their “call” for engagement. What is at stake in Davies’ 
analysis of the performance event is that this “call” designates the intention of the work 
for an audience to engage. As outlined in the previous chapter, by approaching my 
works as inviting thought articulates the intention of my artworks without claiming that 
my works successfully activate thought. The term invite further iterates that the thinking 
that might arise cannot be prescribed because it unfolds on a perceptive level through 
the encounter. This observation further iterates that the work is contingent on the 
subject within the encounter. Barry articulates this by claiming, “Part of the nature of art 
is that it is out there in the community; part of it is in other people’s minds.”250 When 
asked about his work in relation to the public reception of idea Barry claims, “what they 
do with them afterwards is not in my control.”251  
 
Heiser also reflects on how art activates the spontaneous unfolding of thought. He looks 
to Friedrich von Schlegel, who claims good poetry and art in general is characterised by 
“the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings.” Heiser observes how Schlegel aligns 
this intensification of experience with the thought, quoting Schegel, “it is equally deadly 
for the mind to have a system and to have none. It consequently will have to decide to 
connect both states.”252 Heiser observes a similar intellectual-emotional combination in 
Barry’s work. Verwoert develops this point by arguing the impossibility of approaching 
Barry’s work as a purely analytical enterprise because of its emotional quality. 
Verwoert argues that this intellectual-emotional combination as the appellative quality 
in Barry’s work because it encourages further engagement with the work.  Both Heiser 
                                                          
248 It is worth noting that Kantian aesthetics also captures the capacity of art to institute a collective level of appeal by 
the term sensus communis. Sensus communis describes the “universal capacity on the part of every human being to 
sense from within the plurality of coordinates the flourishing of human life and what favors it.”  
249 Davies, David. Philosophy of the Performing Arts, (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 142-143. 
250 This quote is taken from a discussion with Barry that was organised by Jeanne Siegel in the WBAI in New York. 
Lippard, Six Years, 129.  
251 Barry, Conceptual Radio.  
252 Heiser, “Opening Remarks,” 138. 
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and Verwoert’s observations are confirmed by Barry, who acknowledges the emotional 
component as integral to the mediatory process in his work.  
 
PE:  Is emotion part of your work, or how you make it? 
RB:  The emotional component is important. You can’t just rely on ideas, or 
play with various art strategies. But I tend to not use the word “emotion” 
anymore. I like to say “en-gagement,” which is usually an intellectual-
emotional combination.253 
 
 
The philosopher of art, Peter Lamarque also identifies emotion, experience and 
perception within the process of communicating idea in his poetic reading of 
conceptualism. Like Verwoert, Lamarque identifies how conceptual proposition 
‘suggests’ meaning rather than presenting a formulated idea. However, unlike Verwoert, 
Lamarque treats this indeterminate feature as a shortcoming. Although Lamarque’s 
analysis of conceptualism is highly critical, his proposition that artistic thought differs 
from an analytical enquiry is valuable to the enquiry because it further affirms my 
observation of the role of experience in the thinking raised by art.  
 
Lamarque observes how artistic thought differs from certain forms of philosophical 
enquiry in the manner by which it is perceived. Like Verwoert and Heiser, Lamarque’s 
identification of perception renders exclusive conceptual reading of art as an analytical 
enterprise problematic. Lamarque sees the conceptual mandate of art as idea creates too 
close an association between the philosophical or the literary (as in literary fiction as 
distinct from the Romantic fragment) and maintains that it “fall[s] short of both.” He 
claims that the conceptual artwork lacks the critical resources associated with 
philosophy and literature to fully develop ideas.254 Lamarque argues his claim by 
observing how philosophy and literature (excluding certain forms of poetry and 
undoubtedly the Romantic fragment) demonstrate two paradigmatic ways of developing 
and working out the idea. Lamarque observes how philosophical enquiry develops ideas 
through theory building, hypothesis and cognitive analysis. In literature, Lamarque sees 
this performed through the unification and resolution of a subject, configured through a 
literary theme. By observing in conceptualism a failure to fully engage with the analytic 
                                                          
253 Barry, Conceptual Radio.   
254 Peter Lamarque, “On Perceiving Conceptual Art,” in Philosophy and Conceptual Art, ed. Peter Goldie and 
Elizabeth Schellekens (New York: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, 2007), 7. 
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or the thematic, Lamarque aligns the conceptual proposition with poetry. Rather than 
looking to the Romantic fragment, Lamarque looks to the poetic conceit – a form of 
metaphor associated with the 17th century metaphysical poets. The poetic conceit is 
understood as having a conceptual and thus more tenuous relationship between the 
things being compared. Lamarque describes how the idea develops and unfolds through 
the poetic elaboration of the conceit as metaphor. He draws on the metaphysical poetry 
of John Donne to present the process of the poem as, “the whole frame of the poem is a 
beating out of a piece of gold.” In claiming “ideas are only of interest when they are 
articulated, worked out, when something is done to them,” Lamarque maintains such 
indeterminate forms necessitates the “ingenuity of the spectator.”255 The necessity of 
the spectator that Lamarque treats as a shortcoming (in a similar manner to Fried’s 
relation to minimalist and post-minimalist practices) is precisely its value. 
 
By outlining the difference between the experience of ‘reading’ conceptual artworks 
and works of literature and philosophical enquiry Lamarque observes the distinctive 
quality of conceptualism as offering a “curious hybrid of experience.” He maintains that 
“we should see conceptual art of the paradigmatic kind as offering a curious hybrid of 
experience having parallels with, but not reducible to, the cerebral reflection of ideas of 
philosophy.”256 Lamarque’s observation undermines the conceptual delineation between 
the intellect and the senses by acknowledging the experiential within the mediation of 
the conceptual artwork.257 As outlined previously, it is important to note that experience 
includes, but is not restricted to, sensory perceptual experience. By aligning the 
conceptual proposition with poetry, Lamarque introduces other sensory forms, which 
Verwoert and Badiou identify – not just those associated with the ‘lower’ senses, such 
as vision, but more radically the ‘higher’ senses such as perception, imagination, feeling 
                                                          
255 Lamarque, “On Perceiving Conceptual Art,” 8. 
256 Lamarque furthers this point by stating, “the apprehension of themes or conceits of literature and the perception of 
sculpture and painting – to prioritise any of these is in many cases to miss what is distinctive.” In aligning the 
conceptual proposition with aspects of poetry, Lamarque registers how conceptual art is further distanced from a 
modernist reading of art. Lamarque, “On Perceiving Conceptual Art” . 
257 This distinction between the intellect and experience is articulated by LeWitt, who claimed in order for the 
artwork to be “mentally interesting works” it must be “emotionally dry”. In this way LeWitt iterates the tenets of 
conceptualism which claim the formation of idea lies solely in the rational and logical domain of the intellect. It is 
worth drawing the reader’s attention to the fact that LeWitt problematises this position further on in his Paragraphs 
by claiming, “In terms of ideas the artist is free even to surprise himself.” Le Witt’s claim that artwork must be 
emotionally dry is further undermined by his statement “Ideas are discovered by intuition.” Sol LeWitt, “Paragraphs 
on Conceptual Art, 1969,” Artforum, June 1967.  LeWitt’s acknowledgement of the intuition in the creation and 
reception of work introduce processes that are different to those associated with reason and logic that are associated 
with “exclusive” conceptualism associated with Kosuth and Art and Language. The irrational is identified two years 
later in the first of LeWitt’s thirty-five rules, “1. Conceptual artist’s are mystics rather than rationalist. They leap to 
conclusions that logic cannot reach”. Le Witt, “Paragraphs” and Le Witt, “Sentences,” 0-9. 
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and emotion. We can consider this through Barry’s 1969 Projects Class in that it cannot 
be engaged with logically, because there is nothing to ground our position – it can only 
be encountered or perceived through the imagination.  
 
Although 1969 Projects Class is not included in the exhibition Romantic 
Conceptualism, Barry’s seminal contribution to Askevold’s course for students at 
NSCAD allows me to conceive the possibility of an artwork to generate thought by 
provoking the imagination. For 1969 Projects Class Barry sent a series of instructions 
that reads: 
 
The students will gather together in a group and decide on a single 
common idea. The idea can be of any nature, simple or complex. This 
idea will be known only to the members of the group. You or I will not 
know it. The piece will remain in existence as long as the idea remains in 
the confines of the group. If just one student unknown to anyone else at 
any time, informs someone outside the group the piece will cease to 
exist. It may exist for a few seconds or it may go on indefinitely, 
depending on the human nature of the participating students. We may 
never know when or if the piece comes to an end.258 
 
 
 
By inviting the imagination 1969 Projects Class offers an alternative means of 
negotiating with the wider social order by demonstrating how an artwork can fulfil the 
potential to free thought towards a collective process.259 1969 Projects Class can be 
seen to initiate inter-subjectivity and collectivity through the processes required for its 
realisation that a group of students will come together and decide on a common idea. 
The spirit of collective creativity which Verwoert registers in Jena Circle, a community 
of poets, philosophers, dramatists and thinkers, is enforced by this premise. This spirit 
of creative collectivity is articulated in Friedrich Schiller’s Letters Upon the Aesthetic 
Education of Man (1798). Although Verwoert does not reference the Letters or Schiller 
                                                          
258 Concordia, “Canadian Conceptual Art – Projects Class”, accessed November 10th 2011. 
http://ccca.concordia.ca/resources/searches/event_detail.html?languagePref=en&vk=7539.    
259 This twelve-week course was conceived by David Askevold with the support of Garry Neill Kennedy for fine art 
students at Nova Scotia College of Art and Design, Halifax. Project Class was described in the college course 
calendar:  
"For students who do not want to specialize in a specific studio discipline. This course deals with traditional and 
current art concerns and also uses information from other sources. Means of problem-solving are employed which 
seek to avoid some of the presumptions of traditional media. The medium is considered as a vehicle which carries the 
content under consideration and naturally poses its own problems." Mel Bochner, Robert Smithson, Douglas Huebler, 
N.E. Thing Co. Ltd., Dan Graham, Sol LeWitt, Lucy Lippard, Joseph Kosuth, Jan Dibbets and Lawrence Weiner 
were also involved and, like Barry, outlined a specific project on a card that was presented to the class. “Concordia, 
“Canadian Conceptual Art.” 
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for that matter, who was part of the Jena Circle, his Letters inform a Romantic notion of 
art. I draw on Schiller’s Letters because they reaffirm Alberto Toscano’s claim that art 
institutes “other” spaces.260 Toscano, who translated Badiou’s Handbook from French 
into English, designates this space as “other” because it is non-authoritarian and 
maintains this quality furnishes a threshold into a space for thought. Schiller argues that 
by invoking the imagination artworks have the capacity to inscribe a non-authoritarian 
space of discourse because they furnish more open forms of experience and 
exchange.261 This non-authoritarian space of discourse is instigated by aesthetic 
determination or spieltrieb (play drive). Aesthetic determination is proposed to connect 
and maintain a balance of reason and the senses and in this way implicates the free play 
of the imagination. As aesthetic determination is aligned with the imaginary it is 
understood to encompass and embrace all reality because it is without determinable 
limitations.262 In this way aesthetic determination articulates the capacity of art to 
inscribe a non-authoritarian space of discourse. Aesthetic determination is also useful 
when considering the multifarious forms of thought that are raised in Barry’s work 
through processes associated with reason and those associated with the senses. Rather 
than a transference, aesthetic determination bridges matter (sensible) and form 
(thought), initiating a “transition from the passivity of sensuousness to the activity of 
thought.”263 Because there are no images of this work, only anecdotal evidence, 1969 
Projects Class can only be encountered or perceived through the imagination. This 
space that 1969 Projects Class initiates is not confined to the temporal moment enacted 
by the group of students in 1969, it extends beyond this moment to anybody who 
chooses to engage with and experience the mediatory process of this work. 
                                                          
260 Alberto Toscano, “The Sensuous Religion of the Multitude, Art and Abstraction in Negri ,” Third Text 23, no. 4 
(2009), 372 . 
261 Verwoert registers in conceptualism a similar complication of the systematic arrangement of reality that he 
identifies in Romanticism. He observes the political inherent in this refusal of adhering to strict rationalism because 
he sees this as provoking new forms of engagement by which to negotiate the wider social order. Verwoert observes 
the Romantics as developing a “concept of released collective creativity,” through the developments in literature, 
theatre, poetry and philosophical enquiry by the Jena circle. This more open form of creativity as an amalgam of 
disciplines is demonstrated by an affiliation of German Idealism with Romanticism as evidenced by the Oldest 
System Programme of German Idealism (1796). This programme, attributed to the philosophers Hegel and Schelling, 
and the poet Hölderlin, outlines a new way of being in the world through philosophical aesthetics by claiming “the 
highest act of reason, which embraces all ideas, is an aesthetic act.” By maintaining that the philosopher becomes like 
a poet and the poet becomes like a philosopher the Oldest System Programme demonstrates a coexistence of artistic 
and philosophical thought. Through philosophical aesthetics the notion of the philosopher as developing an aesthetic 
sensibility is extended to every individual as “the faculty that places man in relation to the word.” 
Verwoert, “Impulse Concept Concept Impulse,” 167. 
262 By positing aesthetic determination as “the faculty that places man in relation to the world” Schiller articulates the 
link between the aesthetic and the socio-political in Letter XIV.  Friedrich von Schiller, Letters on the Aesthetics 
Education of Man, German Original 1795, trans. Elizabeth M. Wilkenson and L.A.Willoughby (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1967). 
263 Schiller, Letters on the Aesthetics, Letter XXIII 
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3.4 Summary 
 
Although Badiou is not an art critic and does not write about specific artworks his 
formulation of inaesthetics contributes to the ongoing critique of aesthetics that is bound 
into a contemporary reading of art. Badiou’s thought plays a key role in discursive 
space of contemporary art. Badiou contributes to art journals and also presents his line 
of enquiry in public art institutions that include galleries, museums and not-for-profit 
artist-run initiatives.264 However, although Badiou claims inaesthetics is necessary for 
contemporary art, he makes no reference to any forms of contemporary art practice to 
support his thesis. Instead he draws on literary configurations to disclose how 
inaesthetics reveals the operation of the artwork as a specific form of thought.265  
 
My engagement with inaesthetics allows me to develop my enquiry into the relationship 
between art and philosophy and explore how thought might be raised by contemporary 
art. In detailing my reading of Badiou’s “intraphilosophical effect” I observe how 
Badiou’s identification of the unnameable quality of the poem gestures towards an 
inherent quality of indeterminacy and how this quality is crucial to the operation of the 
poem as activating thought. Badiou’s identification of the “demand” of Mallarmé 
coupled with Verwoert’s identification of the “appeal” articulate how they read the 
artistic form to activate thought. These qualities inform my proposition that an artwork 
could invite thought. The term invite is introduced as a key term for the enquiry because 
                                                          
264 For example, Badiou presented his 15 Theses on Contemporary Art in December 2003 in conjunction with the 
publication Lacanian Ink at The Drawing Centre in New York. Other lectures include Does the Notion of Activist Art 
Still Have Meaning, presented in October 2010 and Truth Procedure in Politics Video in November 2006 at the 
Miguel Abrew Gallery, New York. Miguel Abrew Gallery opened in March 2006. The gallery history reads “The 
gallery stages one-person and curated group exhibitions, and organizes film screenings and lectures by leading 
philosophers and critical theorists, such as Alain Badiou, Slavoj Žizek, François Laruelle and Quentin Meillassoux. 
In 2011, the gallery's publishing division, Sequence Press, was established as a collaborative enterprise with British 
publisher Urbanomic and among other titles has released François Laruelle's The Concept of Non-Photography, Nick 
Land's Fanged Noumena, Quentin Meillassoux’s The Number and the Siren, and Spine by R. H. Quaytman, 
http://www.miguelabreugallery.com/EventsAndPostings.htm and The Subject of Art in 2005 at Deitch Projects. 
Although Badiou has not as yet contributed within the framework of a biennial (Badiou’s peer and critic Rancière has 
participated in the Venice Biennial in 2011 as part of the Norwegian pavilion and as keynote at Frieze Art Fair in 
2005), he is nonetheless embedded in the discursive space of contemporary art.  
265 As noted, Badiou looks mainly to literary configurations to disclose the possibility of artistic thought. He also 
looks at other artistic forms in the Handbook, which include theatre, dance and cinema, albeit to a lesser extent. 
Osborne also argues a discrepancy in Badiou’s analysis by observing that Badiou references essentially modernist art 
forms to discuss contemporary art, an observation he uses to support his claim that Badiou is essentially a neo-
classicist. Jacques Rancière follows a similar trajectory in his criticism. He dedicates a chapter,  Jacques Rancière, 
“Alain Badiou's Inaesthetic, The Torsions of Modernism,” in Aesthetics and Its Discontents, 63-88 (UK, USA: Polity 
Press, 2009) (first published in French as Malaise dans l’Esthetique, 2004) critiquing inaesthetics as a return to 
modernity by its desire to categorise and affirm the specificity of art. While accepting these arguments, I see the 
value of inaesthetics to the enquiry because this schema provides an aesthetic framework to support a rigorous 
exploration into the condition of thought in art. 
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it articulates how the thinking raised by art cannot be prescribed because it is dependant 
on the subjects encounter with the artwork. I also draw on Larmarque who to further my 
understanding of the perceptive nature of our encounter with art, confirming my 
observation from my own post-conceptual practice outlined in the previous chapter that 
my works engage on an experiential, perceptive and imaginative level. This affirms 
Osborne’s rhetorical question that asks if the philosophical meaning of the work be 
wholly abstracted from its material means by affirming that the thinking raised by art is 
determined by the artistic form. These insights that arise from my engagement with 
inaesthetics support my provisional proposition that the thinking in art is bound with 
experience. These insights are brought to bear in my analysis of the three event-based 
works that constitute the research project in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: EXPLORING THE PHILOSOPHICAL CHARACTER OF ART 
THROUGH ENACTMENT 
 
 
4.0 Overview 
 
This chapter presents the research project as it is developed through three event-based 
works, Gatherings (Transitory Encounters), Mystical Anarchism and the later iterations 
of Metaphysical Longings (designated by the numerals II, III, IV, V, VII). As the main 
body of the research project is configured by artworks the ambition of these works to 
enact other spaces ultimately defines the ambition of the research project. This chapter 
outlines how the enquiry takes place through the development, enactment and critical 
reflection on these artworks.  Individual accounts detail how these works are enacted. 
An analysis into the philosophical character of these works is developed over three 
discussions.  
 
The first discussion examines how the research project intensifies my engagement with 
philosophical enquiry. Rather than bringing philosophical enquiry and art practice 
together in an explicit manner, I outline how the artwork as event further intensifies the 
entwinement between the domains of contemporary art and philosophy. I present the 
possibility of contemporary art to implicate philosophical meaning by reflecting on 
performative methods used in the enactment of the event-based works.  
 
The second discussion examines how the works advance the working definition of the 
research project. I consider how these works seek to enact other spaces by reflecting on 
the process of staging, drawing on Paul Thom’s analysis of performance and on the 
insights gained from my engagement with ritual theory. I outline how this process of 
staging develops through the research by structuring the event to mirror the tripartite 
stages of ritual. I focus on Mystical Anarchism to reflect on how this process engenders 
interplay between the content and the context and examine the potential of this to 
further implicate philosophical thought on an experiential and symbolic level.  
 
The third discussion focuses on the later iterations of Metaphysical Longings to explore 
the possibility of an artwork to invite thought. I reassert my provisional claim that the 
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thinking raised by art is bound with experience by reflecting on the processes used in 
this work. I draw on Brian Massumi and Simon O’ Sullivan’s reading of affect to 
develop this claim and propose that the condition of thought in art is essentially 
affective. The discussion outlines how my identifying the affective nature of thought in 
my event-based works allows me to conceive of the specificity and particularity of the 
thinking engendered by art.  
 
Before providing individual accounts of the art works I discuss my reading of event as 
an artistic form. This discussion develops from the analysis of my post-conceptual 
practice in Chapter Two that details how the event emerged as a framework to perform 
as the working definition of the research project. This discussion proposes the 
applicability of the event for this enquiry because it presents the artwork as an open 
process that has the potential to extend thought from the jurisdiction of the artist to the 
wider collective. This discussion also introduces the term percipient and presents how I 
formulate this term and argue it as more comprehensive and concise to designate the 
subject encountering contemporary art than the conventional term viewer. These 
insights that emerge from the research project  - the formulation of the term percipient 
and the proposition that the condition of thought in art is essentially affective, are not 
only significant to the enquiry, but are significant in their own right because they 
contribute to the wider discourse on contemporary art. 
 
 
4.1  The Research Project – Three Artworks as Events 
 
The emergence of the event as an artistic form has been hugely significant in informing 
the focus of enquiry and how the research has been performed. I define Gatherings 
(Transitory Encounters), Mystical Anarchism and Metaphysical Longings as events 
because they are temporary and require a gathering for their enactment. I use the term 
event to distinguish these works from theatre and most forms of performance art that are 
more focused on the actor/performer. I also do not name these events Happenings 
because this is now understood to designate a particular moment in art and cultural 
history. Although Happenings are essentially event-based there are certain criteria that 
Allan Kaprow stipulated in his essay, Assemblages, Environments and Happenings 
(1965). The first and most essential criterion is stated from the onset: “A. The line 
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between art and life should be kept fluid and as indistinct as possible.” The third 
stipulation is recorded as “C. The performance of a Happening should take place over 
several widely spaced, sometimes moving, changing locales. This is to differentiate a 
Happening from a performance, which Kaprow describes as,  “A single performance 
space tends towards the static and, more significantly, resembles conventional theatre 
pieces....” Because my works seek to create other spaces, their intention differs 
considerably from the intention to blur art and life that Kaprow proposes. That Kaprow 
later abandoned Happenings for the more generic term Activities due to its overuse in 
popular media also informs my decision to use the generic term “event” in favour of the 
term Happening. I also avoid the terms participatory art and relational art because my 
artworks do not seek to explicitly coerce participation. Nicolas Bourriaud defines 
Relational Aesthetics as artistic gestures that “take] as it’s theoretical horizon the realm 
of human interactions and its social context” and create alternate interactive spaces and 
platforms from communication zones which are constructed and imposed.266 Unlike 
relational artistic practices that utilise collectivity as the content, the collective operates 
in my artworks as the context rather than as the content, furnishing the possibility of my 
artworks to enact other spaces on a symbolic and experiential level. I use the generic 
term event to describe my works because this term admits the “transcategorical” quality 
of the works while conveying their overarching form.267 
 
Because events are temporary this artistic form foregrounds the overarching concern in 
my post-conceptual practice with thought and experience. The development of the event 
as the primary artistic form for the research project has resulted in more large-scale 
ambitious artworks. The event presents an unrestricted artistic form that necessitates 
others to partake in its enactment and realisation. In this way the event presents an 
artistic form that moves towards a collective process extending the work from the 
jurisdiction of the artist to the group. This expansive quality is enhanced through each 
artwork’s enactment as multiple iterations. The artworks cannot be described as single, 
discrete events because they are all constituted by multiple iterations, for example, 
Gatherings (Transitory Encounters) took place over three evenings in June 2008 and 
                                                          
266Nicolas Bourriaud, Postproduction, Culture as Screenplay: How Art Reprogrammes the World. New York: Has & 
Sternberg, 2002.  
267 Yann Chateigné, Manuel J. Borja-Villel and Pedro G. Romero, Bernard Blistène, A Theatre Without Theatre 
(Barcelona/Lisbon: Museu d'Art Contemporani de Barcelona, Fundação de Arte Moderna e Contemporãnnea-
Colecção Berardo, 2007), 226.  
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Mystical Anarchism and Metaphysical Longings have developed through numerous 
iterations over a protracted period of time. The expansive nature of these works permits 
a reading of the artwork as an open process.  
 
In Chapter Two, I described my artworks (drawings, installations, etc.) as artefacts that 
attest to my engagement with philosophy. The insights gained from engagement with 
art theory and inaesthetics enable me to reflect on each drawing as an open process. By 
not presenting a clear philosophical position they necessitate the viewer to formulate 
their own meaning and become involved in the explorative process of enquiry through 
their encounter with these works. The event furthers this notion of the artwork as an 
open-process more explicitly because it provides an unrestrictive artistic form to extend 
the philosophical question of being to others so that they might engage with this 
question in a more direct capacity. The event provides an extra-textual framework to 
develop my overarching concern with thought and experience. 
 
The three event-based artworks, Gatherings (Transitory Encounters), Metaphysical 
Longings and Mystical Anarchism seek to raise philosophical ideas in a non-didactic 
way using performative methods. Although each artwork differs considerably, they 
ultimately share the same ambition to enact other spaces. To fulfil this ambition all 
three events use a process of staging.  I focus on this process to explore the possibility 
that the artworks could implicate philosophical ideas and invite thought. Although each 
artwork differs, each event is staged on a large, over-sized hand-stitched mat (Fig. 32). 
This 17 metre x 7 metre mat took over six months to make and is made from two 
opulent fabrics, cashmere and velvet. Although there was great care taken in making 
this mat, and its size is monumental, I do not refer to it as an artwork. I consider the 
event as the artwork and the mat as a prop that supports the enactment of this temporary 
artistic form. The critic Dorethea Von Hantelmann uses the term “prop” in her analysis 
of Morris’s Bodyspacemotionthings (1971).268 Bodyspacemotionthings comprises huge 
beams, weights, platforms, rollers, tunnels and ramps, with photographs presented 
beside each object demonstrating how they could be used. Von Hantelmann describes 
these works as props because they function in the enactment of this work through their 
                                                          
268 Dorethea Von Hantelmann, “On the Socio-Economic Role of the Art Exhibition,” in Corner-Stones, ed. Nicolaus 
Schafhausen, Monika Szewczyk Juan A. Gaitan (Rotterdam/Berlin: Witte de With Centre for Contemporary Art, 
Stenberg Press), 275. 
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capacity to invite physical engagement. She notes how these objects function to 
transform the spatial and experiential relation of the subject in the space by “trigger[ing] 
self-perception or self-confrontation of the subject, rather than an absorption into the 
object.”269 Von Hantelmann’s reading of the object as a prop “reassigns the emphasis 
from the object to an “aesthetic of subjective and inter-subjective 
experience.”270Although this handcrafted mat does not share the same industrial quality 
of the minimalist objects in Bodyspacemotionthings, it follows the same functionary 
role as the objects in Morris’s work.  The purpose of installing this mat in a gallery was 
not to exhibit an object for a viewer to behold but to support the event by demarcating 
the space and furnishing this space for a group to gather. The conception of the mat as a 
prop reasserts the emphasis on thought and experience that underlines the research 
project.271  
 
 
                                                          
269 The idea of the art object as a ‘prop’ is also exemplified in Brazilian conceptualism through Hélio Oiticica’s 
Parangolés. Although the Parangolés appear as fabric forms, Oiticica made these with the intention that they be 
worn as capes. The intention of the Parangolé is to mobilise specific experiential states in the participants, as 
articulated by the title, slang Portuguese that translates as “idleness, a sudden agitation, an unexpected situation, or a 
dance party.” Oiticica produced the Parangolés with the specific intention that they be worn to perform the samba. 
Rather than art object, the Parangolés would be better approached as a temporary experience that becomes enacted 
each time the cape is worn, used and handed on to another dancer within the gathering (Oiticica fabricated them in 
such a way that they could be easily removed). Like Morris’s components in Bodyspacemotionthings and Oiticica’s 
Parangolés the mat functions within the overarching task of each work to structure experience. How the mat 
functions in the enactment of the event reaffirms the shift in my practice from a concern with artistic form to a 
concern with experience thought and the critical demand of contemporary art. 
270 Von Hantelmann, “On the Socio-Economic Role of the Art Exhibition,” n.p. 
271 The mat was made specifically for the enactment of Gatherings, (Transitory Encounters). The purpose of 
installing this mat in the gallery was to provide a platform for the series of events. On reflection the mat modified the 
conditions of the gallery on the opening night and during the enactment of The Materialisation of the Phantom Muse 
and the screening of The Great Ecstasy of the Woodcarver Steiner. The experience of being in the public space of the 
gallery in stocking feet altered the visitors’ interaction with the space and, more significantly, with one another. The 
softness of the fabric underfoot, being made of cashmere and moleskin, compelled people to sit and recline in the 
formal space of the art gallery. This slight modification to each individual’s physical attitude informed the dynamic in 
the space disrupting the normative mode of interaction that usually occurs on the opening night of an exhibition. The 
presence of the mat disrupted the social hierarchies that are often presented in the art world. The presence of the mat 
seemed to effect the dynamic in the gallery on an inter-subjective level as curators, established artists, emerging 
artists and art students sat/reclined together on the mat in their stocking feet. 
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Figure 32: Hand-made mat of cashmere, moleskin, cotton (17 m  x  7 m).  
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In Chapter Two I outlined how the event emerged as an artistic framework that could 
enact an other space to invite thought. This notion of the artistic event is proposed by 
Schechner who reads the art event as a space to engender thought, describes how they, 
like ritual, “make[s] the space, or create[s] isolated nodes of spatial meaning.”272 This 
reading of art as a space for thought is extended by Toscano by his claim that art enacts 
other spaces to engender thought. Through my reflections on Metaphysical Longings in 
Chapter Two I formulate the proposition that the event provides an applicable artistic 
framework to conduct an enquiry into the philosophical character of art. This 
proposition is reasserted in this chapter by presenting how the non-discursive 
performative processes particular to this artistic event allow me to explore how 
philosophical ideas might be implicated in art. 
 
My reading of event is primarily informed by my art practice. It differs from Badiou’s 
philosophical interpretation of event that is based on the concept of novelty. The 
everyday reading of ‘event’, something that affects change, mediating a ‘before’ and an 
‘after’ in three-dimensional time, is both temporal and narrative. As outlined in Chapter 
Three, Badiou’s event is indeed a moment of change – a fundamental change in that it is 
understood to have no relation to the situation in which it occurs. It is conceived not as 
a link in a narrative chain, but as an absolute novelty, a pure beginning, which is 
literally “unnameable” in the language of the situation.273 Because Badiou’s event is 
something that occurs unexpectedly it cannot be staged.274 This differentiates my 
reading of event from Badiou’s because my events are staged in specific designated 
locations and at particular times. However, although these events are staged they are 
centred on furnishing others to encounter a liminal state as an experience that is “other” 
to our quotidian experience. These temporary artworks exemplify a reading of the 
artwork as an open-process because they are dependent on the collective. Although the 
philosophical interpretation of event in Badiou does not regard event as cultural 
phenomena, it is worth noting that Badiou proposes a requirement of contemporary art 
as “the construction of a new collective.” Badiou maintains that the artwork’s ability to 
                                                          
272 Richard Schechner, “An Interview with Allan Kaprow,” in Happenings and Other Acts (New York: Routledge, 
1995), 188. 
273 Badiou, Infinite Thought, 36-37 and Hallward, Think Again, Alain Badiou, xxiv. 
274 Paul M. Livingston observes that both Being and Event (1988) and its sequel Logic of Worlds: Being and Event II 
(2009) posit if the event is to be truly transformative it amounts to the “sudden, unpredictable advent to appearance of 
a kind of phenomenon that could not possibly be discerned within the previously existing situation.” Paul M. 
Livingston, “Logic of Worlds: Being and Event II,” Notre Dame Philosophical Review, accessed April 2 2014, 
https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/24192-logics-of-worlds-being-and-event-ii/. 
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construct such a collective is essential because the “idea is experienced and investigated 
through the presence of the public.”275 This enquiry uses the event as an artistic form to 
explore how philosophical ideas might be raised on a collective, experiential and 
perceptive level.  
 
The events that configure the research project are premised on a gathering and prioritise 
subjective and inter-subjective experience. The research project raises an issue that I 
identify in contemporary art discourse with the term ‘viewer’. I propose that this term is 
insufficient to designate the subject who encounters my artworks as events. I formulate 
the term percipient in response to this issue, arguing that this term is more 
comprehensive and concise than the conventional term “viewer” to distinguish the 
subject engaged in the artworks within the research project. The act of looking accounts 
for one of many ways we encounter these works and contemporary art in general. As 
noted in Chapter Two, contemporary art incorporates a vast array of artistic forms that 
might not necessarily be encountered on a visual level, for example, there is no visual 
framework to engage with Piper’s Funk Lesson. Similarly Barry’s 1969 Project Class, 
detailed in the previous chapter, can only be encountered through imagination and 
perception. Similarly, little, or rather no emphasis is placed on the act of looking in my 
artworks as events and in the case of Metaphysical Longings the act of looking is 
prohibited as the instruction to “close your eyes” is relayed in each iteration of this 
work. Like Metaphysical Longings, the emphasis in all the artworks that configure the 
research project is on experience and ultimately thought.  
                                                          
275 In this way the event serves as a useful framework to furnish a consideration of the collective directly. The 
collective links the temporal forms (i.e. the now) with the spatial forms (i.e. the here – the presence of a crowd in 
place).  Elie During, “A Theatre of Operations, A Discussion Between Alain Badiou and Elie During,” in A Theater 
Without Theater, 22-27 (Barcelona: Museu d'Art Contemporani de Barcelona, 2009), 25. 
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4.1.1 Gatherings (Transitory Encounters) 
 
Gatherings (Transitory Encounters) marks the first public presentation of the research 
project. This work took place over three evenings from 6pm – 9pm as my contribution 
to the group exhibition Trapezium at The Lab in June 2008 (Fig. 35). Trapezium also 
featured the work of three other Irish artists, a series of paintings by Orla Whelan, a 
collage constructed out of hundreds of small individually etched labels by Sinead O’ 
Reilly and suspended paper balloons by Janine Davidson. For Gatherings (Transitory 
Encounters), the public was invited to the gallery for three events that sought to engage 
with liminality as an experiential and psychological state. Rather than engaging with 
liminality explicitly, Gatherings (Transitory Encounters) sought to develop alternate 
methods of engagement that might instigate a collective form of enquiry in an extra 
textual manner. (Fig. 33, 34) 
 
 
Figure 33 & 34 Research/Working Notebook 
 
A large mat measuring 17 metres by 7 metres was produced in the developing stage of 
Gatherings (Transitory Encounters). Because the mat covered the entire space, (the 
dimensions of the mat mirrored the dimensions of the gallery) the visitors were required 
to remove their shoes when entering the gallery. The three events were enacted on this 
mat. A yoga nidra session was facilitated to inaugurate the first event. The second event 
The Materialization of the Phantom Muse, incorporated an audio-visual performance by 
Dr. John Cussans, and a musical performance with Neil McAvinia and his band 
VooDoo Wray (Fig. 36, 37. A screening of The Great Ecstasy of the Woodcarver 
Steiner (1974), a documentary of the world ski-flying champion Walter Steiner directed 
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by Werner Herzog, marked the final event.276 The mat remained in the gallery for the 
duration of the exhibition.  
 
 
 
Figures 35: Gatherings (Transitory Encounters) (2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36 & 37: Gatherings (Transitory Encounters) (2008). 
 
 
 
                                                          
276 The screening of The Great Ecstasy of the Woodcarver Steiner was kindly supported by the Goethe Institute. 
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4.1.2 Mystical Anarchism 
 
Mystical Anarchism designates an event that was first enacted on August 2nd 2009 in 
Glendalough, Co. Wicklow (Fig. 39).  This event as a secret midnight lecture, was 
developed and realised in collaboration with the philosopher Simon Critchley. It was 
held without authorisation from the National Park. Over one hundred people were 
gathered together on a mat in a forest by the upper lake to hear Critchley’s lecture that 
invoked the Movement of the Free Spirit, a group of 13th century mystics. Critchley 
focused on Marguerite Porete through her strange handbook, The Mirror of Simple and 
Annihilated Souls (and Who Remain Only in Wanting and Desire of Love). Critchley 
disclosed how this handbook led to Porete’s charge of heresy in 1310 and her refusal to 
disavow the message of her handbook led to her execution at the stake. Critchley 
recounted the seven stages that Porete maintained necessary to annihilate the soul and 
bring about a transcendental encounter with the divine. In his lecture Critchley observes 
the political implications of the process of self-deification, outlining how this process 
captures the ethos of the movement by presenting the self as a ‘dividual’. In its 
departure from the individual, the ‘dividual’ subject enables a consideration of more 
socially bound forms of collectivity. In maintaining the spirit is free then “all 
conceptions of mine and thine vanish,” Critchley proposed the tenets of the Movement 
of the Free Spirit as offering a new way of being in the world that adheres to notions of 
freedom and equality.277 Critchley described this process as both mystical and 
anarchistic because the internalisation of religious authority that these mystics practiced 
effectively undermines the hierarchies of the Church and, by extrapolation, the State. 
Following the lecture a conversation was opened out to the group. This conversation 
was drawn to a close after forty minutes due to rain.  
 
Mystical Anarchism also designates a thirty-minute film that documents this intimate 
lecture. A DVD of this film accompanies the thesis. Nothing can be seen in this film bar 
Critchley’s face, which is illuminated by his head torch, and a momentary glimpse from 
a camera flash illuminating the forest where he stands. Mystical Anarchism also 
incorporates an event that took place in Dublin on 28th March 2012 in a semi-
constructed, vacant commercial building in the Smithfield area of Dublin’s city 
                                                          
277 A transcript of the paper Mystical Anarchism is provided in the appendix of the thesis.  
 121 
centre.278 The intention of enacting Mystical Anarchism three years after the original 
event in Glendalough was to screen the film and in this way resume the conversation in 
the forest by the upper lake that had been curtailed by rain. There were three stages to 
the event (Fig. 39). Firstly Edia Connole hosted A Taste of Faith, a last supper for over 
two hundred and fifty people.279 For A Taste of Faith Connole conceived a menu based 
specifically on key ingredients that are referenced in medieval mystical texts (Fig. 40, 
41). Connole outlined the significance of each dish, for example explaining the single 
hazelnut on each plate referenced Porete’s claim that God had revealed the universe to 
her in a hazelnut. Following supper the group were led through the building to the 
second floor. The mat used in the original enactment of Mystical Anarchism was laid 
out for the screening of the film. Following the thirty-minute screening the conversation 
between Simon Critchley and over two hundred and fifty people on the mat that lasted 
over three hours. (Fig.42) 
 
 
                                                          
278 I worked with Block T, an artist-run studio to secure this space for the event. 
279 Brian Hunt, David Fagan and Kathy Tynan participated in this event. This supper was multi-layered, the food 
appeared as ‘slop’ – referencing prison slops and the notion of a last super that is offered to those who are about to be 
executed (think Porete) Although delicious, the formlessness of the food had an abject quality about it. This was an 
important element in relation to the premise of this work in which the participants’ ‘faith’ in Connole, (the chef) was 
‘tested’. A transcript of the paper is provided in the appendix of the thesis. Connole played a major role in the 
realisation of Mystical Anarchism. Connole also features in the film Parodos as one of the thirteen silent masked 
members of the chorus and subsequently facilitated the public conversation with Mark Fisher following his lecture as 
part of The Long Dark Night. 
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Figure 38: Mystical Anarchism (2009). 
An unsanctioned midnight lecture with Simon Critchley, Glendalough, Co. Wicklow. 
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Figure 39: Mystical Anarchism (2012) 
A Taste of Faith hosted by Edia Connole, screening and public conversation with Simon 
Critchley 
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Figures 40: Menu, A Taste of Faith, Edia Connole and Scott Wilson 
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Figure 41: Mystical Anarchism (2012). 
A Taste of Faith - a last supper for 250 people. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 42: Mystical Anarchism (2012). 
Conversation on the mat. 
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The final iteration of Mystical Anarchism (differentiated from the previous iterations by 
the additional title, The Closing of Mystical Anarchism) ran from 18th October 2012 – 
13th January 2013 in the Hugh Lane Gallery, as part of an ongoing project, 
Sleepwalkers: Production as Process, An Experiment in Exhibition Practice, curated by 
Michael Dempsey.280 The first gallery featured the original design of the mat used on 
the invitation. The film Mystical Anarchism was also screened in this space, a small-
scale projection directly onto the wall. A parabolic speaker was positioned above a 
small structure that housed the projector and functioned as a bench for two people. A 
passageway painted in yellow ochre leads from the first gallery to the second gallery 
hidden from view by heavy yellow ochre velvet curtains. The mat that was used in the 
original event in Glendalough and for the subsequent screening in Block T was laid out 
in the gallery. This gallery was dimly lit by a salmon-peach glow and infused with a 
heavy scent reminiscent of the musky smell in a forest. Unlike the previous iterations of 
Mystical Anarchism the philosopher was not present (Fig. 43). 
 
 
 
Figure 43: The Closing of Mystical Anarchism (2012/13) (detail) 
                                                          
280 Sleepwalkers: Production as Process, An Experiment in Exhibition Practice, Hugh Lane Municipal Gallery. 
Artists: Clodagh Emoe, Sean Lynch, Gavin Murphy, Jim Ricks, Linda Quinlan and Lee Welsh. Curators: Michael 
Dempsey, Logan Sisley and Maryisia Wiekiewicz-Carroll. http://hughlane.wordpress.com  
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4.1.3 Metaphysical Longings 
 
Metaphysical Longings has evolved since its first enactment in 2006. To date 
Metaphysical Longings has taken place in four different locations. Although each 
iteration differs they follow the same structure in that a group gathers in a particular 
space and a particular time, lies down, together on a large mat, closes their eyes and 
listens to an audio relaying pre-recorded instructions. These instructions are informed 
by a technique of guided visualisation associated with yoga nidra. There are four stages 
in this instructive process: the first draws attention to the body in space (by focusing on 
particular parts of the body through visualisation and feeling); the second seeks to bring 
awareness of the body in time (by reflecting back on the entire day, focusing on 
particular activities, events, people, objects, etc.); the third stage brings the awareness of 
the world (by imagining particular objects) and the final stage brings the awareness to 
the subject as part of collective (by returning to the here and now and re-engaging with 
the body within group). In the third stage specific objects are listed for the percipient to 
visualise. In yoga nidra these objects are typically linked with images associated with 
the yogic tradition, for example a lotus flower, a shiva lingam, an elephant riding on a 
rat, etc.281 The audio has developed since the first enactment of this work becoming 
more specific so that the content of the audio links with the context (the location and 
time of the event).  
 
Metaphysical Longings II was enacted in the public museum, the National Gallery of 
Ireland, at 8pm on the 10th March 2010 as part of the curatorial project Invisible (Fig. 
44, 45).282 I placed an open invitation in the VAI, limiting the group to thirty. The group 
was requested to meet at the back entrance of the museum. On arrival the group were 
welcomed and led through the darkened length of the Milton Wing to a dimly lit empty 
gallery where a mat was laid out on the floor.283 Once the group had removed their 
shoes and laid down on the mat the audio began. The series of objects relayed in the 
                                                          
281 The deity Ganesh is represented as half elephant, half human and is claimed to ride on a rat. 
282 This project was supported by the Black Church Print Studio in Dublin and was curated by Oliver Dowling, John 
Graham and Mags O’ Brien. I had identified an empty gallery in the museum for the event some time ago and 
following up with the authorities learned that the atmospheric conditions deemed it unsuitable to house precious 
artworks.bngvgv 
283The atmospheric conditions of this room adjacent to the Millton Wing are unsuitable for paintings. 
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third stage of the instructive process referenced the images depicted in the paintings 
hanging in the Milton Wing. For example, “apples on the grass” referenced Walter 
Osborne’s Apple Gathering, Quimperlé  (1883) and “a bolt of lightening” referenced 
the famous Francis Danby painting The Opening of the Sixth Seal (1828). The image of 
the lightening bolt is evocative to many because it was revealed in the following the 
restoration of this work. After ‘waking’ the group remained on the mat for some time 
conversing quietly amongst each other.  
 
 
 
             
 
Figure 44 & 45: Metaphysical Longings II. 
National Gallery of Ireland, Dublin. 
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Figure 46: Invitation to participate in Live@8 from Ruby Wallis. 
 
 
Metaphysical Longings IV took place at 8pm on 30th March 2011, in a pub in County 
Galway. Metaphysical Longings IV was the first of a series of performative works that 
were enacted for Live@ 8, curated by Ruby Wallis (Fig. 46, 47).284 Metaphysical 
Longings IV developed from the previous iteration at the NGI and played with the 
notion of developing the National Programme to a pub in Co. Galway. The National 
Programme involves key institutions lending artworks to regional galleries. 
Metaphysical Longings IV sought to initiate a space so that a group might collectively 
encounter the paintings from the Milton Wing in the National Gallery of Ireland. Rather 
than bringing the paintings to the pub, Metaphysical Longings III sought to furnish the 
group’s encounter with these works on a perceptive level. For example, the evocative 
statement “bolt of lightning” referencing The Opening of the Sixth Seal (1828) enabled 
the group to perceive this painting on a collective level. For Metaphysical Longings IV 
the pub was prepared in advance of the event. All the chairs and tables were removed 
                                                          
284 Live@8 was a bi-monthly interdisciplinary live event in Galway, presenting new contemporary art performance, 
video, film, sound and music in a social context. Organised by Vivienne Dick, Maeve Mulrennan and Áine Phillips it 
ran from April 2008 to June 2013. Live@8 has shown and presented the work of hundreds of live artists, film makers 
and musicians, with each event guest curated by notable Irish and international curators and artists. http://live-at-
eight.blogspot.ie. This particular event included a monologue by Paul Timmoney, a live sound work by Suzanne 
Walsh and an audio-visual piece by Alice Maher and Vivienne Dick. 
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and the mat was laid out covering the entire floor. On arrival to the pub the visitors were 
requested to remove their shoes. When everybody had settled, Metaphysical Longings 
IV was introduced as part of the National Programme. As with the case of the previous 
iterations, the group lay down on the mat, closed their eyes and listened to the 
instructions (Fig. 48). Following Metaphysical Longings IV the group remained on the 
mat, which functioned as an auditorium/stage for the proceeding performances that ran 
until midnight. At the end of the night the audience helped me roll up the mat and fit it 
into my Mazda 121. 
 
 
 
Figure 47: Introduction to Metaphysical Longings IV 
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Figure 48: Metaphysical Longings III. 
Live at 8, Bar 8, Co. Galway. 
 
 
Metaphysical Longings III was enacted at midday on 4th May 2010 in the Gallerie Sint-
Lukas with students from the MA Transmedia course at the Hogeschool Sint-Lukas, 
Brussels as part of a two-day workshop. Rather than outlining how the notion of 
indeterminacy and alternate temporalities could be explored through art, Metaphysical 
Longings III operated as an alternative to a standard lecture to disclose this notion 
through enactment. Metaphysical Longings III sought to enact a space where the 
students might experience the previous exhibition on a perceptive level. In preparation 
for the event I visited the gallery to see the previous exhibition, taking note of features 
that stood out in the exhibition and that were peculiar to the space. These objects 
relayed in the third stage of the audio track which listed features that I identified in the 
exhibition. When it was time to present a lecture I led the group out of the classroom 
into the darkened gallery where the mat was laid out. Metaphysical Longings III lasted 
for forty-minutes. Following this session the group helped roll up the mat. 
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 Figure 49:Research/Working Notebook. 
 
 
Metaphysical Longings V took place at midday in a suburban garden in County Dublin 
as part of a three-day site-specific project Portrait of a Space, 9th – 11th September 
2011.285 This project was curated by Teresa Gillespie and Rose Lejeune and took place 
in Clonlea Studios. These studios are located in a beautiful garden and include a yoga 
studio and a foundry.286 In preparation I visited the site of Clonlea Studio with Teresa in 
advance of the event, taking note of specific features such as the water lilies floating in 
the pond by the studio, a bronze sculpture of a woman that was installed in a tree and a 
strange-shaped tree described by Teresa as a ‘Goddess Tree’. These features informed 
the list of images referenced in the audio (Fig.49). Metaphysical Longings V was 
scheduled to follow Jan Verwoert’s lecture at midday. Verwoert’s lecture “The Devils 
in the Thing Talks to the Devils Out There [sic]” details Verwoert’s perception of 
sculpture as an action performed with things in space. Verwoert posed two questions 
relating to action: What kind of action? And what this space might designate, physical 
space, social space and/or the space of history? After Verwoert’s lecture Teresa ushered 
the group out from the lecture space to the garden, asking them to lay the mat on the 
                                                          
285 Portrait of a Space took place in September 2011 and was curated by Teresa Gillespie and Rose Lejeune. 
http://portraitofspace.wordpress.com Participants include critics and theorists, Jan Verwoert, Andrea Philips and 
Francis Halsall and international artists Thomas Kratz, Sally Ginger Brockbank, Jesse Jones, and Boyle and Shaw. 
286 Clonlea Studio was established by Teresa’s Father, Ronan Gillespie, an Irish sculptor who specialises in bronze 
casting. 
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lawn in between two large speakers. In this iteration of Metaphysical Longings the 
source of the audio was present. The group lay down and listened to the instructions. 
When the group “awoke” they remained reclining on the mat for some time, after which 
they rolled up the mat and squeezed it into my Mazda 121. (Fig 50, 51). 
 
     
Figure 50 & 51: Metaphysical Longings V. 
Jan Verwoert reclining and rolling up mat. 
 
 
4.2 The Research Project – Entwining Art and Philosophy Through Enactment 
 
Since embarking on the formal enquiry, philosophy has become further integrated in the 
activities that constitute my practice. These activities include my participation in a 
reading group focusing on the philosophical interpretation of event and my convening 
The Experiential, a bi-monthly aesthetics reading group. I see these activities as part of 
my post-conceptual practice, because they are crucial to the development of my work. 
These activities also inform the development of the research project because they offer 
point of entry to further engage with philosophical enquiry and have led to 
collaborations with philosophers and thinkers that include Dr. John Cussans, Edia 
Connole and Simon Critchley. This discussion outlines how the research project as the 
development and enactment of event-based works, intensifies the entwinement between 
art and philosophy 
 
Mystical Anarchism marks a significant development in the research project by 
intensifying the entwinement between art and philosophy through my collaboration with 
Simon Critchley. As detailed in Chapter Two, I had been reading Critchley’s 
philosophical writings. Through my involvement with the Event Research Group I had 
the opportunity of meeting him in February 2009. He accepted my invitation as keynote 
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speaker for a seminar Critchley on Ethics, Politics of Resistance in the Contemporary 
World that I had organised with the group.287  The aim of the seminar was to offer 
further insight into Critchley’s book, Infinitely Demanding, Ethics of Commitment, 
Politics of Resistance (2007).288 In this book Critchley considers the possibility of re-
inscribing new ways of thinking about the world, by looking to artistic and political 
methods that remobilise subjective and political agency and overcome the diminishing 
utopian impulse in thought imposed by the neo-liberal situation.  Through this seminar I 
sought to extend Critchley’s enquiry to others and overcome the diminishing utopian 
impulse in thought imposed by the neo-liberal situation I invited the philosopher Aislinn 
O’ Donnell, who was at that time working at the NCAD (National College of Art and 
Design) to respond to Critchley’s keynote paper.  
 
 
Figure 52: Declan Clarke, Critchley on Ethics, Politics of Resistance in the 
Contemporary World, 2009 
Figures 53 & 54: Shane Cullan, Critchley on Ethics, Politics of Resistance in the 
Contemporary World, 2009 
 
 
I also invited artists Declan Clarke and Shane Cullan to contribute to the seminar 
because their work offered examples of how art and art practice might engender 
political agency. Clarke spoke about his recent exhibition, Loneliness in West Berlin, 
(2009) Goethe Institute Dublin. This exhibition centred around the experience of a 
former member of the June 17th Movement, and as part of the exhibition Clarke had 
transcribed an interview with this member in a pamphlet that was made available at the 
exhibition (Fig. 52). Cullan spoke about his artistic/political gesture of presenting a 
memorial for the civilians who had suffered the Second Massacre at Quana in 2006 
                                                          
287 The Event Research group was convened by Dr Tim Stott, and included Dr. Glen Loughran, Dr. Connel Vaughan, 
John Buckley and Edia Connole. This peer-led research group ran from 2008-2010. Speaking Matters is the name for 
a series of seminars organised by researchers at GradCAM. 
288 Simon Critchley, Infinitely Demanding, Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance (New York: Verso, 2007).  
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(Fig. 53,54). Following this presentation he slowly relayed the thirty names of the 
civilians, including children, who were killed in the massacre.  
 
Although Critchley on Ethics… was held in NCAD it was open to the wider community 
and attracted students of philosophy and a wide network of friends who were not 
necessarily associated with the disciplines of art or philosophy but were nevertheless 
interested in the issues informing this public lecture based on the possibility of 
subjective and political agency.289 Presenting a philosophical enquiry into the 
possibility of re-imagining the world in conjunction with specific artistic projects that 
might present this possibility opened up the enquiry by extending the parameters of the 
discursive space.  
 
Although I do not approach the seminar Critchley on Ethics ... as an artwork, I do see 
the development and planning of this seminar as one of many activities that constitute 
my practice. This activity further entwines philosophy into my practice and 
consequently informed the development of Mystical Anarchism. Firstly, my observation 
that the conversation following Critchley on Ethics …. was dominated by academics 
prompted me to me to question the appropriateness of an academic framework to 
engender a more inclusive conversation. This observation plays a key role in developing 
the research project because it prompted me to develop Mystical Anarchism as an 
alternate framework that might extend philosophical enquiry to others through more 
experimental modes of address. Secondly, the opportunity to meet Critchley led to our 
collaboration. This collaboration emerged out of a series of conversations following his 
engagement with my practice and my engagement with his enquiry, specifically his 
paper Mystical Anarchism (that was in a developmental stage). Mystical Anarchism 
focuses Movement of the Free Spirit, an exemplary millenarian movement based in the 
low countries of Europe during Medieval period. Instead of looking to contemporary 
examples, as he had for Infinitely Demanding… Critchley uses a historical lens to re-
                                                          
289 The statement advertised on the GradCAM website demonstrates how the concerns of contemporary art were 
entwined in this lecture: Simon Critchley on Ethics, Politics of Resistance in the Contemporary World: 
At a time of widespread economic crisis and growing social instability, critical thought and practice can work to 
address the political nihilism that results in an apparent poverty of alternatives. What figures, relationships, and 
models of praxis still have relevance and possibility within our situation? Drawing on current attempts to rethink 
convergences between cultural practices, political agency and philosophy around matters of concern to us all, and 
motivated more broadly by an examination of correspondences between philosophy and culture, the Event Research 
Group will stage an afternoon of presentations and discussion that takes as its point of departure philosopher Simon 
Critchley's important contributions to contemporary problems concerning ethics and political resistance 
http://www.gradcam.ie/speaking_matters/simon_critchley.php 
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engage with the past in order to propose the possibility of an alternate, more collective 
model of community. I observed how my practice and Critchey’s enquiry aligned. My 
work sought to engage with liminality in a direct experiential way. Critchey’s area of 
enquiry, Marguerite Porete’s handbook seemed to suggest this state. For example, the 
intensification of experience that Porete describes in her handbook could be approached 
as a liminal state because she claims this threshold state is transformative, in that it 
eventually leads to deification. I also observed that the Movement of the Free Spirit 
exemplified communitas. In his paper Mystical Anarchism Critchley observes the socio-
political implications of the transformation of the individual to the ‘dividual’ and how 
this informs the communist sensibility of the Movement of the Free Spirit, where “all 
conceptions of mine and thine vanish”. 290 Through our conversations I realised how our 
specific enquiries aligned, not only in relation to liminality, but also in the way that both 
enquiries considered the potential of the collective to forge new states of being in the 
world and consequently new ways of thinking about the world. These insights informed 
our decision to merge the enquiry of the philosopher with that of the artist through the 
development of the event Mystical Anarchism. (Fig. 55, 56, 57, 58) 
 
               
       
Figure 55, 56, 57 & 58: Research/Working Notebooks 
 
                                                          
290 A transcript of the paper Mystical Anarchism is provided in the appendix of the thesis.  
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The film Mystical Anarchism also develops the entwinement between philosophy and 
art by presenting an additional artistic form to engage with philosophical ideas. The 
footage of this lecture captured by Thomas McGraw Lewis was originally intended for 
archival purposes. Because the lecture was shot in near darkness all that can be seen is 
Critchley’s face (illuminated by his head torch) emerging out of the darkness (Fig.59). 
From my perspective, the footage evoked the esoteric nature of the content of 
Critchley’s lecture while capturing a quality of otherness that the event sought to enact. 
I felt it necessary to produce a film that could be publically screened. This film also 
presented an opportunity to recommence the conversation between the group and the 
philosopher that was curtailed by the rainfall in Glendalough furthering the entwinement 
and extending the work through the collaborative event in Block T.  
 
 
 
Figure 59: Mystical Anarchism (2011). 
Still from 30 min. film. 
 
 
Gatherings (Transitory Encounters) can also be approached as entwining philosophy 
with art. By departing from a didactic formal mode of explicating liminality and 
relaying ideas pertaining to this intensive experiential state, the three events in 
Gatherings (Transitory Encounters) sought to implicate philosophical ideas associated 
with the notion of liminality through enactment. Instead of using the didactic methods 
that are used in an academic seminar, (i.e. presenting a papers, and using PowerPoint, 
etc.) Gatherings (Transitory Encounters) sought to engage with liminality through more 
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performative methods. The process of psychic sleep that was deployed in Metaphysical 
Longings inaugurated the first stage of the three stages that constitute Gatherings 
(Transitory Encounters). Through techniques of guided visualisation associated with the 
meditative practice of yoga nidra this first stage of the work sought to temporarily 
disengage a preoccupation with the self and initiate a collective experience. The second 
stage of this work, titled The Materialization of the Phantom Muse also uses a 
performative method. Instead of speaking directly about the link between this 
psychological state and liminality, Cussans suggested this experiential in-between state 
by holding a virtual séance with the late feminist writer Charlotte Perkins-Gillman.291 
Perkins-Gillman’s short story The Yellow Wallpaper (1892) describes the misdiagnosis 
of a woman suffering post-natal depression and the trauma that resulted from the ‘rest 
cure’ (requiring the patient to avoid intellectual or emotional stimulation). This semi-
autobiographical piece of fiction articulates the psychological trauma of confinement as 
it manifests as a vision of a woman trapped behind wallpaper. The performance of the 
séance literally enacted a threshold that linked the here and now with the ghost of 
Perkins-Gillman through the interface of the computer that was projected onto the wall. 
More performative methods of engaging with liminality were further developed through 
VooDoo Wray’s blues performance. The notion of a liminal state that is neither here nor 
there, caught “betwixt and between” was suggested through the set that began with You 
Got to Move a traditional negro song about death (as a departure from this world into 
the next and/or escaping from the Southern United States) and ended with songs that 
include Preachin’ Blues (Up Jumped The Devil), by Robert Johnson, Poor Black Mattie 
by R.L. Burnside, and Black Widow by Townes Van Zandt  (Fig. 60).292 Johnson, 
Burnside and Van Zandt’s lives can be interpreted as liminal. Turner’s notion of  
“betwixt and between” is exemplified by the myth of Johnson, who is believed to have 
sold his soul to the devil at the crossroads. Similarly, Burnside was convicted of murder 
having killed a man at a dice game and Van Zandt, an alcoholic and a drug addict, had 
no long-term memory due to insulin shock therapy he had received for bipolar disorder. 
 
 
                                                          
291 Dr. John Cussans’ research is predominantly focused on wayward imagination and mystical belief systems that 
have been pathologised by normative psychology. 
292 Turner, The Ritual Process, viii.  
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Figure 60: Voodoo Wray set list. 
 
 
The third stage of Gatherings (Transitory Encounters) also suggests the subjective 
experiential state of liminality in an extra-textual manner. Although Herzog does not 
use the term liminal in his documentary The Great Ecstasy of the Woodcarver Steiner, 
his documentary capturing the inner turmoil of Steiner during the 1975 Ski-flying 
World Championship also articulates the liminal state as “betwixt and between”. 
Throughout the competition the ski federation authorities continually extend the length 
of the jump and although Steiner realises the dangers of this jump he has an unremitting 
desire to perform this potentially life-threatening act. Herzog’s documentary captures an 
intensification of experience, the psychological state of a man in a state of suspension – 
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caught between his confounding experience of fear and desire. This intensification of 
experience that is disorientating and is classically described as “being outside oneself” 
is evoked through the mesmerising slow-motion footage of Steiner literally suspended 
in mid- air (Fig. 61).293 Although Gatherings (Transitory Encounters), does not bring 
philosophical enquiry and art practice together in an explicit manner, the performative 
processes used in the three events sought to implicate philosophical ideas associated 
with the notion of liminality through enactment.  
 
                        
Figure 61, The Great Ecstasy of the Woodcarver Steiner, 1975 (film still). 
 
 
Like Gatherings (Transitory Encounters), Metaphysical Longings does not bring 
philosophical enquiry and art practice together in an explicit manner. There is no 
philosopher present in this enactment of this work, nor is there a philosophical message, 
only a disembodied voice relaying a series of straightforward instructions.  Although the 
first enactment of Metaphysical Longings was more modest in scale than the seminar 
Critchley on Ethics … (in that only thirteen people participated, as opposed to over 
eighty people attending the seminar) and less ambitious in scale than Mystical 
Anarchism I maintain this artwork offers a more sophisticated, framework to engage 
with philosophical notions of subjectivity. As argued in Chapter Two, although 
Metaphysical Longings was enacted on a patchwork of blankets in a small disused flat, 
it nevertheless offered a more direct way where a group might engage with the 
                                                          
293 Because intensive emotional states are disorientating they are classically described as being outside of oneself, in 
that the person’s experience seems ‘other’ to their normal state of being. Brian Massumi, “The Autonomy of Affect,” 
Cultural Critique (University of Minnesota Press), no. 31 (Autumn, 1995), 83-109. 
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existential question of being in a more experimental and ultimately a more expansive 
manner. Metaphysical Longings offered a more direct way to engage and explore the 
notion of being through the group’s direct experience. 
 
I propose event-based artworks can offer alternate and potentially more inclusive 
framework to explore philosophical ideas. The conversations following these three 
event-based works was more inclusive than the conversation that followed the seminar 
Critchley on Ethics. I also propose that this entwinement can potentially offer new ways 
of thinking. The intention motivating Gatherings (Transitory Encounters), 
Metaphysical Longings and Mystical Anarchism was not to present knowledge and 
relay philosophical ideas through the explication of theory but to extend enquiry to 
others in a non-didactic manner through enactment. These works sought to offer an 
alternate entry point to engage with philosophical ideas on subjectivity by engaging 
with liminality in a more explorative, experiential way. The following discussion further 
examine how an entwinement between art and philosophy is performed both explicitly, 
and, more pertinently, implicitly by focusing on the process of staging used in the 
event-based works to enact other spaces. 
 
 
4.3 Enacting Other Spaces – Staging and Mirroring the Tri-Partite Structure of 
Ritual 
 
This discussion reflects on the possibility of the event-based works to implicate 
philosophical meaning on an experiential and symbolic level. Moving from an analysis 
of the entwinement of art and philosophy, this discussion reflects on the process of 
staging used throughout the research project. In theatre staging designates the use of 
temporary backdrops to create alternate, imaginary realms. This discussion examines 
how the process of staging developed through the research project and how I employed 
this method to enact an experiential, symbolic realm that I define as an other space. By 
reflecting on the development of the research project I outline how I sought to enact an 
other space by mirroring the tripartite stage of ritual in the event-based works.  
 
Gatherings, (Transitory Encounters), Mystical Anarchism and Metaphysical Longings 
are defined as events and not performances, however, their staging ultimately involves 
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what the performance theorist Paul Thom observes as a “performance setting – a space 
set apart from the space of everyday life” and a “performance occasion – a period of 
time structured for the purpose of that performance.” 294 Staging designate key features 
in the enactment of my event-based works that include: the choice of location, the 
timing, the and the use of props, namely a 17 metre x 7 metre mat that is used 
throughout the research project.  
 
Gatherings, (Transitory Encounters), designates the first public enactment of the 
research project. Although I consider the inaugural event (a public yoga nidra session) 
of this work a failure, acknowledging and reflecting on this failure (in comparison to the 
success of the first enactment of Metaphysical Longings) has informed the development 
of the research project by affirming that staging is essential to the experiential and 
symbolic reading of event-based artworks and crucial to enacting an other space. 
Thom’s assertion that a consideration of location and time are essential to the enactment 
of performative event is substantiated when comparing the success of Metaphysical 
Longings with the inaugural event of Gatherings, (Transitory Encounters).  
 
Although spatial and temporal conditions might seem superficial, these are crucial to 
establishing a “performance setting” and a “performance occasion” and inform how we 
encounter the work. In the first enactment of Metaphysical Longings in Pallas Heights 
the spatial and temporal conditions were highly considered, i.e. locating the event in a 
derelict housing complex and timing it at dusk. These conditions informed the 
experiential dimension of the work. As outlined in Chapter Two, the event was timed so 
that the setting sun would bathe the domestic interior space with a peach glow when the 
group “awoke”. The transformation of this room enhanced and seemed to mirror the 
intimacy that was initiated by the shared experience of the group. The spatial and 
temporal conditions also informed the conceptual dimension of the work. A condemned 
building can be read as a liminal zone and dusk can be read as a liminal moment in 
time. Experiencing a transitional experiential state in a liminal zone at dusk might 
enhance the notion of impermanence. I hoped to further implicate the subjective state of 
indeterminacy through my gesture of extending an invitation to “experience the infinite” 
in this particular location at this particular time.295 Staging Metaphysical Longings in 
                                                          
294 Davies, Philosophy of the Performing Arts, 174. 
295 Fig. 21, Invitation to Metaphysical Longings 
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this particular location also intensified the experiential dimension of this work. The 
requirement to travel to this demolition site at dusk, climb four flights of stairs in an 
empty inhabited social housing complex and enter a room in an empty flat with twelve 
other strangers bracketed off an intensive experience that differed from the quotidian 
experience. I had timed the event Metaphysical Longings, so that when the group 
“woke” the atmosphere of the room appeared transformed by the peach glow of the 
setting sun.    
 
   
 
Figure 62 & 63: The Lab, Dublin City Council, Foley Street, Dublin 1. 
 
 
In the case of the inaugural event of Gatherings, (Transitory Encounters), the 
“performance occasion” and the “performance setting” was not fully considered.  This 
lack of consideration undermined the crucial experiential dimension, which in turn led 
to the failure of this work. The spatial conditions at the gallery space of the Lab on the 
night of the inaugural event differed considerably from the domestic space of Pallas 
Heights, detracting from the enactment of the event on multiple levels (Fig. 62, 63). On 
a practical level, the large gallery space at the Lab was much colder that the cosy room 
at Pallas that was heated by a Superser (Fig. 23). As noted in Chapter Two, in order to 
practice yoga nidra effectively the mind and body must be totally relaxed. The 
requirement to remain still over a period of time causes the temperature of the body to 
drop. This distracts from this practice that seeks to transfer awareness from the logical 
and rational to the perceptive. In Pallas Heights the audio could be clearly heard from 
the cassette tape because the space was so small. However, the small cassette player 
was inadequate in the large space of the Lab. Having to concentrate trying to hear 
further distracted from the process of letting go. The spatial conditions can also be seen 
informing the work on a symbolic level. Because the gallery space at the Lab was 
considerably larger than Pallas Heights the small group who arrived for the inaugural 
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event lay down at a considerable remove from one another undermined the possibility 
of instituting a collective experience and transforming the dynamic in the space.   
 
The process of staging developed through the research project and for Mystical 
Anarchism the location and timing of this event was highly considered (Fig. 64, 65, 66). 
Glendalough, a national park situated approximately fifty miles outside of Dublin’s city 
centre, designates the “performance setting" and midnight designates the “performance 
occasion”. This process of staging sought to engender an inter-play between the content 
of Critchley’s lecture with the context of the event. The intention of enacting Mystical 
Anarchism in this “significant place at this significant time” was to intensify the 
experiential dimension and inform the conceptual framework of this work.296 The name 
Glendalough is derived from the Irish Glenn dha Lough (the valley of the two lakes). 
This site is geographically significant, being formed by a fault line in the earth’s crust. 
Glendalough is also culturally significant, being an ancient monastic settlement 
established around the following of St. Kevin, a hermit monk who had previously 
resided on the banks of the upper lake. St. Kevin’s mendicant lifestyle mirrors that of 
Porete’s and the Movement of the Free Spirit. The intention of enacting the event in 
Glendalough was to symbolically invoke the community in Critchley’s lecture. 
 
 
   
Figure 64 & 65: Research/Working Notebooks 
 
                                                          
296 To begin the lecture, Critchley welcomes the group to “this significant place at this significant time”. See DVD 
that accompanies this thesis.  
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Figure 66: Mystical Anarchism (2009). 
 
The liminal state is anthropologically conceived as a “timeless state of being ... that lies 
parallel to our ‘normal’ state of being, or is perhaps superimposed on it, or somehow 
coincides or coexists with it.”297 By enacting Mystical Anarchism at midnight I sought 
to superimpose the artwork so that it might coincide or coexist with the dynamics of the 
site. The dynamic of Glendalough radically changes at night. This national park is no 
longer busy with tourists, hill walkers and families. The darkness obscures the amenities 
and man-made structures such as signs and maps. At midnight the park seems to revert 
back to a mystical site. I sought to gesture towards the element of secrecy associated 
with Porete’s esoteric text and the community of mystics by enacting the event in a 
forest at midnight. Although I did not seek permission from the National Parks 
Authority for a practical reason (namely because they would probably have refused my 
request), the secrecy of the event might also be read as engendering an interplay 
between the content of Critchley’s lecture with the context of the event.298 Midnight is a 
significant time, often understood as a time of potential, a time when we might think 
differently. Badiou’s peer Jacques Ranciére also observes the potential of night in his 
essay The Nights of Labour. In this essay Ranciére reflects on how the auto-didactic 
                                                          
297 Turnbull, “Liminality,” 80. 
298 The decision to not ask permission from the state authorities was also practical decision. I anticipated they would 
refuse my bringing one hundred people to the banks of the Upper Lake at midnight. This observation demonstrates 
how art practice often necessitates  the artist to operate in an anarchistic manner. 
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activities of the proletariat instrumentalised an alternate temporality carving out a space 
where they could institute their own subjective agency.299 By enacting Mystical 
Anarchism at midnight I sought to initiate an alternate temporality, where the ideas of 
the philosopher might be extended to the wider collective. 
 
The collective gathering is crucial to all of the events in the research project. However, 
in his analysis of the performance event Thom fails to register the method of assembly. 
I propose that the way the group gathers together in my work also informs its 
experiential dimension and the symbolic meaning. This method of assembly in Mystical 
Anarchism mirrors the tri-partite structure of ritual. This process of staging was 
developed through a process of reflecting back on the structure of Metaphysical 
Longings. Although I did not plan to mirror the tri-partite structure of ritual in this work 
the three phases – pre-liminal, liminal and post-liminal, can be recognised in this event. 
In ritual initiates are symbolically removed from their everyday experience. The 
requirement of each individual to travel to a condemned building at dusk can be read as 
marking the pre-liminal stage of the event. The collective act of lying together, the 
intensification of experience through the process of yoga nidra and subsequent 
transformation to the dynamic of the group can be aligned with the liminal stage and the 
departure of the group from this space as a newly formed collective following this 
process can be aligned with the post-liminal stage.  
 
By mirroring the tri-partite structure that Van Gennep identifies in ritual, Mystical 
Anarchism sought to enact another space where Critchley’s philosophical enquiry 
would converge in the enactment of the work. The method of assembly is initiated from 
the outset, by the hand-delivered invitation to participate. Partaking in the invitation to 
travel to an undisclosed location, departing from the familiar location of the National 
Gallery in Ireland, in Dublin’s city centre where they began their journey can be aligned 
with the pre-liminal stage. Their return to the city in the coach marks the post-liminal 
stage.  
 
Within ritual theory it has been recognised that a shared experience is crucial to 
activating the liminal state. This sharing of experience is thematised by Turner’s term 
                                                          
299 This pedagogical process can also be registered in Irish history through the phenomenon of the hedge school, a 
secret educational system that literally took place in the hedges during the late 16th /17th century in Ireland 
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communitas.300 Although it might seem grandiose to extend Turner’s term communitas 
to the gathering participating in Mystical Anarchism, the mirroring of ritual in this work 
instituted a shared experience which is understood to enhance commonality. The 
method of assembly affects how the work is encountered on an experiential level, as the 
collective spirit intensifies the experience, enhancing the feeling of anticipation, the 
feeling that something is bound to take place. Mystical Anarchism also operates on an 
inter-subjective level amongst the group, who collectively share an intensive experience 
of being brought by coach to an unknown location, being directed along a dirt track to 
encounter a huge handmade mat laid out in a clearing in a forest, where they would 
gather together to listen to Critchley relay his intimate lecture in darkness. By 
performing philosophy through enactment, ideas on collectivity and utopian forms of 
community were not only suggested through the enactment, but might also be “felt” as a 
shared experience. This notion of inclusivity, universality and collectivity that Critchley 
describes is literally performed through the method of assembly and the enactment of 
the event that implicates all percipients within its realisation and enactment.301 By 
creating a space where a group could gathering together for a discrete period of time, 
Mystical Anarchism sought to extend Critchley’s philosophical ideas on the possibility 
of utopian forms of community to others so that they might be engaged with these ideas 
a more immediate and meaningful capacity.  
 
                                                          
300 During, A Theatre of Operations, 25. 
301 This observation is developed from von Hantelmann’s reading of Daniel Buren’s monumental 65 x 32-foot striped 
canvas which was produced specifically to fill the centre space of the Guggenheim’s rotunda in 1971. This work was 
dismantled before the opening as a result of pressure from other exhibiting artists who felt this work caused 
obstruction to their work. For more see Von Hantelmann, “The Rise of the Exhibition,” 186. 
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4.4 The Artwork as an Open-Process - Inviting Thought and Affective Thought 
 
The first discussion in this chapter introduces the event and outlines how this artistic 
form permits a reading of the artwork as an open-process. I outline how the event 
extends the work from the jurisdiction of the artist because it necessitates others to 
partake in its enactment and realisation. This discussion focuses on Metaphysical 
Longings as an open process, considering the insights gained from my engagement with 
inaesthetics and art theory while reflecting on how this work operates. By analysing 
how this works invites a particular way of thinking I develop my provisional claim that 
the thinking in art is bound with experience to assert that proposition that artistic 
thought is essentially affective. 
 
In the previous chapter I detail how Badiou formulates his understanding of the poem as 
an open process that “demands” our engagement through Mallarmé’.302 Badiou 
identifies the unnameable quality in Mallarmé’s poem as placing the “demand” on the 
reader. In this way Badiou observes that the indeterminate quality that permeates the 
poetry of Mallarmé does not denote inadequacy, but ensures that the poem fulfils its 
task to activate thought. I also detail how Verwoert extends this notion of the artistic 
form as an open process to contemporary art. Verwoert identifies how the reductive 
processes in conceptual artworks, namely Barry’s conceptual propositions, provokes 
each of us to conjure up our thoughts, as he explains, “The idea is actualized through an 
“appeal” to its recipients to realise it within their own thoughts.”303 I also observe how 
Davies follows this logic in his analysis of the performance event by identifying how 
these artistic forms are designated by their “call” to engage.   
 
Davies analysis of the performance event is useful when reflecting on the research 
project because it allows me to reflect on the potential of my event-based works to 
invite thought. In his analysis Davies distinguishes how we encounter artistic forms 
from forms that might also be associated with aesthetic contemplation, such as natural 
phenomena, i.e. landscapes, mountains, etc. Davies maintains that we become interested 
in performance events because they are enacted and realised with intention. He claims 
that once we engage with the artistic form as something intentionally made, or the event 
                                                          
302 Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 27, 29, 52, 63. 
303 Verwoert, “Impulse Concept Concept Impulse,” 165-175. 
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as something intentionally enacted, our interest becomes interrogative. Davies maintains 
that the “call” activates thought by necessitating a distinctive regard to engage with the 
artistic form in that it “requires close attention to the details of its artistic vehicle.”304 
Davies observes how the expressive quality of the artwork communicates the higher 
content of this work.305 In this way the “details” inform how the artwork is received and 
how the “higher level content is articulated through lower level content.”306  
 
Davies analysis is also useful to the enquiry because it affirms my provisional claim that 
the thinking raised by art is bound with experience. Davies’ analysis reasserts Badiou’s 
inaesthetic reading of artistic thought as “inseparable from the sensible” by describing 
how thought is determined by our encounter with the artistic form.307 As Davies 
observes, our encounter with the artistic form (be it object, proposition or event) has an 
ephemeral quality. Like Badiou and Verwoert, Davies maintains this transient quality 
does not undermine “the artistic status of that thing.” He sees this indeterminate quality 
as its determining feature which furnishes the “the higher level content” to unfold in the 
work by extending a “call” for the audience to engage.308 Davies looks to Thom’s 
analysis of the performance event to distinguish how the attention solicited by this 
artistic form is not passive but active. Thom describes the act of attending to the event 
as “playful beholding” (a notion that aligns closely with Schiller’s play drive).309 For 
Thom, playful beholding involves the audience engagement with the actions performed 
in the here and now and those recollected. In this way, such playful beholding attests to 
how an audience might equally attend to what might not necessarily be presented to 
them, such as comparing aspects of the performance with other performances or events 
in their own lives. By identifying engagement as “playful beholding” Thom 
distinguishes how the encounter activates thought and that this thought is perceptive.   
 
Reflecting on the processes used in the enactment of Metaphysical Longings allows me 
to explore how the thinking by art differs from a way of thinking associated with the 
discipline of philosophy as it is academically practiced. The meditative process of 
                                                          
304 Davies, Philosophy of the Performing Arts, 14. 
305 Davies draws on Keith Jarret’s Köln Concert, January 24th 1975, noting how the sequence of sounds produced and 
the richness of the timbre serve to communicate meaning. Davies, Philosophy of the Performing Arts, 135. 
306 Davies, Philosophy of the Performing Arts, 142. 
307 Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 19. 
308 As Davies notes, although our encounter with the artistic form may be of an ephemeral nature, the transient 
quality does not affect “the artistic status of that thing.” Davies, Philosophy of the Performing Arts, 143. 
309Davies, Philosophy of the Performing Arts, 174. 
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guided visualisation used in the enactment Metaphysical Longings informs how the 
work is encountered and ultimately perceived. Like Barry’s 1969 Project Class, the 
objects in Metaphysical Longings can only be encounter through the imagination. 
Barry’s 1969 Project Class demonstrates how the thoughts that are potentially raised by 
his works cannot be prescribed and are determined by the percipient. This emphasis on 
the subject, or in my lexicon percipient, is asserted by Barry, who when asked about the 
reception of his conceptual propositions maintains, “what they do with them afterwards 
is not in my control.”310 Barry’s reflections articulate the unlikelihood of his 
propositions to transfer a single discrete idea because they are unresolved. I approach 
my artworks in a similar manner because they not institute an idea that I authorise but 
instead seek to enact an other space where thought might unfold.   Metaphysical 
Longings emphasises the role of the percipient by removing the presence of the 
philosopher from the enactment of the work. There is nothing in this work that 
evidences the ‘mastery’ of the philosopher or the ‘mastery’ of the artist, because I also 
participate in these works as a member of the group.311 In addition, the audio track 
offers no clear philosophical message. There is no didactic message, only a series of 
instructions from the disembodied voice.. These aspects of Metaphysical Longings 
necessitate the percipient to configure the meaning. In this way the thought that is 
potentially engendered by Metaphysical Longings is determined by the artistic form and 
dependant on the percipients encounter with this form. Metaphysical Longings operates 
through its performativity – not only through the processes used to enact these works 
but, more significantly, by its very nature as an process in and of itself. In the four 
iterations of Metaphysical Longings, the performance of philosophy is not explicit, but 
performed in each event in an implicit manner. Perception and imagination are 
foregrounded in these events which require the group to visualise particular images and 
situations, demonstrating the possibility of approaching philosophical concerns relating 
to the subject and our being in the world on an experiential and collective level. 
 
The notion of the ‘dividual’ and the potential of the collective that is raised on a 
performative level in Mystical Anarchism is advanced further in Metaphysical Longings 
through the form of meditation associated with yoga nidra. Each iteration of 
                                                          
310 Barry, Conceptual Radio. 
311 The content of the audio is further developed in Metaphysical Longings V to further distance the artist as the 
author of this work. Specific pre-recorded instructions that manage the group i.e. the instruction to step onto the mat, 
remove shoes, find a space, lie down, etc. ensures that there is no requirement for the artist to speak. 
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Metaphysical Longings uses the process of psychic sleep, a form of meditation 
associated with yoga nidra. As noted, it is claimed that practicing yoga nidra induces a 
greater sense of engagement and being with the world because it temporarily disengages 
a preoccupation with the self through an intensification of experience. In order to 
experience a threshold state that activates consciousness and heightens awareness it is 
absolutely necessary to disengage the ego through a process of letting go. In each 
enactment of Metaphysical Longings all percipients are bound together by trust through 
this collective process. The process of guided visualisation used throughout 
Metaphysical Longings necessitates the group to engage on a perceptive level. In this 
way Metaphysical Longings might potentially enact an other space where more open, 
less bounded ways of thinking may flourish. 
 
I develop my provisional claim that the thinking raised by art is bound with experience 
by proposing that the thinking potentially engendered by Metaphysical Longings is 
essentially affective. Affect has also been theorised by Brian Massumi and Simon O’ 
Sullivan through the philosophy of Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. O’ Sullivan 
maintains that affect is a “bloc of sensations {sic.}” that are activated by the 
subject/percipient.312 As affect is subject to a range of bodily sensations, it ensures that 
all faculties that become activated through the encounter with this work are accounted 
for. For example, the experience of arriving to a particular location, the sensation of 
lying together on a soft cashmere mat, the act of listening to instructions are as 
important, if not more so, as the ‘appearance’ of the work. This is crucial to a 
comprehensive and considered reading of works like Metaphysical Longings which do 
not operate on a visual level, but on a perceptive level. Because the term affect is not 
only restricted to physiological capacities, such as sight, hearing, taste, smell, touch, and 
audio it ensures that the ‘higher’ senses that are implicated through the enactment of 
this work are captured.  
 
The difficulty to grasp affect on a conceptual level is theorised by Brian Massumi, who 
argues that there is no cultural or theoretical vocabulary specific to affect. Simon O’ 
Sullivan develops Massumi’s claim that affect is extra discursive, being outside 
                                                          
312 For more see Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy? Colombat, “Deleuze and the Three Powers,” 207-223 O' 
Sullivan, “The Aesthetics of Affect,” 125-36. 
 152 
discourse, and extra-textual because it does not produce “knowledge”.313 Massumi 
looks to Deleuze and Guattari and draws on the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, who 
claims “an affect or passion of the mind is a confused idea” and who claims thought 
determined by affect differs from thought associated with logic and reason.314 As 
outlined in Chapter Two the thinking that Metaphysical Longings invites radically 
differs from rational forms of thought associated with analytical enquiry. I propose that 
the thinking that Metaphysical Longings potentially invites is affective because it is not 
bound with the strictures of reason but instead adheres to the logic of experience, 
perception and the imagination. As outlined, Metaphysical Longings seeks to engage 
with liminality in a more direct, experiential level to potentially attain a greater 
awareness of being and collectivity. The intentions that motivate the enactment of 
Metaphysical Longings are not disclosed to the group before the session, nor are they 
divulged when the session is complete. This decision not to specify the intentions is to 
ensure that the meaning of the work remains open. By resisting specification 
Metaphysical Longings allows more perceptive and imaginative forms of thought to 
unfold. This is further asserted in the enactment of this work that has no clear 
philosophical message but seeks to engage through experience. The inherent complexity 
surrounding affect, being bound with subjective (and sometimes intensive) experiential 
states captures nuances of the thought that Metaphysical Longings potentially invites.  
 
 
4.5 Summary 
 
In presenting the development of the research project as it is performed through three 
event-based works, this chapter discloses how the enquiry is carried out through a post-
conceptual practice. The chapter outlines how philosophy is further entwined in my 
practice through the development of the research project. This chapter also presents the 
value of the event for the research project. I outline how I develop this artistic form to 
advance the working definition of the research project by reflecting on the potential of 
the artworks to enact an other space.  
 
This chapter reveals that the process of reflection is integral to my practice, the 
                                                          
313 Ibid. 
314 Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, trans. W.H. White and A. H. Stirling (London: Wordsworth Classics, 2001), 158. 
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development of the research project and the performance of the enquiry. As noted in 
Chapter Two, my decision to use the event as the framework to explore how thought is 
raised by art was not a concerted decision but emerged through my practice. The 
working definition for the research project to enact an other space to activate thought 
also developed through the research process. This chapter reveals that the process of 
staging and the mirroring of the tri-partite structure of ritual in the latter part of the 
research project was not conceived in a definitive manner but rather emerged in a pre-
verbal, intuitive level through the process of making and presenting work.  
 
This chapter develops from Chapter Two by bringing the insights gained from my 
engagement with inaesthetics and art theory to bear when reflecting on the research 
project as the development and enactment of event-based works. It is through the 
process of developing and enacting event-based works that I seek to explore the 
philosophical character of art. I undertake this explorative enquiry by reflecting on the 
entwinement between art and philosophy as it is performed by the research project, by 
analysing how philosophical ideas might be implicated through the research project (by 
registering the explicit and implicit presence of philosophy) and by examining the 
potential of the artworks that configure the research project to invite thought. It is 
through the process of developing and enacting event-based works that key insights 
emerged, these include my realisation of the process of staging, my formulating the 
term percipient and my proposition that the condition of thought in art is essentially 
affective.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
It is only when there is distance from the work that the research project can be 
thoroughly analysed. The process of critical and retrospective reflection reveals that 
many of the key decisions that inform the development of the research project were not 
made at the onset of the formal enquiry but emerged through my immersion in my art 
practice. My decision to use the event as the primary framework and the working 
definition that these events might enact other spaces was not pre-planned, but rather 
resulted from the changes that occurred in my practice. Similarly the process of staging 
and the mirroring of the tri-partite structure of ritual that was used in each work to enact 
other spaces were not formulated as a methodology in a definitive manner but rather 
developed in a pre-verbal, intuitive level through the process of developing, making 
enacting and critical reflecting on actual art works. 
 
Five key insights emerged by addressing the questions driving the enquiry which asked: 
What is the relationship between art and philosophy in my post-conceptual practice? 
How might my artworks raise philosophical ideas and thought? What is the nature of 
this thought? As these insights are interwoven within the thesis it is important to 
identify each insight and distinguish how it emerged through the research project. By 
detailing how each insight contributes to the discursive space of contemporary art and 
contemporary aesthetics. This Conclusion to the thesis aims to present the value of 
conducting an enquiry into contemporary art through a post-conceptual practice. 
 
Examining the relationship between art and philosophy in my practice led to the first 
insight, my identifying an entwinement between art and philosophy in my practice. In 
the Introduction to the thesis attention is drawn to the ‘performative contradiction’ of 
this enquiry that uses philosophy in a conventional manner to analyse the relationship 
between art and philosophy in my post-conceptual practice. Identifying this 
performative contradiction affirms that my use of philosophy in my practice is 
particular. The term entwinement articulates the particularity of the engagement 
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between the disciplines in my post-conceptual practice that I identify as symbiotic. The 
reference to Badiou’s “knot” suggests the enquiry’s engagement with inaesthetics.315  
 
The discussion in Chapter Two detailed how I identify the entwinement between art and 
philosophy in my practice by reflecting on the drawings, The Clear Apprehension… and 
Mapping Nihilion. My analysis of how these works emerged out of my working through 
particular existentialist philosophical ideas presents a radically different form of 
engagement between art and philosophy than the linear form designated by aesthetics. 
As explained in this analysis, philosophy is not deployed to interpret these works nor do 
these works seek to illustrate philosophical ideas. Instead artistic processes and 
philosophical enquiry become entwined through my working through ideas of 
impermanence and indeterminacy. Identifying the entwinement is crucial because it 
informed my observation that philosophical ideas might be further explored through the 
process of art making and revealed a particular way of thinking that unfolded through 
this process. This was tested in the event Metaphysical Longings in its aim to expand 
the philosophical questions of being to others in an extra-textual, non-didactic manner 
through their direct participation in the process of enacting work. This process of 
analysing the entwinement of art and philosophy in this event-based work provided an 
entry point to reflect on the capacity of an artwork to implicate philosophical ideas. This 
methodology of reflecting on the entwinement to explore how philosophical ideas are 
implicated was developed and used to analyse the event-based works that configure the 
research project. 
 
Analysing how philosophical ideas are implicated in my event-based works leads to the 
second insight, that art invites thought. As outlined in Chapter Three, I use the term 
invite to acknowledge that an artwork has the potential to activate thought, but that such 
thought might not necessarily be raised, as it is essentially determined on the subject 
within the dynamic. This insight that art invites thought is informed by my hesitancy to 
co-opt Badiou’s term “demand” (that he uses when reflecting on Mallarmé) which I 
read as too definitive. Instead, by considering more open-ended terms, such as the 
“appeal” that Verwoert observes in Barry’s conceptual propositions and the romantic 
fragment and the “call” that Davies observes in the performance event I formulate a 
                                                          
315 Alain Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 3. 
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way of articulating the intention of the artwork to engage and engender thought while 
avoiding making a definitive claim that all artworks successfully activate thought. The 
value of this insight for a more general understanding of contemporary art is that it 
engages with Foster’s notion of the birth of the viewer by asserting that such thought is 
contingent on the subject within the encounter.  
 
My provisional claim that the thinking raised by art is bound with experience leads to 
the third insight, that artistic thought is essentially affective. This insight is most 
significant to the enquiry because it addresses the challenging question raised in the 
enquiry which asked, what is the nature of artistic thought? The term affect articulates a 
way of thinking that is particular to art. As outlined in Chapter Three, Badiou 
distinguishes artistic thought from the thinking raised by philosophy by registering it as 
“inseparable from the sensible” and “unthinkable”. He confirms this by arguing this 
form of thought is “irreducible to philosophy”, because he sees philosophy as “devoted 
to the invention of concepts alone.”316 As outlined in Chapter Two, I observed that my 
practice generated a particular way of thinking that was bound with experience. As 
noted, I observed how my thinking was bound up with the process of making work, a 
process of action and contemplation and how the transcription of philosophical 
statements coupled with the process of rendering stars allowed me to further 
contemplate and explore notions of being and existence. However, as detailed these 
thoughts were not governed by reason nor are my thought processes systematic. Instead 
the thinking that unfolds from my practice is perceptive and imaginative.  
 
I also observed a link between thought and experience in the encounter with artworks, 
and how the artistic form informed the way one might think. Although my drawings 
directly reference philosophical ideas, they do not present ideas that are fully resolved 
because the strange juxtaposition created by the drawing disrupts such a reading. 
However because these ideas are presented in the context of a drawing and because they 
have not been developed through a system of logical analysis they invariably encourage 
a different form of engagement. This way of thinking that these drawings invite cannot 
be prescribed because it is dependant on and determined by the percipient and their 
encounter with the sensible dimension of the artistic form.  
                                                          
316 Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 9-19. 
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This observation that thought is bound with experience and that it is dependant on and 
determined by the artistic form is developed in Chapter Four by analysing of the process 
of staging and the mirroring of the tri-partite structure of ritual that was used to enact 
other spaces on an experiential level. As noted, within ritual theory it has been 
recognised that a shared and intensive experience is essential to activating the liminal 
stage in ritual. As detailed, I sought to enhance the experiential dimension of Mystical 
Anarchism by staging this work at midnight in a secret location and sought to initiate a 
shared and intensive experience through the mode of assembly. I also sought to initiate 
a shared and intensive experience through collective meditation in Metaphysical 
Longings. As outlined in Chapter Four, the inherent complexity surrounding affect, 
being bound with subjective, and sometimes, intensive experiential states, is valuable 
when reflecting on these works because it captures the nuances of thought that these 
works might invite.  
 
By defining artistic thought as affective reaffirms that the thinking that unfolds through 
the encounter with art is not bound to the strictures of reason or logic. As detailed in 
Chapter Four, Massumi asserts this point by claiming that affect is extra discursive, 
being outside discourse, and extra-textual because it does not produce ‘knowledge’.317 
The difficulty to grasp affect on a conceptual level is theorised by Massumi, who claims 
that there is no cultural or theoretical vocabulary specific to affect. In response to 
Massumi I argue that contemporary art provides a unique “vocabulary” to engage with 
affect by observing how the artworks in this research project operate on an affective 
level. As affect is subject to a range of bodily sensations, it ensures that all senses, 
including the higher sense of perception that is activated through the encounter with the 
event-based works, are accounted for. By registering that artistic thought is essentially 
affective articulates that the thinking raised by art is bound up with the artistic form, the 
encounter, the percipient, and their experience.  
 
The fourth insight, the formulation of the term percipient, developed from my 
awareness that vision is not necessarily the predominant way that we encounter 
contemporary art. Indentifying that perception is the predominant way that we 
                                                          
317 Brian Massumi, “The Autonomy of Affect,” Cultural Critique (University of Minnesota Press), no. 31 (Autumn, 
1995), 83-109. Massumi observes the difficulty to grasp affect on a conceptual level and claims that there is no 
cultural or theoretical vocabulary specific to affect. The research project provides a context to explore how 
contemporary art could provide a ‘vocabulary’ specific to affect through event-based works. 
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encounter all forms of contemporary art (from my analysis of art theory detailed in 
Chapters One and Three and from my reflecting on my own work) informed my 
developing the term percipient as a more comprehensive and precise alternative to the 
term viewer. Although the term percipient does not appear until in the fourth and final 
chapter, the necessity for a new term to define the subject of contemporary art is raised 
in the first chapter of the thesis.318 My analysis of art theory detailed in Chapter One 
reveals how the radical transformations in artistic practice, (through minimal, 
conceptual and post-conceptual practices) necessitated different forms of engagement 
than just vision alone. As Foster observes, the minimalist’s concern with the subjects’ 
experience that instigated a radical shift form the modernist reading of art as an 
idealised form disrupted the visual bias that had been upheld by formal aesthetics. 
Danto also reflects on developments in art practice and how works like, Warhol’s Brillo 
Boxes and Piper’s Funk Lesson could no longer be thematised by traditional aesthetic 
categories that focused on the visual aspect of the artwork. In the case of Funk Lesson 
Danto observes how the overarching concern with equality and inclusion is brought to 
bear through the work itself and observes how the meaning of the work is essential. 
 
If meaning is essential how might we engage with this fundamental aspect of 
contemporary art?  Although the enquiry does not explicitly pose this question the 
insight that artistic thought is essentially affective asserts perception as the primary 
mode of engagement. Perception is introduced in Chapter One through Foster’s analysis 
of minimalism, a moment that he defines as the crux of contemporary art. As outlined, 
Foster maintains that the emphasis on experience in minimalism relocated the act of 
thinking from the privileged domain of philosophy to the domain of the subject and 
their encounter with the work. As thought and experience come into play in this 
encounter he argues that minimalism operates on a perceptive level. My understanding 
that contemporary art in all its multifarious forms is ultimately perceived, is also guided 
by Osborne’s reading of contemporary art as the reflective mediation of concept and 
affect. Through this reading contemporary art cannot be engaged with on a purely 
analytical level because it acknowledges the experiential within the conceptual 
framework. This observation that the sensible dimension of the artistic form is essential 
to the reading of the work and that this necessitates more perceptive forms of 
                                                          
318 It is remarkable that Morris also retained the term viewer in his writings on art when these texts dealt primarily 
with the external relations of art and the physical nature of the encounter with art.  
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engagement is developed in Chapter Three through Verwoert and Heiser’s revisionist 
reading of conceptualism. As detailed, Heiser’s observation of an intellectual-emotional 
combination in key conceptual artworks that restrict them from operating on a purely 
cognitive level as strict conceptualists would assert. Verwoert develops this insight by 
observing an emotional quality in Barry’s conceptual propositions. Lamarque’s poetic 
treatment of conceptualism also asserts perception as the overarching mode to engage 
with the conceptual proposition because it suggests meaning rather than presenting a 
formulated idea. Similarly, Badiou also acknowledges perception in his reading of the 
poem as an “operation” that activates the “sensory perception of a regime of 
thought”.319 All of the artworks referenced in Chapters One and Three differ 
significantly in their form, I observe that they ultimately share the same mode of 
engagement. For example, the minimalist object differs significantly from the 
dematerialised conceptual proposition, as does the participatory art events that 
incorporate dance and music from the poem. However as detailed in Chapters One and 
Three the meaning of these diverse artistic forms are ultimately engaged with through 
perception.  
 
 
When compiling the accounts of Gatherings (Transitory Encounters), Mystical 
Anarchism and Metaphysical Longings for the final chapter of the thesis it became clear 
that the term viewer was not appropriate to describe the people gathered together for 
each event. It seemed inappropriate to define those present at Mystical Anarchism as 
viewers when detailing that the first iteration of this event, was for the most part in near 
darkness. Furthermore, in it’s form as a midnight lecture Mystical Anarchism was 
primarily engaged with on an aural level. However, as detailed in the account, there 
were many aspects to this work, for example the act of meeting in Dublin’s city centre 
and travelling on a coach with others to an undisclosed location, the arrival at a dark 
forest and the requirement to follow a dirt track to a large mat that was laid out under a 
canopy of trees. It is believed that darkness can enhance other senses, for example the 
sounds in the forest became more amplified at night and the scent of the vegetation can 
become more intensive. Darkness also enhances the sense of touch, and as people try to 
negotiate their way in the dark, they inevitably move closer to one another. These 
                                                          
319 Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 19. 
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crucial aspects do not necessitate sight, but instead necessitate more perceptive forms of 
engagement. The inappropriateness of the term viewer becomes more apparent when 
noting that those present at each event are explicitly instructed to close their eyes.  
 
Although photographic documentation of the artwork is provided in the thesis, they do 
not provide an adequate framework to fully engage with the complexity of these works. 
This is because the emphasis of my events is not on their appearance but on the way that 
they are experienced and perceived.320  The term percipient acknowledges the 
perceptive faculties such as feeling, and imagination that are mobilised through the 
artworks as events i.e. an awareness of physicality, the realisation of the passage of 
time, the transformation to the dynamic between individuals or within a group, a feeling 
of commonality etc. and provides a more appropriate term to describe those present at 
each event. The term percipient also articulates how the artworks depend on others to 
achieve the overarching aim to enact other spaces on an experiential and symbolic 
level. As argued in my analysis, in order for a work to exist it must be realised and 
perceived.  
 
The term percipient ensures that the conceptual aspect of contemporary art and its 
experiential dimension is acknowledged. Moving from my specific enquiry to a more 
general reading of contemporary art, I maintain that the term percipient provides a more 
apposite term to define the subject of contemporary art. Furthermore, I see the term 
viewer as upholding a modernist reading of art as an object to be beheld by the viewer’s 
gaze. The term percipient overcomes this issue by ensuring that all forms of 
engagement initiated by the multifarious range of artistic forms are accounted for. In 
this way, the percipient provides a more comprehensive term to engage with 
contemporary art because it articulates the overarching way we engage with 
contemporary art in all of its multiple forms, be it an minimalist object, a conceptual 
proposition, a temporary event-based work or a poem.  
 
The fifth insight, my claim that inaesthetics is an expansion of, rather than a departure 
from aesthetics has not featured in the thesis up until this point, mainly because it does 
                                                          
320 The photographic documentation is provided in the thesis to illustrate how these works were staged and to provide 
an archive of the iterations of the artwork as they developed. The photographic documentation of Metaphysical 
Longings II and Metaphysical Longings IV  (Fig. 43, 44) were re-staged to avoid disrupting the enactment of this 
work. Similarly the photographs archiving my research/working notebooks are provided to enhance the reflective 
process by presenting the development of the research project. 
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not directly address the three questions driving the enquiry. However, this insight 
ultimately emerges from undertaking this enquiry, and is significant to the enquiry 
because it opens up how we might approach aesthetics for contemporary art. Although 
my reading of inaesthetics as expanding aesthetics differs from Badiou, who maintains 
it is against aesthetics, I propose inaesthetics opens up aesthetics for contemporary art. 
As detailed in Chapter One, Osborne, Foster and Danto, acknowledge the necessity for 
a new aesthetic configuration for contemporary art by observing how aesthetics lacked 
the critical resources to engage with developments in art practice. These readings also 
demonstrate how the lineage of contemporary art is bound up with the question of 
aesthetics. I maintain this bind further necessitates the configuration of a new aesthetics 
for contemporary art. Although Osborne claims that the turn to European philosophical 
tradition has “failed to achieve a convincing theoretical purchase on contemporary art,” 
I argue that inaesthetics achieves a “theoretical purchase” in the way that it engages 
with the complicated relation between art and aesthetics that underlines contemporary 
art.321 Although Osborne takes issue with Badiou (claiming that he is a neo-classicist), I 
argue that inaesthetics contributes to aesthetic discourse by troubling the interpretative 
role of philosophy, which in turn re-asserts the possibility that we can think through 
art.322  
 
We might see inaesthetics as developing from Danto’s thesis that raises the inadequacy 
of aesthetics for contemporary art by asserting the possibility that we can think through 
art. Although Danto dismisses aesthetics as a viable enquiry for artistic practice, it is 
clear that expanding aesthetics is within his remit, when he states, “I feel that expanding 
this range will itself be a philosophical project. But it falls outside of the range of 
defining art…” Although Danto does not undertake this task, his End of Art thesis 
nevertheless highlights the requirement for a new schema that redefines the relationship 
between art and philosophy. Although Badiou makes no reference to Danto, I approach 
inaesthetics as fulfilling Danto’s demand to “expand the range” of aesthetics for 
                                                          
321 Osborne, "Art Beyond Aesthetics,” 9.  
322 Although Osborne is critical of Badiou’s overarching philosophical system of thought, his reading of 
contemporary art also acknowledges an alternative engagement between art and philosophy that is designated by the 
general reading of aesthetics. Osborne maintains that Badiou’s articulation of a “(re)turn to philosophy” in Being and 
Event presents a neo-classical  interpretation of philosophy, citing Adorno’s sense of neo-classicism as “a historical 
regression to means and forms that no longer have any social objectivism, however formally ‘objectivist’ they may 
appear.” Peter Osborne, “Neo-classic: Alain Badiou’s Being and Event,” Radical Philosophy 142 (March/April 
2007): 19-30. For a counter position on this criticism see, Hollis Phelps, “ Between Rupture and Repetition: 
Intervention and Evental Recurrence in the Thought of Alain Badiou ,” Parrhesia, no 5 (2008): 60-72. 
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contemporary art by proposing a fourth schema that re-orientates the role of philosophy 
in respect to art.323 As detailed in Chapter Three, by undermining the interpretative role 
of philosophy, inaesthetics re-orientates the role of philosophy in respect to art and 
configures a new schema that sustains a productive rather than a contentious bind with 
contemporary art because it advances the primacy of art for thought.  
 
Although Badiou’s epigraph prefacing the Handbook of Inaesthetics presents 
inaesthetics as against aesthetics I see it as unavoidably situated within the discursive 
field of contemporary aesthetics. This argument has also been advanced by Jacques 
Rancière. He claims, “Even as it tries to ward off aesthetics perhaps inaesthetics thereby 
enters into a new dialogue with it.” Although Rancière is critical of inaesthetics, he 
nevertheless argues that, inaesthetics puts aesthetics “back into play, if not into 
question, the operations through which it sought to challenge the logic of the aesthetic 
regime of the arts.”324 I argue that inaesthetics ultimately presents a new aesthetic 
configuration by challenging the general understanding of aesthetics as the 
philosophical interpretation of art.  As outlined in the brief précis in Chapter One, 
aesthetics is not a rigidly defined discipline, but one that is continually evolving. As 
noted, Perniola observes that interpretations of aesthetics emerged, and continue to 
emerge, through a series of ongoing ruptures within previous aesthetic categories.325 He 
notes that these ruptures do not necessarily close down aesthetic enquiry but ultimately 
reactivate and expand our engagement with the discourse on a critical level.326 By 
rupturing the interpretative role of philosophy in the general conception of aesthetics, I 
approach inaesthetics as reactivating a critical engagement with aesthetics and 
ultimately expanding the discourse.  
 
An expansion of discourse is not only achieved by a future trajectory of conjecture, 
discourse can also be expanded by a retroactive reflection on past configurations and 
                                                          
323 Although Danto’s claim for the unequivocal separation of art and philosophy is ostensibly in contrast to Badiou’s 
inaesthetics (as an amalgam of these disciplines), both philosophers are profoundly sceptical of the interpretative role 
of philosophy in aesthetics. Danto, “The End of Art,” 131 -134.   
324 Jacques Rancière, “Aesthetics, Inaesthetcis, Anti-Aesthetics,” in Think Again: Alain Badiou and the Future of 
Philosophy, ed. Peter Hallward, 218-232 (London, New York: Continuum, 2004), 231. 
Rancière’s criticism of inaesthetics as a return to modernity and a desire to affirm the specificity of art is levelled in 
the chapter “Alain Badiou’s Inaesthetics”, in Aesthetics and its Discontents, (2009), (first published Malaise dans 
l’Esthetique, 2004). 
325 Mario Perniola, “Cultural Turns in Aesthetics and Anti-Aesthetics,” Filozofski Vestnik XXVIII, no. 2, (2007): 39-
51. 
326 Perniolla, Cultural Turns in Aesthetics and Anti-Aesthetics, 39. 
 163 
interpretations. This process is exemplified by Foster’s anti-aesthetic practice that 
informs his reading of contemporary art. Foster proposes anti-aesthetics revises the 
eclipsed space of aesthetic enquiry in the way that it responds to the closure to more 
critical experimental forms of art practice in the mid 1980s, (see footnote 35) Badiou 
similarly formulates inaesthetics in response to a similar “closure” to more critical 
experimental forms of art practice that he identifies in the mid 1990s.327 However, by 
reasserting the underlying principles of philosophical aesthetics that inform 
Romanticism, such as the formation of the subject, our being in the world and world 
making in general, I maintain inaesthetics also revises the eclipsed space of aesthetic 
enquiry so that it can re-engage with contemporary art. Although Badiou configures 
inaesthetics as an alternate to Romanticism because it de-sutures truth from art (to 
ensure that truth is no longer “sutured” to only one of its conditions) it nevertheless 
asserts a Romantic conception of thought being immanent to art. Inaesthetics also 
reasserts sensuous forms of knowledge that Romanticism espoused as demonstrated by 
Badiou’s reading of Mallarme’s poems as “a thought inseparable from the sensible.”328 
By rearticulating key principals associated with philosophical aesthetics through a new 
schema, inaesthetics does not perform a complete departure from aesthetics, it expands 
aesthetics for contemporary art.  
 
I maintain that inaesthetics has the critical resources to engage with the condition of 
thought in contemporary art that previous forms of aesthetics lacked.329 My use of 
inaesthetics as a theoretical guide to explore the specificty of artistic thought that my 
event-based works could invite, reveals its value to the artist/researcher. As noted 
previously, inaesthetics enables me to identify and reflect on the entwinement of art and 
philosophy in my post-conceptual practice and in the event-based works that configure 
the research project. In this way inaesthetics provides a guide to engage with the 
specific form of thought that my works invite and informs the key insight that emerges 
out of this enquiry, that artistic thought is essentially affective .  
 
As detailed in Chapter Three, although Badiou claims inaesthetics is necessary for 
contemporary art, he makes no reference to any forms of contemporary art practice to 
                                                          
327 Badiou, The Handbook of Inaesthetics, 8.  
328 Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 19. 
329 Osborne, "Art Beyond Aesthetics,” 9. 
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support his thesis but focuses draws on literary configurations to disclose how 
inaesthetics reveals the operation of the artwork as a specific form of thought.330 Just as 
Badiou’s use of literary configurations is informed by his personal and direct 
engagement with the literary form, being a novelist, playwright and a philosopher, my 
personal and direct engagement with contemporary art practice informs this enquiry. 
Although Badiou claims inaesthetics as necessary for contemporary art he offers no 
examples from contemporary art practice to assert his claims. This lacuna in his thesis 
reveals the value of my enquiry into contemporary art because it is centred around 
actual  art works that I develop and enact. Through inaesthetics Badiou reflects on a 
particular engagement between philosophy and art from the vantage point of the 
philosopher. Through this enquiry I reflect on the particular engagement between art 
and philosophy that is performed through a post-conceptual art practice. This 
distinguishes the reflective aspect of this enquiry as one pursued from the perspective of 
the artist.331   
 
The value of an enquiry through practice is affirmed by the configuration of ‘new 
knowledge’ through the curatorial project Romantic Conceptualism. Through a 
curatorial practice and the framework of the exhibition Heiser and Verwoert formulate a 
new reading of conceptualism as romantic. Similarly, the insights yielded from this 
enquiry affirm that an enquiry through art practice can produce ‘new knowledge’ that 
contributes to contemporary art discourse and contemporary aesthetics. Situating an 
enquiry into the philosophical character of contemporary art in a post-conceptual art 
practice provides a context to reflect on the relationship between contemporary art and 
philosophy and more rigorously examine the particular form of engagement between 
these disciplines as they are played out through art practice. Had this enquiry been 
carried out through theory alone I might not have observed that the thinking raised by 
art is bound with experience or conceived the artwork as inviting thought and that such 
                                                          
330 As noted, Badiou looks mainly to literary configurations to disclose the possibility of artistic thought. He also 
looks at other artistic forms in the Handbook, which include theatre, dance and cinema, albeit to a lesser extent. 
Osborne also argues that there is a discrepancy in Badiou’s analysis by observing that Badiou references essentially 
modernist art forms to discuss contemporary art, an observation he uses to support his claim that Badiou is essentially 
a neo-classicist. Jacques Rancière follows a similar trajectory in his criticism. He dedicates a chapter, “Alain Badiou's 
Inaesthetic, The Torsions of Modernism,” in Aesthetics and Its Discontents, 63-88 (UK, USA: Polity Press, 2009) 
(first published in French as Malaise dans l’Esthetique, 2004) critiquing inaesthetics as a return to modernity by its 
desire to categorise and affirm the specificity of art. While accepting these arguments, I see the value of inaesthetics 
to the enquiry because this schema provides an aesthetic framework to support a rigorous exploration into the 
condition of thought in art. 
331 Riera, Alain Badiou, Philosophy and its Conditions, 80.  
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thought is affective. Similarly, the term percipient that I use in the analysis of the 
research project might not have emerged without my having to reflect on the event-
based works. I also maintain that my engagement with inaesthetics from the side of art 
practice instead of theory alone offered a new perspective that informed my re-
interpreting inaesthetics as an expansion of aesthetics because I could apply this 
reconfigured aesthetic framework to engage with the conceptual and experiential 
aspects of my work. 
 
My struggle with writing this thesis, of trying to adhere to a systematic form of 
argumentation and theory building demonstrates explicitly how thinking through 
practice differs radically from the thinking required to explicate clearly the nuances and 
development of a research project. However, in undertaking this research project I have 
come to realise the requirement to capture these insights that are raised through practice 
to extend and develop our general understanding of contemporary art. Although I note 
that the lineage of contemporary art is informed by the developments in art practice, it is 
necessary to acknowledge how specific readings of these practices also play a crucial 
role in extending the horizon of contemporary art. This is demonstrated clearly in the 
thesis through Osborne, Foster and Danto’s readings of contemporary art and Verwoert 
and Heiser’s revisionist reading of conceptualism. Although this conventional method 
of exposition seems at odds with my practice, it provides a framework to present how 
such an enquiry through practice reveals a particular way of engaging with 
philosophical ideas and a particular way of thinking from the perspective of the artist. In 
this way the thesis reveals the more systematic process of critical reflection, analysis 
and evaluation that I use in the later stages of the enquiry. I hope to have presented how 
the diverse processes that configure the post-conceptual practice and accordingly the 
research project informs a more robust if not at the very least an alternative form of 
enquiry. I also hope to have demonstrated my endeavour to maintain a candid and 
honest reading of my practice through specific artworks so that this enquiry fulfils its 
task of contributing to the discourse on contemporary art and the development of 
contemporary aesthetics. 
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APPENDIX I: UN COUP DE DÉS, STÉPHANE MALLARMÉ 
 
 
  
UN COUP DE DÉS 
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
JAMAIS 
  
  
                                                                                 QUAND BIEN MÊME LANCÉ 
DANS DES 
CIRCONSTANCES                                                                                   ÉTERNELLE
S 
  
DU FOND D'UN NAUFRAGE 
  
    
 
  
Soit 
         que 
                l'Abîme  blanchi               étale                       furieux                                     
  sous une inclinaison                                                      planche 
désespérément                                                                                         d'aile                  
                                                                  la 
sienne                                                                                           par             avance 
retombée d'un mal à dresser le 
vol                                                                                                                                    
      et couvrant les 
jaillissements                                                                                                                      
                        coupant au ras les bonds 
                                                                                                                               très à 
l'intérieur résume                                                                                        l'ombre 
enfouie dans la profondeur par cette voile alternative 
                                                                                                          
jusqu'adapter                                                                                                   sa béante 
profondeur entant que la coque 
                                                                                                                       d'un bâtiment 
                                                                                                                                penché 
de l'un ou l'autre bord 
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             LE MAÎTRE                                             hors d'anciens 
calculs                                                                                où la manoeuvre avec l'âge 
oubliée   surgi                                                                                         jadis il 
empoignait la barre        inférant                               de cette configuration          à ses 
pieds                                                                                                    de l’horizon 
unanime                                                             que 
se          prépare                                                                                          s'agite et 
mêle                                                                                              au poing qui 
l'étreindrait                                   comme on menace             un destin et les vents 
          l'unique Nombre qui ne peut pas             être un 
autre                                                                                                                Esprit         
                                                                                                                  pour le 
jeter                                                                                                                                     
            dans la 
tempête                                                                                                                               
    en reployer la division et passer 
fier                                                             hésite                                     cadavre par le 
bras           écarté du secret qu'il détient  plutôt             que de jouer                    en 
maniaque chenu                                    la partie                    au nom des 
flots                                                                    un             envahit le 
chef                                                                                      coule en barbe 
soumise                                               naufrage cela             direct de 
l'homme                                                                                              sans 
nef                                                                                                 n'importe          
                                                                                                                     où vaine 
 
  
  
ancestralement à n'ouvrir pas la 
main                                                                     crispée            
                                          par delà l'inutile tête         legs en la 
disparition                                         à quelqu'un 
                                                                   ambigu                                   l'ultérieur 
démon immémorial  ayant              de contrées 
nulles                                                  induit  le vieillard     
avec la 
probabilité                                                                celui                                                  
                      son ombre puérile  caressée      
lavée                                            assouplie par la vague et 
soustraite                                          aux durs os perdus entre les ais     
                                                                   né                                                                     
    d'un ébat  la m er par l'aïeul tentant ou l'                               ne 
chance oiseuse                                                                                           Fiançailles 
 dont           le voile d'illusion rejailli leur hantise           ainsi que le fantôme d'un 
geste                                                chancellera                                                s'affalera
                                                                       folie   
                                                                                                                           N'ABOLI
RA   
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COMME SI 
                                                       Une insinuation                   simple 
                                                                  au silence                  enroulée avec 
ironie                                                                                                      
                                       ou                                                                                                 
                                               le 
mystère                                                                                                                                
                                  précipité                                                                                            
                                                                                      hurlé 
                                             dans quelque proche                   tourbillon d'hilarité et 
d'horreur 
                                                                         voltige                    autour du 
gouffre                                                                                                                                
                    sans le 
joncher                                                                                                                                
                                            ni fuir 
                                                                      
                                                                        et en berce le vierge indice 
  
                                                                                                                                             
                                COMME SI 
  
  
 
  
  
         plume solitaire éperdue 
                                                                 sauf                             que la rencontre ou 
l'effleure une toque de 
minuit                                                                                                                                  
            et 
immobilise                                                                                                              au 
velours chiffonné par un esclaffement sonore 
                                                                                                               cette blancheur 
rigide 
                                                                                                      dérisoire                        
                                                                                                        en opposition au 
ciel                                                                                                                        
 trop                                                                                                                                 
pour ne pas 
marquer                                                                                                                              
                                exigüment                                                                                            
                                                                             quiconque 
                                                                                                                                 prince 
amer de l'écueil 
                                                                                                                               s'en 
coiffe comme de 
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l'héroïque                                                                                                                            
                    irrésistible mais 
contenu                                                                                                                               
      par sa petite raison virile 
                                                                                                                                             
                                    en foudre 
  
 
  
  
  
soucieux                   expiatoire et 
pubère                                                                                   muet                                    r
ire 
                                                                                                                                             
   que                                                                                                                                   
                                        SI     
                                                           La lucide et seigneuriale aigrette             de 
vertige                                                                                      au front 
invisible                                                                  scintille                                               
                                     puis ombrage                                                            une stature 
mignonne ténébreuse          debout                                                                            en sa 
torsion de 
sirène                                                                                                                                  
          le 
temps                                                                                                                                   
                  de souffleter                                                         par d'impatientes squames 
ultimes           bifurquées 
                                                                                                                                             
  un roc 
                                                                                                                                           f
aux manoir                                                                                                     
                                                       tout de 
suite                                                                                                                                    
                             évaporé en brumes 
                                                                                                                                             
          qui 
imposa                                                                                                                                
                                    une borne à l'infini 
                                                                           
 
  
                                                  C'ÉTAIT                                                       LE 
NOMBRE                                                        issu 
stellaire                                                                                                                               
             EXISTÂT-IL 
                                                                                                                   autrement 
qu'hallucination éparse d'agonie 
                                                                                                               
         COMMENÇÂT-IL ET CESSÂT-
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IL                                                                                                                      sourdant 
que nié et clos quand 
apparu                                                                                                                                 
               enfin                                                                                                                     
           par quelque profusion répandue en 
rareté                                                                                       
                                                                               SE CHIFFRÂT-IL 
  
 évidence de la 
somme pour peu qu’une 
 
 
ILLUM
INÂT-
IL 
CE 
SERAIT                                                                                          pire                              
   non                                            davantage ni 
moins                                                                              indifféremment mais 
autant               LE HASARD 
  
                                                                                                          Choit                         
                                                                                         la 
plume                                                                                                                       rythmi
que suspens du 
sinistre                                                                                                                                
                                            s'ensevelir                                                                               
                                                                 aux écumes 
originelles                                                                                                        naguères 
d'où sursauta son délire jusqu'à une 
cime                                                                                                                                    
                                     flétrie                                                                                             
                                par la neutralité identique du gouffre 
                                                                           
 
  
  
  
                    RIEN 
                             de la mémorable crise                                             où se 
fût                                                  l'événement            accompli en vue de tout résultat 
nul                                                                                                                                       
                        humain 
                                                                                                                 N'AURA EU 
LIEU                                                                                                                 une 
élévation ordinaire verse l'absence 
                                                                                                                                      QU
E LE LIEU                                                                                      inférieur clapotis 
quelconque comme pour disperser l'acte 
vide  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  abruptement qui sinon 
                                                                                                                                par son 
mensonge                                                                                                                            
                      eût 
fondé                                                                                                                                   
            la perdition 
                                                                                    dans ces 
parages                                                                                                                         du 
vague                                                                                                                                  
         en quoi toute réalité se dissout 
                                                                           
 
  
EXCEPTÉ                   à l'altitude                                      PEUT-
ÊTRE                                                           aussi loin qu'un endroit       fusionne avec 
au-
delà                                                                                                                                     
     hors 
l'intérêt                                                                                                                                
   quant à lui 
signalé                                                                                                                                 
                                    en 
général                                                                                                            selon telle 
obliquité par telle 
déclivité                                                                                                                              
                                          de 
feux                                                                                                                   vers          
                                                                                                              ce doit 
être                                                                                                                              le 
Septentrion aussi 
Nord                                                                                                                                    
      UNE CONSTELLATION                                                                                        
                                    froide d'oubli et de 
désuétude                                                                                                                            
                                         pas 
tant                                                                                                                                      
                        qu'elle 
n'énumère                                                                                                                            
 sur quelque surface vacante et 
supérieure                                                                                                                           
                                le heurt 
successif                                                                                                                              
                                               sidéralement                                                                         
                                                d'un compte total en 
formation                                                                                                        veillant       
                                                                                                               doutant                 
                                                                                                                     roulant            
                                                                                                                                        bril
lant et 
méditant  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                             avant de 
s'arrêter                                                                                                                               
        à quelque point dernier qui le sacre 
  
                                                                                                                                       Tou
te pensée émet un Coup de Dés 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
A THROW OF THE DICE 
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
NEVER 
  
  
                                                                                 EVEN WHEN TRULY CAST IN 
THE 
ETERNAL                                                                                   CIRCUMSTANCE 
  
OF A SHIPWRECK’S DEPTH 
  
    
 
  
Can be 
         only 
               the Abyss   
raging               whitened                       stalled                                       beneath the 
desperately                                                      sloping 
incline                                                                                         of its 
                                                                                  own wing                                         
                                                  through            an advance falling back from ill to take 
flight                                                                                                                                    
      and veiling the 
gushers                                                                                                                                
              restraining the surges 
                                                                                                                               gathered 
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far within                                                                                        the shadow buried 
deep by that alternative sail 
                                                                                                          almost 
matching                                                                                                   its yawning 
depth to the wingspan like a hull 
                                                                                                                       of a vessel 
                                                                                                                                rocked 
from side to side 
   
 
  
             THE MASTER                                             beyond former 
calculations                                                                                where the lost manoeuvre 
with the age   rose                                                                                         
        implying                                                                           that formerly he grasped 
the helm                               of this conflagration          of the 
concerted                                                                                                       horizon at his 
feet                             
                                                                                                           that          readies 
itself                                                                                          moves and 
merges                                                                                              with the blow that 
grips it                                   as one threatens             fate and the winds 
          the unique Number which cannot             be 
another                                                                                                                Spirit      
                                                                                                                     to hurl 
it                                                                                                                                          
       into the 
storm                                                                                                                                   
relinquish the cleaving there and pass 
proudly                                                             hesitates                                     a corpse 
pushed back           by the arm from the secret   rather            than taking 
sides                    a hoary madman                                    on behalf                    of the 
waves                                                                    one             overwhelms the 
head                                                                                      flows through the 
submissive beard                                               straight shipwreck             that of the 
man                                                                                              without a 
vessel                                                                                                 empty          
                                                                                                                     no matter 
where 
 
  
  
ancestrally never to open the 
fist                                                                     clenched            
                                          beyond the helpless head         a legacy in 
vanishing                                         to someone 
                                                                   ambiguous                                   the 
immemorial ulterior demon   having             from non-existent 
regions                                                  led   the old man towards this ultimate meeting 
with 
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probability                                                                this                                                    
                    his childlike shade   cares     
rendered                                            supple by the wave and 
shielded                                          from hard bone lost between the planks     
                                                                   born                                                                  
       of a frolic   the sea           
sea                              making a vain 
attempt                                                                                           an Engagement 
 w hose           dread the veil of illusion rejected           as the phantom of a 
gesture                                                will 
tremble                                                collapse                                                                  
     madness   
                                                                                                                           WILL 
NEVER ABOLISH   
  
 
  
AS IF 
                                                       A simple                   insinuation 
                                                                  into silence                  entwined with 
irony                                                                                                      
                                       or                                                                                                 
                                               the 
mystery                                                                                                                                
                                  hurled                                                                                                
                                                                                  howled 
                                             in some close                   swirl of mirth and terror 
                                                                         whirls                    round the 
abyss                                                                                                                                   
                 without 
scattering                                                                                                                            
                                                or dispersing 
                                                                      
                                                                        and cradles the virgin index there 
  
                                                                                                                                             
                                AS IF 
  
  
 
  
  
         a solitary plume overwhelmed 
                                                                 untouched                             that a cap of 
midnight grazes or 
encounters                                                                                                                          
                    and 
fixes                                                                                                              in crumpled 
velvet with a sombre burst of laughter 
                                                                                                               that rigid 
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whiteness 
                                                                                                      derisory                         
                                                                                                       in opposition to the 
heavens                                                                                                                         too 
much 
so                                                                                                                                 not 
to 
signal                                                                                                                                  
                            closely                                                                                                     
                                                                    any 
                                                                                                                                 bitter 
prince of the reef 
                                                                                                                               
heroically adorned with 
it                                                                                                                                          
      indomitable but 
contained                                                                                                                            
         by his petty reason virile 
                                                                                                                                             
                                    in lightning 
  
 
  
  
  
anxious                   expiatory and 
pubescent                                                                                   dumb                                
    laughter 
                                                                                                                                             
   that                                                                                                                                   
                                        IF     
                                                           The lucid and lordly crest             of vertigo 
                                                                                     on the invisible 
brow                                                                  sparkles                                                   
                                 then shades                                                            a slim dark 
tallness          upright                                                                           in its siren 
coiling                                                                                                                                 
           at the 
moment                                                                                                                               
                      of striking                                                         through impatient ultimate 
scales          bifurcated 
                                                                                                                                             
  a rock 
                                                                                                                                           a 
deceptive manor                                                                                                     
                                                       suddenly                                                                       
                                                                                          evaporating in fog 
                                                                                                                                             
          that 
imposed                                                                                                                               
 189 
                                     limits  on  the infinite 
                                                                           
 
  
                                                  IT WAS                                                       THE 
NUMBER                                                    stellar 
outcome                                                                                                                              
              WERE IT TO HAVE 
EXISTED                                                                                                                   other 
than as a fragmented agonised hallucination 
                                                                                                                        WERE IT 
TO HAVE BEGUN AND 
ENDED                                                                                                                      a 
surging that denied and closed when 
visible                                                                                                                                 
               at 
last                                                                                                                                by 
some profusion spreading in 
sparseness                                                                                       
                                                    WERE IT TO HAVE AMOUNTED 
  
 to the fact of the 
total though as little as one 
WERE 
IT TO 
HAVE 
LIGHT
ED 
IT WOULD BE                                                                          
                 worse                                 no                                            more nor 
less                                                                              indifferently but as much         
CHANCE 
                                                                                                          Falls                          
                                                                                        the 
plume                                                                                                                       rhythm
ic suspense of the 
disaster                                                                                                                               
                                             to bury 
itself                                                                                                                                    
            in the original 
foam                                                                                                        from which its 
delirium formerly leapt to the 
summit                                                                                                                                
                                         faded                                                                                          
                                   by the same neutrality of abyss 
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                    NOTHING 
                             of the memorable crisis                                             where the 
event                                                  matured            accomplished in sight of all non-
existent                                                                                                                                
                               human outcomes 
                                                                                                                 WILL HAVE 
TAKEN 
PLACE                                                                                                                 a 
commonplace elevation pours out absence 
                                                                                                                                      BU
T THE PLACE                                                                                      some lapping 
below as if to scatter the empty 
act                                                                                                                                       
abruptly that otherwise 
                                                                                                                                by its 
falsity                                                                                                                                  
                would have 
plumbed                                                                                                                              
                 perdition 
                                                                                    in this 
region                                                                                                                         of  
vagueness                                                                                                                            
               in which all reality dissolves 
                                                                           
 
  
EXCEPT                   at the 
altitude                                      PERHAPS                                                           as far 
as a place       fuses with beyond 
                                                                                                                                          o
utside the 
interest                                                                                                                                
   signalled regarding 
it                                                                                                                                          
                           in 
general                                                                                                            in accord 
with such obliquity through such 
declination                                                                                                                          
                                              of 
fire                                                                                                                   towards      
                                                                                                                  what must 
be                                                                                                                              the 
Wain also 
North                                                                                                                                   
       A CONSTELLATION                                                                                        
                                    cold with neglect and 
desuetude                                                                                                                            
                                         not so much 
though                                                                                                                                 
                             that it fails to 
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enumerate                                                                                                                           
  on some vacant and superior 
surface                                                                                                                                
                           the consecutive 
clash                                                                                                                                    
                                         side 
really                                                                                                                         of a 
final account in 
formation                                                                                                        attending    
                                                                                                                  doubting            
                                                                                                                          rolling       
                                                                                                                                             
shining and 
meditating                                                                                                                           
                                before 
stopping                                                                                                                              
         at some last point that crowns it 
  
                                                                                                                      All Thought 
expresses a Throw of the Dice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:http://www.poetryintranslation.com/PITBR/French/MallarmeUnCoupdeDes.htm 
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APPENDIX II: MYSTICAL ANARCHISM BY SIMON CRITCHLEY (2009) 
 
 
The return to religion has become perhaps the dominant cliché of contemporary theory. 
Of course, theory often offers nothing more than an exaggerated echo of what is 
happening in reality, a political reality dominated by the fact of religious war. Somehow 
we seem to have passed from a secular age, which we were ceaselessly told was post-
metaphysical, to a new situation where political action seems to flow directly from 
metaphysical conflict. This situation can be triangulated around the often fatal 
entanglement of politics and religion, where the third vertex of the triangle is violence. 
Politics, religion and violence appear to define the present through which we are all too 
precipitously moving, the phenomenon of sacred political violence, where religiously 
justified violence is the means to a political end. The question of community, of human 
being together, has to be framed – for good or ill – in terms of this triangulation of 
politics, religion and violence. In this essay, I want to look at one way, admittedly a 
highly peculiar and contentious way, in which the question of community was posed 
historically and might still be posed. This is what I want to call ‘mystical anarchism’. 
However, I want to begin somewhere else, to be precise with two political theories at 
the very antipodes of anarchism. 
 
 
Carl Schmitt – The Political, Dictatorship and the Belief in Original Sin 
 
Let’s return to that return to religion. Perhaps no thinker has enjoyed more popularity in 
the last years and seemed more germane than Carl Schmitt. The reasons for this are 
complex and I have tried to address them elsewhere.(ref ID) In his Political Theology, 
he famously writes, ‘All significant concepts in the modern theory of the state are 
secularized theological concepts’. This is not just true historically, Schmitt insists, but 
systematically and conceptually. The omnipotent God of medieval Christianity becomes 
the omnipotent monarch, for example in Hobbes’s Leviathan. Until the late 17th 
Century, the general will was a theological term of art that referred to the will of God. 
By 1762, in Rousseau’s Social Contract, the general will had been transformed into the 
will of the people and the question of sovereignty was transposed from the divine to the 
civic. Of course, this entails that the will of the people is always virtuous and those who 
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oppose it can be legitimately exterminated as evil. The politicization of theological 
concepts leads ineluctably to the attempt to purify virtue through violence, which is the 
political sequence that begins with French Jacobinism in 1792 and continues through to 
the dreadful violent excesses of 20th Century politics that we can summarize with the 
proper names of Lenin, Stalin and Hitler through to what some might call the ‘Islamo-
Leninism’ or ‘Islamo-Jacobinism’ of al Qaeda and related groups.  
 
But such an argument does not exonerate so-called liberal democracy. On the contrary, 
Schmitt views the triumph of the liberal-constitutional state as the triumph of deism, a 
theological vision that unifies reason and nature by identifying the latter with divinity. 
As can be seen most obviously in the deism of the Founding Fathers, American 
democracy is a peculiar confection of Roman republicanism and puritanical 
providentialism, enshrined in the John Winthrop’s sermon about the ‘Citty (sic) on the 
Hill’ (that Sarah Palin ascribed to Ronald Reagan), the upbuilding of the ‘New 
England’. At the core of American democracy is a civil religion which functions as a 
powerful sustaining myth and buttresses the idea of manifest destiny. Obama’s political 
genius was to have reconnected classical liberal constitutionalism with a motivating 
civil religion focused around the idea of belief and a faith in change and progress.   
 
Schmitt’s problem with liberalism is that it is anti-political. What this means is that for 
the liberal every political decision must be rooted in a norm whose ultimate justification 
flows from the constitution. Within liberalism, political decisions are derived from 
constitutional norms and higher than the state stands the law and the interpretation of 
the law. This is why the highest political authority in a liberal state rests with the 
supreme court or its equivalent. Political action is subordinated to juridical 
interpretation. For Schmitt, a truly political decision is what breaks with any norm, frees 
itself from any normative ties and becomes absolute. This is why the question of the 
state of exception is of such importance to Schmitt. The state of exception is that 
moment of radical decision where the operation of the law is suspended. This is what 
the Romans call iusticium, and which Agamben has written about compellingly. What 
the decision on the state of exception reveals is the true subject of political sovereignty. 
Schmitt famously writes that, ‘Sovereign is who decides on the state of exception’ 
(‘Soverän ist, wer über den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet’). That is, the sovereign is the 
person who is exhibited by the decision on the state of exception. The question ‘who?’ 
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is answered by the decision itself. That is, the decision on the state of exception, the 
moment of the suspension of the operation of law, brings the subject ‘who?’ into being. 
To put it into a slogan, the subject is the consequence of a decision. The subject that is 
revealed by the decision on the state of exception is the state and the core of Schmitt’s 
theory of the political is to show that the true subject of political is the state and that the 
state must always stand higher than the law.  
 
Schmitt makes the fascinating remark that the concept of the state of exception is the 
jurisprudential analogue to the concept of the miracle in theology. The triumph of 
liberalism as the triumph of deism is the hegemony of a religious view of the world that 
tries to banish the miracle, as that which would break with the legal-constitutional 
situation, the order of what Badiou calls the event, and which at time he compares with 
a miracle.  Liberal constitutionalists, like Locke, Kant or Neo-Kantians like Kelsen seek 
to eliminate the state of exception and subject everything to the rule of law, which is the 
rule of the rule itself, namely reason. Schmitt criticizes the rationalism of liberalism in 
the name of what he calls – and here we find echoes of Dilthey in Schmitt that will 
resound further in the young Heidegger – a philosophy of concrete life. Such an 
existential approach embraces the exception and breaks with the rule and the rule of the 
rule. Schmitt writes, thinking explicitly of Kierkegaard, ‘In the exception the power of 
real life breaks through the crust of a mechanism that has become torpid through 
repetition’.  
 
It is not difficult to see why Schmitt’s existential politics of passion and concrete life 
and his critique of liberal democracy should have won him many friends on the left, like 
Chantal Mouffe. Sadly perhaps, they are not friends that Schmitt would have chosen. 
He was much happier in the company of Catholic counter-revolutionaries like Joseph de 
Maistre and Donoso Cortés. What has to be grasped is that Schmitt’s argument for the 
state of exception as exemplifying the operation of the political is also an argument for 
dictatorship. If the subject of sovereignty is revealed in the decision on the state of 
exception, then this decision is the act where the constitution is suspended and 
dictatorship is introduced. Dictatorship, then, is justified when there is an actual or 
imagined danger to the existence of the state. Roman republicanism explicitly allowed 
for this possibility and one might ponder as to the conceivability of republicanism as a 
political form without the possibility of recourse to dictatorship. The condition of 
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possibility for legality and legitimacy is the political act that suspends it.  
Obama writes in The Audacity of Hope, ‘Democracy is not a house to be built, it is a 
conversation to be had’. At the core of Obama’s liberal civil religion is a resolute 
defense of the primacy of the constitution, an absolute conviction that all political 
decisions have to be derived from norms, and that the procedure for decision making is 
deliberation. It’s enough to make Habermas burst into a break dance. However, Schmitt 
would be turning in his grave. For him, the idea of everlasting conversation is a 
gruesomely comic fantasy. If liberals were presented with the question, ‘Christ or 
Barabas?’, they would move to adjourn the proceedings and establish a commission of 
investigation or a special committee of inquiry that would report back sometime the 
following year. Within liberalism, everything becomes everlasting discussion, the 
glorious conversation of humankind, the sphere of what Schmitt calls with a sneer 
‘culture’. Such a culture floats like foam over the socio-economic reality of the liberal 
state which Schmitt, following his teacher Weber, compares to a huge industrial plant 
dominated by capitalism and scientism and incapable of political action. For Catholic 
counter-revolutionaries, like Donoso Cortés, faced with the hegemony of a depoliticized 
liberalism powerless in the face of a capitalist economy, the only solution was 
dictatorship. Faced with the toothless liberal constitutionalism of Weimar Germany in 
the 1920s and the fact of economic collapse, it is not difficult to understand the appeal 
the argument for dictatorship had for Schmitt with the rise of the National Socialists. 
The only way to restore the true subject of the political, namely the state, was the 
suspension of the constitution and the decision to declare a state of exception. 
 
The political theology of liberalism is the pervasiveness of a weak deistic God. The 
liberal, like Obama, wants God, but one that is not active in the world. He wants a God 
that permits no enthusiasm and who never contradicts or overrides the rule of reason 
and law. That way, it is assumed, leads to the prophetic radicalism of Jeremiah Wright. 
In short, liberals want a God that cannot perform miracles. Against this, Schmitt wants 
to revivify the political by restoring the state of exception and the possibility of the 
miracle. But, as Schmitt makes crystal clear, this requires a belief in original sin. 
 
For Schmitt, every conception of the political takes a position on human nature. It 
requires some sort of anthropological commitment: human beings are either naturally 
good or evil. Schmitt thinks – and I agree – that this leads to the two most pervasive 
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political alternatives to liberalism: authoritarianism and anarchism. Anarchists believe 
in the essential goodness of the human being. Their progenitor is Rousseau and his 
belief that wickedness is the historical outcome of the development of society towards 
greater levels of inequality. By contrast, on this view, political legitimacy can be 
achieved by what Rousseau frequently referred to as ‘a change in nature’, from 
wickedness to goodness, of the kind imagined in The Social Contract. Although this is a 
caricature of Rousseau and he could in no way be described as an anarchist, this view is 
more accurately developed by Bakunin: namely that if human beings are essentially 
good, then it is the mechanisms of the state, religion, law and the police that make them 
bad. Once these mechanisms have been removed and replaced with autonomous self-
governing communes in a federative structure, then we will truly have heaven on earth. 
We will come back to this view below, but it is worth noting that arguments for 
anarchism always turn on the idea that if human beings are allowed to express what 
comes naturally to them, if the force of life itself is not repressed by the deathly force of 
the state, then it will be possible to organize society on the basis of mutual aid and 
cooperation.  
 
By contrast, authoritarians believe that human nature is essentially wicked. This is why 
the concept of original sin is so important politically. For Donoso Cortés and de 
Maistre, human beings were naturally depraved and essentially vile. There is something 
essentially defective in human nature which requires a corrective at the political and 
theological level. It requires the authority of the state and the church. Thus, because the 
human being is defined by original sin, authoritarianism, in the form of dictatorship say, 
becomes necessary as the only means that might save human beings from themselves. 
Human beings require the hard rule of authority because they are essentially defective. 
Against this, anarchism is the political expression of freedom from original sin, that a 
sinless union with others in the form of community is the realization of the highest 
human possibility.  
 
The idea of original sin is not some outdated relic from the religious past. It is the 
conceptual expression of a fundamental experience of ontological defectiveness or lack 
which explains the human propensity towards error, malice, wickedness, violence and 
extreme cruelty. Furthermore this defect is not something we can put right, which is 
why authoritarians think that human beings require the yoke of the state, God, law and 
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the police. Politics becomes the means for protecting human beings from themselves, 
that is, from their worst inclinations towards lust, cruelty and violence. As Hobbes 
shows, any return to a state of nature is an argument in favour of the war of all against 
all. We can find numerous post-Christian attempts to rethink the concept of original sin. 
For example, Freud advances the Schopenhauerian thesis that there might simply be a 
disjunction between eros and civilization, between the aggressive, destructive workings 
of lIbid.inous desire and the achievements of culture. This disjunction is only held in 
check through the internalized authority of the super-ego. Again, Heidegger’s ideas of 
thrownness, facticity and falling were explicitly elaborated in connection with Luther’s 
conception or original sin and seek to explain the endless human propensity towards 
evasion and flight from taking responsibility for oneself. Although such a responsibility 
can be momentarily achieved in authentic resoluteness, it can never arrest the slide back 
into inauthenticity. The concept of original sin is still very much with us.  
 
 
John Gray – The Naturalization of Original Sin, Political Realism and Passive Nihilism 
 
The most consequent contemporary defence of the idea of original sin can be found in 
the work of John Gray. What he gives us is a naturalized, Darwinian redescription of 
original sin. To put it brutally, human beings are killer apes. We are simply animals, and 
rather nasty aggressive primates at that, what Gray calls homo rapiens, rapacious 
hominids. Sadly, we are also killer apes with metaphysical longings, which explains the 
ceaseless quest to find some meaning to life that might be underwritten by an 
experience of the holy or the numinous. Today’s dominant metaphysical dogma – and 
this is Gray’s real and rightful target – is liberal humanism, with its faith in progress, 
improvement and the perfectibility of humankind, beliefs which are held with the same 
unquestioning assurance that Christianity was held in Europe until the late 18th century. 
As Gray makes clear, progress in the realm of science is a fact. Furthermore, it is a 
good. De Quincey famously remarked that a quarter of human misery resulted from 
toothache. The discovery of anaesthetic dentistry is, thus, an unmixed good. However, 
although progress is a fact, faith in progress is a superstition and the liberal humanist’s 
assurance in the reality of human progress is the barely secularized version of the 
Christian belief in Providence.  
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The most extreme expression of human arrogance, for Gray, is the idea that human 
beings can save the planet from environmental destruction. Because they are killer apes, 
that is, by virtue of a naturalized version of original sin that tends them towards 
wickedness and violence, human beings cannot save their planet. Furthermore, the earth 
doesn’t need saving. This is where Gray borrows from James Lovelock’s Gaia 
hypothesis. The earth is suffering from a disseminated primatemaia, a plague of people. 
Homo rapiens is ravaging the planet like a filthy pest that has infested a dilapidated but 
once beautiful mansion. In 1600 the human population was about half a billion. In the 
1990s it increased by the same amount. This plague cannot be solved by the very 
species who are the efficient cause of the problem, but only by a large scale decline in 
human numbers, back down to manageable levels, say half a billion or so. This is the 
wonderfully distopian vision at the heart of Gray’s work: when the earth is done with 
humans, it will recover and human civilization will be forgotten. Life will go on, but 
without us. Global warming is simply one of many fevers that the earth has suffered 
during its history. It will recover, but we won’t because we can’t.  
 
Gray writes, with Schmitt explicitly in mind, ‘Modern politics is a chapter in the history 
of religion’. Politics has become a hideous surrogate for religious salvation. Secularism, 
which denies the truth of religion, is a religious myth. Specifically, it is a myth of 
progress based in the idea that history has a providential design that is unfolding. Now, 
such myths are important. They enable presidents like Barack Obama to get elected. But 
it doesn’t mean that they are true or even salutary. What most disturbs Gray are utopian 
political projects based on some apocalyptic faith that concerted human action in the 
world can allow for the realization of seemingly impossible ends and bring about the 
perfection of humanity. Action cannot change the world because we are the sort of 
beings that we are: killer apes who will use violence, force and terror at the service of 
some longed-for metaphysical project. For Gray, the core belief that drives utopianism, 
on the right as much as the left, is the false assumption that the world can be 
transformed by human action and that history itself is progress towards such a 
transformation. As Gray makes explicit, his critique of utopianism derives in large part 
from Norman Cohn’s hugely influential book, originally published in 1957, The Pursuit 
of the Millennium.  
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It is Cohn’s analysis of millenarianism that is so important for Gray. This is the idea 
that salvation is not just a possibility, but a certainty which will correspond to five 
criteria: salvation is collective, terrestrial, imminent, total and miraculous. In his later 
work, Cosmos, Chaos and the World to Come, Cohn traced the roots of this millenarian 
faith back to Zoroaster’s break with the view that the world was the reflection of a static 
cosmic order defined by cycle of conflict. On the Zoroastrian view, sometime between 
1500 and 1200 BC, the world was moving, through incessant conflict, towards a 
conflictless state. A time would come when, during a final bloody battle, God and the 
forces of good would defeat once and for all the armies of evil. Thus, a marvellous 
consummation is at hand, the moment when good will triumph over evil and the agents 
of evil will be annihilated. After that time, Cohn writes, ‘The elect will thereafter live as 
a collectivity, unanimous and without conflict, on a transformed and purified earth’.  
 
This idea finds expression in certain Jewish sects before finding its most powerful 
articulation in Christian ideas of the Apocalypse, the Last Days and the Millennium. On 
the basis of the authority of the Book of Revelation, it was believed that after Christ’s 
Second Coming, he would establish a kingdom of God on earth and reign over it with 
his elect, the company of saints, for a thousand years until the Last Judgement and the 
general resurrection of the dead. Early Christians, like St Paul, believed that the Second 
Coming was imminent and that they were living in the end times. The search for signs 
of the Second Coming obviously took on enormous importance. The key clue to the 
beginning of the end times – and this is crucial – is the appearance of the Antichrist: the 
prodigious, evil, arch-enemy of God. The Antichrist is what Ernesto Laclau would call a 
‘floating signifier’ in millenarian political theology. He is endlessly substitutable can be 
personified the great Satan, the Pope, the Muslims or the Jews. What is crucial here is 
the identification of the Antichrist as the incarnation of evil that presages the 
reappearance of Christ or a similarly messianic figure and leads to a bloody and violent 
terrestrial combat to build heaven on earth. This, of course, is the deep logic of the 
Crusades, which began with Pope Urban II’s plea to the Church council of 1095 to go to 
Jerusalem and, in his words, ‘liberate the Church of God’. This lead directly to the 
‘People’s Crusade’ or the ‘Peasants’ Crusade’ in 1096-97 and to the formation of a 
Christian fighting force in Asia Minor that was between 50,000 to 70,000 strong. It is a 
compelling and disturbing historical fact that the recruitment of soldiers for the 
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‘People’s Crusade’ in France, Germany and the Low Countries established a disturbing 
new and seemingly addictive habit in Western life: pogroms against the Jews. It would 
appear that the idea of the people requires the external identification of an evil enemy 
who can be legitimately annihilated in the name of God. Such has arguably always been 
the justificatory logic of Western military intervention: it is right to exterminate the 
enemy because they are the incarnation of evil. Such views have always vindicated 
crusaders from the 11th Century through to their more recent epigones. From the time 
of Saladin’s destruction of the Third Crusade in the last 12th Century, the response has 
always been the same: jihad or war against infidels. It is perhaps not so surprising that 
Saddam Hussein sought to depict himself in propaganda alongside Saladin. After all, 
they were both born in Tikrit, despite the awful irony that Saladin was a Kurd.  
 
What is implied fairly discreetly by Cohn and rather loudly trumpeted by Gray, is that 
Western civilization might be defined in terms of the central role of millenarian 
thinking. What takes root with early Christian belief and massively accelerates in 
medieval Europe finds its modern expression in a sequence of bloody utopian political 
projects, from Jacobinism to Bolshevism, Stalinism, Nazism and different varieties of 
Marxist-Leninist, anarchist or Situationist ideology. Much of John Gray’s Black Mass 
attempts to show how the energy of such utopian political projects has drifted from the 
left to the right. The apocalyptic conflict with the axis of evil by the forces of good has 
been employed by Bush, Blair et al as a means to forge the democratic millennium, a 
new American century of untrammeled personal freedom and free markets. In the past 
decade, millennial faith has energized the project of what we might call military neo-
liberalism, where violence is the means for realizing liberal democratic heaven on 
Earth. What is essential to such neo-liberal millenarian thinking is the consolidation of 
the idea of the good through the identification of evil, where the Anti-Christ keeps 
putting on different masks: Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden, Kim Jong-il,  
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, etc. etc. 
 
We saw how Schmitt’s critique of liberalism led him towards an argument for 
dictatorship underpinned by a belief in original sin. Where does Gray’s naturalization of 
the concept of original sin leave us? He powerfully identifies the poison within liberal 
humanism, but what is the antidote? This is what he calls ‘political realism’. We have to 
accept that the world is in a state of ceaseless conflict never far from a state of war. In 
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the face of such conflict, Gray counsels that we have to abandon the belief in utopia and 
try and cope with reality. This means accepting the tragic contingencies of life and the 
fact that there are simply moral and political dilemmas for which there is no solution. 
We have to learn to abandon daydreams such as a world of universal human rights, or 
that history has a teleological purpose that underwrites human action. We even have to 
renounce the Obama-esque delusion that one’s life is a narrative that is an episode in 
some universal story of progress. Against the grotesque distortion of conservatism into 
the millenarian military neo-liberalism  of the neo-conservatives, Gray wants to defend 
the core belief of traditional Burkean Toryism. The latter begins in a realistic 
acceptance of human imperfection and frailty, a version of original sin. As such, the 
best that flawed and potentially wicked human creatures can hope for is a commitment 
to civilized constraints that will prevent the very worst from happening. Political 
realism is the politics of the least worst. 
 
The most original feature of Gray’s work is the way in which a traditional conservatism 
underpinned by a deep pessimism about human nature is fused with a certain strand of 
Taoism. As Gray points out, ‘Nothing is more human than the readiness to kill and die 
in order to secure a meaning for life’. The great human delusion is that action can 
achieve a terrestrial salvation. This has lead to nothing but bloodshed, the great 
slaughter bench of millenarian history. Killer apes like us have to learn to give up the 
search for meaning and learn to see the purpose of aesthetic or spiritual life as the 
release from meaning. If seeing one’s life as an episode in some universal narrative of 
meaning is a delusion, then the cure consists in freeing oneself from such narratives. 
Maybe we just have to accept illusions. What interests Gray in the subtle paradoxes of 
the greatest Taoist thinker, Chuang-Tzu, is the acceptance of the fact that life is a dream 
without the possibility or even the desire to awaken from the dream. If we cannot be 
free of illusions, if illusions are part and parcel of our natural constitution, then why not 
simply accept them? In the final pages of Black Mass, Gray writes, ‘Taoists taught that 
freedom lies in freeing oneself from personal narratives by identifying with cosmic 
processes of death and renewal’. Thus, rather than seek the company of utopian 
thinkers, we should find consolation in the words of  ‘mystics, poets and pleasure-
lovers’. It is clear that for Gray, like the late Heidegger, the real source of human 
problems resides in the belief that action can transform the world. Action simply 
provides a consolation for the radical insignificance of our lives by momentarily staving 
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off the threat of meaninglessness. At the core of Gray’s work is a defense of the ideal of 
contemplation over action, the ataraxia of the ancients, where we simply learn to see the 
mystery as such and do not seek to unveil it in order to find some deeper purpose 
within.  
 
Schopenhauer, often read in an abridged aphoristic form, was the most popular 
philosopher of the 19th Century. Nothing sells better than epigrammatic pessimism. It 
gives readers reasons for their misery and words to buttress their sense of hopelessness 
and impotence. Such is what Nietzsche called ‘European Buddhism’. John Gray is the 
Schopenhauerian European Buddhist of our age. What he offers is a gloriously 
pessimistic cultural analysis which rightly reduces to rubble the false idols of the cave 
of liberal humanism. Counter to the upbeat evangelical atheism of Dawkins, Hitchins et 
al , Gray provides a powerful argument in favour of human wickedness that is 
consistent with Darwinian naturalism. It leads to the position that I call ‘passive 
nihilism’.  
 
The passive nihilist looks at the world from a certain highly cultivated detachment and 
finds it meaningless. Rather than trying to act in the world, which is pointless, the 
passive nihilist withdraws to a safe contemplative distance and cultivates and refines his 
aesthetic sensibility by pursuing the pleasures of lyric poetry, bird-watching or botany, 
as was the case with the aged Rousseau. In a world that is rushing to destroy itself 
through capitalist exploitation or military crusades (usually two arms of the same killer 
ape), the passive nihilist withdraws to an island where the mystery of existence can be 
seen for what it is without distilling it into a meaning. In the face of the coming century 
which in all likelihood will be defined by the violence of faith and the certainty of 
environmental devastation, Gray offers a cool but safe temporary refuge. Happily, we 
will not be alive to witness much of the future that he describes. 
 
I have looked at two interrelated responses to the thought that the modern concepts of 
politics are secularized theological concepts. Schmitt’s critique of constitutional 
liberalism as anti-political leads him to a concept of the political that finds its 
expression in state sovereignty, authoritarianism and dictatorship. Gray’s critique of 
liberal humanism and the ideas of progress and Providence that it embodies leads him to 
a political realism of a traditional Tory variety. He fuses this, in an extremely 
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compelling way, with what I have called passive nihilism. Both conceptions of the 
political are underpinned by ideas of original sin, whether the traditional Catholic 
teaching or Gray’s Darwinian naturalization of the concept. The refutation of any and 
all forms of utopianism follows from this concept of original sin. It is because we are 
killer apes that our metaphysical longings for a conflict-free perfection of humanity can 
only be pursued with the millennial means of violence and terror.  
 
 
Millenarianism 
 
Is the utopian impulse in political thinking simply the residue of a dangerous political 
theology that we are much better off without? Are the only live options in political 
thinking either Schmitt’s authoritarianism, Gray’s political realism or business as usual 
liberalism; that is, a politics of state sovereignty, an incremental, traditionalist 
conservatism or varieties of more or less enthused Obamaism? In order to approach 
these questions I would like to present the form of politics that Schmitt and Gray 
explicitly reject, namely anarchism. Now, I have sought to outline and defend a version 
of anarchism in some of my recent work. This is what I call an ethical neo-anarchism 
where anarchist practices of political organization are coupled with an infinitely 
demanding subjective ethics of responsibility. However, for reasons that will hopefully 
become clear, I want to present a very different version of anarchism, perhaps the most 
radical that can be conceived, namely ‘mystical anarchism’. The key issue here is what 
happens to our thinking of politics and community once the fact of original sin has been 
overcome.  
 
Let’s return to Cohn’s The Pursuit of the Millenium. What Cohn tries to show is the 
way in which millenarian Christian belief took root amongst significant sectors of the 
rootless and dislocated poor of Europe between the 11th and 16th Centuries. The belief 
that these were the Last Days led to a revolutionary eschatology, where a series of 
messiah figures, prophets or indeed ‘Christs’ would spontaneously appear. Cohn gives 
an extraordinary catalogue of these messiahs, from Tancheln, the Emperor Frederick, 
the Pseudo-Baldwin, through to John Ball, Hans Böhm, Thomas Müntzer and terrifying 
and bloodthirsty Jan Bockelsen, better known as John of Leyden. What unites these 
figures is not just their heretical fury and utter self-belief. It is rather their capacity to 
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construct what Cohn calls, non-perjoratively but put psychoanalytically, a phantasy or 
social myth around which a collective can be formed. The political structure of this 
phantasy becomes complete with the identification of an enemy. It is always in relation 
to an enemy that the eschatological phantasy finds its traction. This enemy is always the 
Antichrist, whose identity floats in different historical manifestations of millenarianism. 
It can be the Moslems or indeed Jews for the Crusaders, but it is more often simply the 
forces of the Catholic church and the state. A holy war is then fought with the Antichist, 
where violence becomes the purifying or cleansing force through which the evil ones 
are to be annihilated. Terror is a common feature of life in the New Jerusalem. 
 
Revolutionary millenarianism desires a boundless social transformation that attempts to 
recover an egalitarian state of nature, a kind of golden age of primitive communism. 
This required the abolition of private property and the establishment of a commonality 
of ownership. Justification for such views would invariably be Biblical, usually the 
Garden of Eden. As a famous proverb from the time of the English Peasants’ Revolt 
puts it, possibly recited by the hedge priest John Ball,  
 
‘When Adam delved and Eve span, 
Who was then a gentleman?’.  
 
The task of politics was the construction of the New Jerusalem and the model was 
always paradise, the Garden of Eden before the occurrence of original sin. There was a 
perfectly obviously reason why such forms of revolutionary millenarian belief should 
arise amongst the poor: they owned nothing and therefore had nothing to lose. Thus, by 
destroying private property, they had everything to gain. The only extant fragment from 
John Ball, preserved and probably embellished by chroniclers, makes the point 
powerfully, 
 
‘Things cannot go well in England, nor ever will, until all goods are held in common, 
and until there will be neither serfs nor gentlemen, and we shall be equal. For what 
reason have they, whom we call lords, got the best of us? How did they deserve it? Why 
do they keep us in bondage? If we all descended from one father and one mother, Adam 
and Eve, how can they assert or prove that they are more masters than ourselves? 
Except perhaps that they make us work and produce for them to spend!’ 
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Yet, the poor, as the saying goes, have always been with us. What seems to be novel in 
the earlier part of large historical panorama that Cohn describes is the emergence of the 
urban poor in the rapidly industrializing textile-producing towns of Flanders and 
Brabant from the 11th Century onwards. Thus, it is not simply that millenarian belief 
arises amongst the poor, but specifically amongst those groups whose traditional ways 
of life have broken down. Millenarian belief arises amongst the socially dislocated, 
recently urbanized, poor who had moved from the country to the city for economic 
reasons. Although Cohn says nothing on this topic, it is interesting to note that the 
socio-economic condition of possibility for revolutionary eschatology is dislocation, the 
same category that Marx employs to describe the formation of the industrial proletariat 
during the industrial revolution.  
 
(Perhaps a similar hypothesis could be used to explain the formation of millenarian 
sects in the United States from the time of settlement onwards. I am thinking in 
particular of the explosion of millenarian faith in areas like the ‘burned-over district’ of 
upper New York State during the late 18th Century and the first decades of the 19th 
Century in groups like the Shakers. It is not exactly difficult to find the living 
descendents of such millenarian religious belief all across the contemporary United 
States. There seems to be a powerful correlation between evangelism, social dislocation 
and poverty. Yet, what is sorely missing from contemporary American millenarianism 
is the radical anarcho-communism of groups like the Shakers. For the latter, all property 
was held in common, without mine and thine. An ethos manual labour was combined 
with spiritual purification achieved through taking the vow of chastity. With hands at 
work and hearts set to God, the Shakers attempted to recover the communistic equality 
of Eden without the sins of the flesh. This was further radicalized through the 
revelations of the founder of the Shakers, Ann Lee or Mother Ann (1736-84), from 
Manchester who brought a select band of persecuted Shakers (more properly, The 
Church of Believers in Christ) from England to New York 1774 before setting up 
communities in upper state New York and Western Massachusetts. Various divine 
visitations led her to declare celibacy and the imminent second coming of Christ. She 
was seen by some as the female equivalent of God, the female complement to the divine 
male principle. For the Shakers, to be a believer in Christ was to participate in the dual 
nature of divinity, both male and female.) 
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Medieval revolutionary millenarianism drew its strength and found its energy amongst 
the marginal and the dispossessed. It often arose against a background of disaster, 
plague and famine. As Cohn notes, 
 
‘The greatest wave of millenarian excitement, one that swept through the whole of 
society, was precipitated by the most universal natural disaster of the Middle Ages, the 
Black Death.’ 
 
It was amongst the lowest social strata that millenarian enthusiasm lasted longest and 
expressed itself most violently. For example, the flagellant movement first appeared in 
Perugia in 1260 as an apparent consequence of the famine of 1250 and the plague of 
1259. It swept from Italy into the Rhine Valley in the 14th Century, where great crowds 
of itinerant flagellants went from town to town like a scourging insurgency becoming 
God-like through acts of collective imitatio Christi. Such extreme self-punishment was 
deemed heretical because it threatened the Church’s authority over the economy of 
punishment, penitence and consolation. The poor were not meant to take the whip into 
their own hands. But the centerpiece of Cohn’s book is the description and analysis of 
the dominant form of revolutionary millenarianism: the so-called heresy of the free 
spirit. It is to this that I would now like to turn. 
 
 
The Movement of the Free Spirit 
 
We know very little about the movement of the Free Spirit. Everything turns on the 
interpretation of Paul’s words, ‘Now the Lord is the Spirit, and where the Lord's Spirit 
is, there is freedom’(2 Corinthians 3:17). There are two possibilities here: either the 
Lord’s Spirit is outside the self or within it. If the Lord’s Spirit is outside the self, 
because the soul languishes in sin and perdition, then freedom can only come through 
submitting oneself to divine will and awaiting the saving activity of grace. Such is the 
standard Christian teaching, which explains the necessity for the authority of the Church 
as that terrestrial location or, better, portal to the Lord’s Spirit. But if – and here is the 
key to the heresy – the Lord’s Spirit in within the self, then the soul is free and has no 
need of the mediation of the Church. Indeed, and we will come back to this presently, if 
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the Lord’s Spirit is within the self, then essentially there is no difference between the 
soul and God. The heretical Adamites who moved to Bohemia after being expelled from 
Picardy in the early 15th Century, are reported as beginning the Lord’s Prayer with the 
words, ‘Our Father, who art within us…’. If a community participates in the Spirit of 
God, then it is free and has no need of the agencies of the Church, state, law or police. 
These are the institutions of the unfree world that a community based on the Free Spirit 
rejects. It is not difficult to grasp the anarchistic consequences of such a belief.  
 
The apparently abundant and widespread doctrinal literature of the movement of the 
Free Spirit was repeatedly seized and destroyed by the Inquisition. Very few texts 
remain, such as the fascinating Schwester Katrei, apocryphally attributed to Meister 
Eckhart. At least one of the extant manuscripts bears the inscription, That is Sister 
Katrei, Meister Eckhart’s Daughter from Strasbourg. Although this is a huge topic that I 
do not want to broach here, the relation between Eckhart’s thinking, deemed heretical 
posthumously by the Pope at Avignon in 1327, and the movement of the Free Spirit is 
hugely suggestive. Of the documents related to the Free Spirit that remain, I’d like to 
focus on Marguerite Porete’s extraordinary The Mirror of Simple and Annihilated Souls 
and Who Remain Only in Wanting and Desire of Love, to give the text its full and 
indeed ambiguous title. The text was only discovered in 1946. It seems clear that 
Eckhart knew Porete’s The Mirror and responded to it explicitly or implicitly in his 
texts and sermons. For example, Michael Sells claims that when Eckhart returned to 
Paris in 1311, one year after Porete’s execution, he stayed at the same Dominican house 
as William Humbert, Porete’s inquisitor. One can only wonder at the content of their 
conversations. The Mirror is an instruction manual of sorts that details the seven stages 
that the soul must pass through in order to overcome original sin and recover the 
perfection that belonged to human beings prior to their corruption by the Fall. The 
Mirror seems to have circulated in multiple manuscripts and translations in the Middle 
Ages and Porete appears to have had many followers as far away from her native 
Hainaut in northern France as England and Italy. We know relatively little with 
certainty about Porete, although there is a surprising amount of documentation related to 
her trial and execution for heresy  . She was a learned Beguine, which was the term that 
was used to describe semireligious women who lived alone or in Beguine houses or 
Beguinages. These began to appear in the southern Low Countries in the late 12th and 
early 13th Centuries and were effectively communes or experimental associations for 
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the sisters of the Free Spirit and their brothers, the Beghards, from which we derive the 
English word ‘beggar’. Marguerite seems to have led an itinerant mendicant life of 
poverty accompanied by a guardian Beghard. Her book was condemned, seized and 
publicly burned at Valenciennes, but she refused to retract it. When Porete came to the 
attention of the Inquisition in Paris, she was imprisoned for eighteen months, but 
refused to recant or seek absolution. She was burnt at the stake in 1310. The fact that 
she was treated with relative liberality and not immediately executed seems to suggest 
that she was from the upper strata of society and she had some powerful friends. 
Although it is not my topic here, it is truly fascinating how many women were involved 
with the movement of the Free Spirit and their relatively high social status. Scholars of 
mysticism like Amy Hollywood and poets like Anne Carson have rightly identified 
Porete and the Beguine movement as a vital precursor to modern feminism. It is highly 
revealing that, in the proceeding of her trial, Porete’s work is not just referred to as 
being ‘filled with errors and heresies’, but as a ‘pseudo-mulier’, a fake woman.  
 
 
Becoming God 
 
I’d like to identify the core of the movement of the Free Spirit by recounting the seven 
stages of what Porete calls ‘the devout soul’ outlined in Chapter 118 of The Mirror (the 
book contains 139 Chapters). What is described is nothing other than the process of 
self-deification, of becoming God. 
 
1. The first state occurs when the Soul is touched by God’s grace and assumes the 
intention of following all God’s commandments, of being obedient to divine law. 
 
2. The second state mounts yet higher and Soul becomes a lover of God over and 
above commandments and laws. Regardless of any command, the Soul wants to do all it 
can to please its beloved. In this second state, and one thinks of St. Paul’s argument in 
Romans here, the external becomes internal and law is overcome by love. 
 
3. In the third state, consumed by love for divine perfection, the Soul attaches itself 
to making ‘works of goodness’. These can be images, representations, projects and 
objects that give us delight in glorifying God. But Porete insists, and this is a theme that 
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Eckhart will take up in his extraordinary German sermons, the Soul ‘…renounces those 
works in which she has this delight, and puts to death the will which had its life from 
this…’ The Soul no longer wills, but undergoes a detachment from the will by obeying 
the will of another, namely God. The Soul must become a ‘martyr’; that is, a witness 
and victim to God by abstaining from works and destroying the will. Porete’s language 
here is extremely violent, writing that, ‘One must crush oneself, hacking and hewing 
away at oneself to widen the place in which Love will want to be’. This is the beginning 
of the painful process of the annihilation of the Soul, where suffering is necessary in 
order to bore open a space that is wide enough for love to enter. Anne Carson rightly 
compares this process of annihilation with Simone Weil’s idea of decreation, ‘To undo 
the creature in us’. 
 
4. In the fourth state, when I have renounced my will and hewn away at myself, 
when I have begun to decreate and annihilate myself, I am filled with God’s love and 
exalted ‘into delight’. Porete’s wording here is extraordinary, the Soul, ‘…does not 
believe that God has any greater gift to bestow on any soul here below than this love 
which Love for love has poured forth within her’. In the fourth state, the Soul is in love 
with love as such and becomes intoxicated, ‘Gracious Love makes her wholly drunken’ 
(emphasis mine). 
 
Excursus: In his wonderfully capacious and open-minded investigation of mysticism in 
The Varieties of Religious Experience, William James discusses the relation between 
mystical states and drunkenness. This is what he calls the idea of ‘anaesthetic 
revelation’, which he links to his own experiences with nitrous oxide or laughing gas, 
which had been a drug of choice amongst scientists, poets and intellectuals throughout 
the 19th Century. Nitrous oxide, James recounts from personal experience, induces a 
feeling of reconciliation or oneness at a level deeper than that of ordinary waking 
consciousness with its separation of subjects and objects. Indeed, James goes further 
and compares this mystical experience of reconciliation, or cosmic consciousness, with 
what he sees as Hegel’s pantheism. This is, for James, the ‘…monistic insight, in which 
the OTHER in its various forms appears absorbed into the One’. On this reading of 
Hegel (and, of course, other readings are possible), the key to dialectical thinking is the 
unity of the Same and the Other, where what Hegel calls the Concept would be that 
movement of thinking which grasps both itself and its opposite. James adds that, ‘this is 
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a dark saying’, but he insists that ‘the living sense of the reality’ of Hegel’s philosophy 
‘only comes in the artificial mystic state of mind’. In others words, Hegel can only be 
understood when one is drunk on laughing gas. 
 
Drunkenness is always followed by a hangover. Such is the condition of what Porete 
calls ‘dismay’ and which other mystics commonly call distress, dereliction and distance 
from God. The error of the fourth state - and by implication James’s analysis of 
mysticism - is to believe that the progress of the Soul is complete in its beatific union 
with God. Such a conception of unio mystica is common to many mystics and was 
tolerated and even encouraged by the Church, when and where it could be controlled. 
Porete, however, is engaged in a much more radical enterprise, namely the Soul’s 
annihilation. This brings us to the fifth state. 
 
5. The dismay and dereliction of the fifth state arises from the following sober 
consideration: on the one hand, the Soul considers God as the source of things that are, 
that is, of all goodness. But, on the other hand, the Soul then turns to consider itself, 
from which all things are not. The free will that God put into the Soul has been 
corrupted by the Fall. Insofar as the Soul wills anything, that thing is evil for it is 
nothing but the expression of original sin and the separation from the divine source of 
goodness. As Porete puts it, ‘The Soul’s Will sees…that it cannot progress by itself if it 
does not separate itself from her own willing, for her nature is evil by that inclination 
towards nothingness to which nature tends…’ How, then, can I will not to will? I 
cannot, for every act of will, even the will not to will, is the expression of separation 
from divine goodness and therefore evil. As we saw in the third state, the Soul has tried 
to cut away at itself, to bore a hole in itself that will allow love to enter. But the 
momentary exaltation of the fourth state, drunk with divinity, was illusory and 
transitory. The fifth state, Porete writes, ‘…has subdued her (i.e. the Soul) in showing to 
the Soul her own self’. It is here that we face what Porete repeatedly calls an ‘abyss’, 
‘deep beyond all depths’, ‘without compass or end’. This abyss is the gap between the 
willful and errant nature of the Soul and divine goodness. It cannot be bridged by any 
action. In the fifth state, two natures are at war within me: the divine goodness that I 
love and the evil that I am by virtue of original sin. As Paul puts it, ‘The Good that I 
would I do not, but the Evil that I would not that I do’. Faced with this abyss, in the fifth 
state I become a paradox. The Soul wants to annihilate itself and unify with God. But 
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how? How can an abyss become a byss? 
6. This is the work of the sixth state, which is the highest that can be attained 
during terrestrial life. In the sobriety of the fifth state, the Soul knows two things: divine 
goodness and the errant activity of the will. In making ‘her look at herself again’, in 
such painful self-scrutiny, Porete adds that,  
‘…these two things that she sees take away from her will and longing and works of 
goodness, and so she is wholly at rest, and put in possession of her own state of free 
being, the high excellence of which gives her repose from every thing’.  
Having gone through the ordeal of the fifth state, the Soul finds repose and rest, what 
Eckhart will call an experience of releasement.  
 
The reasoning here is delicate: the abyss that separates the Soul from God cannot be 
byssed or bridged through an act of will. On the contrary, it is only through the 
extinction of the will and the annihilation of the Soul that the sixth state can be attained. 
That is, the Soul itself becomes an abyss, that is, it becomes emptied and excoriated, 
entering a condition of absolute poverty. It is only in such poverty that the wealth of 
God can be poured into the Soul. In the fifth state, the Soul looked at herself and 
experienced dereliction. But in the sixth state, ‘…the Soul does not see herself at all’. 
Not only that, the Soul also does not see God. Rather, and these words are 
extraordinary,  
‘God of his divine majesty sees himself in her, and by him this Soul is so illumined that 
she cannot see that anyone exists, except only God himself, from whom all things 
are…’    
When the Soul has become annihilated and ‘free of all things’, then it can be illumined 
by the presence of God. It is only by reducing myself to nothing, that I can join with 
that divine something. As Porete insists, in this sixth state the Soul is not yet glorified, 
that is, a direct participant in the glory of God. This only happens after our death, in the 
seventh state. But what happens in the sixth state is even more extraordinary than glory.  
 
Let me quote at length the key passage, 
‘…this Soul, thus pure and illumined, sees neither God nor herself, but God sees 
himself of himself in her, for her, without her, who - that is, God – shows to her that 
there is nothing except him. And therefore this Soul knows nothing except him, and 
loves nothing except him, and praises nothing except him, for there is nothing but he.’ 
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Which means the following: the annihilated Soul becomes the place for God’s infinite 
self-reflection. The logic here is impeccable: if the Soul has become nothing, then it can 
obviously see neither itself nor God. On the contrary, God enters into the place that I 
created by hewing and hacking away at myself. But that place is no longer my self. 
What the Soul has created is the space of its own nihilation. This nihil is the ‘place’, or 
better what Augustine might call the ‘no place’, where God reflects on himself, where 
‘God sees himself of himself in her’. God’s love fills the annihilated Soul, in a 
movement of reflection which is at once both, ‘for her’ and ‘without her’. The only way 
in which the Soul can become for God is by becoming without itself. In its nihilation, 
the no-place of the Soul becomes the place of God’s reflection on himself, in-himself 
and for-himself. 
 
As Anne Carson rightly asks in her inquiry into how it is that women like Sappho, 
Simone Weil and Marguerite Porete tell God, ‘What is it that love dares the self to do?’ 
She answers that, ‘Love dares the self to leave itself behind, to enter into poverty’. Love 
is, thus, the audacity of impoverishment, of complete submission. It is an act of absolute 
spiritual daring that induces a passivity where the self becomes annihilated; it is a 
subjective act where the subject extinguishes itself. Become a husk or empty vessel 
through this act of daring, the fullness of love enters in. It is through the act of 
annihilation that the Soul knows nothing but God, ‘and loves nothing except him’. Once 
the Soul is not, God is the only being that is. 
 
7. As I already indicated, the seventh state is only attained after our death. It is the 
condition of ‘everlasting glory’ of which we shall have no knowledge until our souls 
have left our bodies.  
 
 
Communistic Consequences  
 
It is time to draw the significant consequences from Porete’s sinuous argumentation. 
Why was The Mirror condemned as heresy? For the simple reason that once the Soul is 
annihilated, there is nothing to prevent its identity with God. By following the itinerary 
of the seven states described in The Mirror, the Soul is annihilated and I become 
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nothing. In becoming nothing, God enters the place where my Soul was. At that point, I 
– whatever sense the first person pronoun might still have – become God. When I 
become nothing, I become God.  
 
As William James shows, varieties of this claim can be found in the mystical tradition. 
But perhaps everything goes back to St. Paul’s words in Galatians 2:20, ‘I live, yet not 
I, but Christ liveth in me’. That is, when I annihilate myself, that is, when I crucify 
myself in an imitatio Christi, then Christ lives within me. In other words, the I that lives 
is not I but God. This might also be linked to the Henry Suso’s words, ‘The spirit dies, 
and yet it is alive in the marvels of the Godhead’. Or indeed, we could make a 
connection to the differenceless point of the Godhead at the heart of Eckhart’s theology. 
Yet, Porete is more radical still. The heart of the heresy of the Free Spirit is not some 
Neo-Platonic idea of the contemplative union of the intellect with the One as the source 
of an emanation, God, the bliss of contact with the divine. Rather, as Cohn writes, ‘It 
was a passionate desire of certain human beings to surpass the condition of humanity 
and to become God’. What Porete is describing is a painful process of decreation: 
boring a whole in oneself so that love might enter. It is closer to Teresa of Avila’s 
piercing of the heart that takes place when she is on fire with the love of God, ‘The pain 
was so great, it made me moan’. This desire for annihilation unleashes the most extreme 
violence against the self. For example, Angela of Foligno writes,  
‘There are times when such great anger ensues that I am scarcely able to stop from 
totally tearing myself apart. There are also times when I can’t hold myself back from 
striking myself in a horrible way, and sometimes my head and limbs are swollen.’ 
 
The consequence of such a process of self-deification is to overcome the condition of 
original sin and to return to the freedom that human beings enjoyed before the Fall. As 
the founder of the Quakers, George Fox, has it, ‘I was come up to the state of Adam in 
which he was before he fell’. It is not difficult to see why the Movement of the Free 
Spirit posed such a profound threat to the authority of the Catholic Church and the 
governmental and legislative authority of various states in which it manifested itself. If 
it was possible to overcome original sin and regain the Edenic state of intimacy with the 
divine, then what possible function might be served by the Catholic Church, whose 
authority as a mediator between the human and the divine is only justified insofar as 
human beings live and travail in the wake of original sin. As we have seen in our 
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discussion of Schmitt, all forms of ecclesiastical and governmental authoritarianism 
require a belief in original sin. It is only because human beings are defective and 
imperfect that church and state become necessary. If human beings become free, that is, 
perfected by overcoming the sin and death that define the post-Lapsarian human 
condition, then this has dramatic political consequences. 
 
To begin with, as we saw in our allusions to John Ball and the Peasants’ Revolt, if the 
spirit is free then all conceptions of mine and thine vanish. In the annihilation of the 
Soul, mine becomes thine, I becomes thou, and the no-place of the Soul becomes the 
space of divine self-reflection. Such an experience of divinity, of course, is not my 
individual private property, but is the commonwealth of those who are free in spirit. 
Private property is just the consequence of our fallen state. The Soul’s recovery of its 
natural freedom entails commonality of ownership. The only true owner of property is 
God and his wealth is held in common by all creatures without hierarchy or distinctions 
of class and hereditary privilege. The political form of the Movement of the Free Spirit 
is communism.  
 
Furthermore, it is a communism whose social bond is love. We have seen how Porete 
describes the work of love as the audacity of the Soul’s annihilation. Clearly, there can 
be no higher authority than divine love, which entails that communism would be a 
political form higher than law (Marx repeats many of these ideas, imagining 
communism as a society without law). We might say that law is the juridical form that 
structures a social order. As such, it is based on the repression of the moment of 
community. Law is the external constraint on society that allows authority to be 
exercised, all the way to its dictatorial suspension. From the perspective of the 
communism of the Free Spirit, law loses its legitimacy because it is a form of 
heteronomous authority as opposed to autonomously chosen work of love. Furthermore, 
and perhaps this is what was most dangerous in the Movement of the Free Spirit, if 
human beings are free of original sin, where God is manifested as the spirit of 
commonality, then there is no longer any legitimacy to moral constraints on human 
behaviour that do not directly flow from our freedom. The demands of the state and the 
church can simply be ignored if they are not consistent with the experience of freedom. 
To be clear, this is not at all to say that the Movement of the Free Spirit implies 
immoralism. On the contrary, it is to claim that morality has flow from freedom by 
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being consistent with a principle of that is located not in the individual but in its divine 
source, the Free Spirit that is held in common.  
 
The Movement of the Free Spirit has habitually been seen as encouraging both moral 
and sexual libertinage. One cannot exaggerate the extent to which the alleged sexual 
excesses of the adepts of the Free Spirit obsessed the Inquisition that investigated and 
condemned the Movement, destroying its literature and executing or incarcerating its 
members. Most of what we know of the Movement is mediated through the agency of 
the Church that outlawed it. Such evidence is clearly difficult to trust. In particular, the 
various inquisitors seem obsessed with cataloguing instances of nakedness, as if that 
were evidence of the most depraved morals. But what are clothes for, apart from 
keeping the body warm? They are a consequence of the Fall when we learned for the 
first time to cover our bodies for shame. If that shame is lifted with the overcoming of 
original sin, then why wear clothing at all? Furthermore, this tendency to prurience is 
continued by the Movement’s modern inquisitors, like Cohn, who takes great delight in 
describing the ‘anarchic eroticism’ of the adepts of the Free Spirit. For example, he 
takes evident pleasure in describing the excesses of the Nuns of Schweidnitz in Silesia 
in 1330s, who claimed that they had such command over the Holy Trinity that they 
could ‘ride it as in a saddle’. On this view, the Movement of the Free Spirit allows and 
even encourages sexual licentiousness where adepts throw off the moral prudery of the 
Church and run amok in some sort of huge orgy. 
 
It is, of course, impossible to assess these claims of erotic libertinage. After all, the 
accusations are made by the accusers and it would be somewhat odd to trust them 
entirely. In the case of Cohn, the curiosity about the sexual antics of adepts of the Free 
Spirit is perhaps explained by the Zeitgeist in which he was writing. In the Conclusion 
to the 1970 revised edition of The Pursuit of the Millenium, Cohn argues for a 
continuity between medieval practices of self-deification and ‘the ideal of a total 
emancipation of the individual from society, even from external reality itself…with the 
help of psychedelic drugs…’ But I see little evidence for the suggestion of such narcotic 
or erotic license. On the contrary, what one finds in Porete and in many other mystical 
texts from the period and later is not some wild unleashing of repressed sexual energy, 
but rather its subtle transformation. Texts like The Mirror testify to a passion 
transformed from the physical to the metaphysical, to a certain spiritualization of desire. 
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Some might call this sublimation. What is most striking in the writing of the mystics, 
particularly female mystics, is the elevation of the discourse of desire in relation to the 
object cause of that desire, which is the beloved: God usually in the person of Christ. 
What the female mystic wants is to love and desire in the same place and this requires 
both the articulation of desire and its transmutation into love. To reduce mystical 
passion to some pent-up sexual energy is to miss the point entirely. It is to mistake 
sublimation for repression. If anything, what seems to mark texts like The Mirror is an 
experience of passivity and an emphasis on submission. The movement of the Free 
Spirit is not about doing what you want. On the contrary, it is about the training and 
submission of free will in order to recover a condition of commonality that overcomes 
it, namely love.  
 
Indeed, the emphasis on submission and quietism that one finds in Porete and others 
seems more likely to lead to chastity than license. Unrestrained erotic exuberance would 
simply be the false exercise of the will. The point of Porete’s seven-state itinerary is the 
disciplining of the self all the way to its extinction in an experience of love that 
annihilates it. To my mind, the Movement of the Free Spirit finds a greater echo in the 
chastity of groups like the Shakers than the exhaustive and exhausting cataloguing of 
sexual excesses listed that took place in the Chateau de Silling in the Marquis de Sade’s 
120 Days of Sodom. 
 
 
Do not kill others, only yourself 
 
There is no doubt that the Movement of the Free Spirit is deeply antinomian, refusing 
the metaphysical, moral, legislative and political authority of both church and state. As 
such, it constituted a clandestine and subversive movement of resistance. The earliest 
appearance of the many alleged heresies linked to the Free Spirit comes from an 
investigation held in Germany in the 1260s. The first of the accusations is extremely 
revealing, ‘To make small assemblies and to teach in secret is not contrary to faith but is 
contrary to the evangelical way of life…’ Note the emphasis on size and secrecy here. 
The great threat of the Movement of the Free Spirit was a secret network of small 
activist groups linked together by powerful bonds of solidarity and love. It was also a 
highly mobile network and what seems to have constantly worried the Church was the 
 217 
itinerant nature of the Beguines and Beghards and the way in which they moved from 
town to town and state to state. In addition, the rallying cry of these mendicants was 
‘Brod durch Gott’, ‘bread for the sake of God’ and they preached, as did the Franciscan 
Spirituals, a doctrine of the poverty of Christ. As William Cornelius is reported to have 
said in the mid-13th Century, ‘No rich man can be saved, and all the rich are miserly’. 
The point is not lost on Cohn who writes that, at its height, the Movement of the Free 
Spirit, ‘had become an invisible empire’ held together by powerful emotional bonds. 
Devoted to undermining the power of church and state, abolishing private property and 
establishing what can only be described as an anarcho-communism based on the 
annihilation of the self in the experience of the divine, the ruthlessness with which the 
Movement was repeatedly crushed should come as no surprise.  
 
What kind of assessment can we make of the Movement of the Free Spirit? Cohn sees 
millenarianism as a constantly recurring and dangerous threat that is still very much 
with us. What finds expression with the heresy of the Free Spirit is, he writes, ‘…an 
affirmation of freedom so reckless and unqualified that it amounted to a total denial of 
every kind of restraint and limitation’(148). As such, the Free Spirit is a precursor of 
what Cohn calls ‘that bohemian intelligentsia’ that has plagued the 20th Century and 
which has been living from the ideas expressed by Bakunin and Nietzsche ‘…in their 
wilder moments’. The Free Spirit was ‘the most ambitious essay in total social 
revolution’(149), which finds its continuation on the extreme left and right alike.  
‘Nietzsche’s Superman…certainly obsessed the imagination of many of the “armed 
bohemians” who made the National-Socialist revolution; and many a present-day 
exponent of world revolution owes more to Bakunin than to Marx’.(149) 
This is not the place to show either the erroneousness of such readings of Nietzsche and 
Bakunin or the chronic limitation of such arguments by insinuation that allegedly 
connect the Free Spirit to Nazism via Nietzsche. Let’s just note that, as we saw with 
Porete, the Free Spirit is not a ‘reckless and unqualified’ assertion of freedom that 
denies all ‘restraint and limitation’. On the contrary, Porete is arguing for a rigorous and 
demanding discipline of the self where individual acts of arbitrary freedom are directed 
outside themselves to a divine source which is the basis for commonality. To say it once 
again, the Free Spirit is not about doing what you want. Neither is it amoralistic; rather, 
it is a stringent and demanding ethical disciplining of the self. 
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Cohn uses the standard ‘depth psychology’ talk of the 1950s and 60s to diagnose the 
malady that drives the desire for mystical anarchism. He explains mysticism 
aetiologically as a ‘profound introversion’ of ‘gigantic parental images’(176). This is 
both a defence against reality and ‘a reactivation of the distorting images of infancy’. 
Thereafter, two possibilities are possible: either the mystic emerges from the process of 
introversion successfully, ‘as a more integrated personality’, or he ‘introjects’ these 
images unsuccessfully and ‘emerges as a nihilistic megalomaniac’. Cohn catalogues the 
repeated occurrence of such megalomaniacs in great historical detail and there is no 
denying the existence of forms of sophism, obscurantism and charlatanry that are allied 
to the Movement of the Free Spirit. However, I am not only suspicious of the validity of 
such aetiological explanations, but would also want to interrogate the normative 
presupposition that such explanations invoke for the emergence of phenomena like 
mysticism. Cohn simply assumes that ‘integrated personality’ is an unquestioned good, 
along with related ideas of reinforcing the ego and encouraging it to adapt to reality. 
What Porete is describing is what we might call a creative disintegration of the ego, an 
undermining of its authority which allows a new form of subjectivity to stand in the 
place where the old self was. Rather than seeing Porete as a retreat to some alleged 
illusory infantile state, the process of the Soul’s annihilation might be seen as the self’s 
maturation and mutation where it is no longer organized around the individual and his 
self-regarding acts of will. Rather than integrating some given   personality, what Porete 
is describing is the emergence of a new form of subjectivity, a transformation of the self 
through the act of love.  
 
As we saw above, John Gray makes explicit what is implicit in Cohn’s approach. He 
extends the condemnation of groups like the Free Spirit to any and all utopian 
movements. The burden of a book like Black Mass is to show the continued malign 
presence of millenarian, apocalyptic politics in the contemporary world. What is 
particularly powerful in Gray’s approach is the manner in which he extends Cohn’s 
diagnosis to the neo-conservative millenarianism of the Bush administration, gleefully 
embraced by Blair, for whom ‘the clichés of the hour have always been eternal verities’. 
However, as I argued in detail above, the critique of utopianism does not vindicate 
Gray’s call for political realism, which draws on his naturalization of the concept of 
original sin. Relatedly, it is something of an understatement to suggest that Carl Schmitt 
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would have been out of sympathy with both the theology and politics of mystical 
anarchism. I’m sure Schmitt would have happily served as Porete’s inquisitor and 
probably personally lit the fire that consumed her and her books. 
 
A very different take on these matters can be found in Raoul Vaneigem’s The 
Movement of the Free Spirit from 1986. In many ways, Vaneigem unwittingly confirms 
all of Cohn’s worst fears: he offers a vigorous defence of the Movement of the Free 
Spirit as a precursor to the insurrectional movements of the 1960s such as the 
Situationist International, in which Vaneigem’s writings played such a hugely 
influential role. He writes of the Free Spirit,  
‘The spring has never dried up; it gushes from the fissures of history, bursting through 
the earth at the slightest shift of the mercantile terrain’.(94)  
In Debord’s distopian vision of the society of the spectacle where all human relations 
are governed by exchange - the dictatorship of a commodity system that Vaneigem 
always compares to the negativity of death - the Free Spirit is an emancipatory 
movement that operates in the name of life, bodily pleasures and untrammeled freedom. 
Vaneigem reinterprets the Free Spirit’s insistence on poverty of spirit as the basis for a 
critique of the market system where life is reduced to purposeless productivity and life-
denying work. As such, the most radical element in the Movement of the Free Spirit, for 
Vaneigem, was ‘an alchemy of individual fulfillment’ where the cultivation of a state of 
perfection allowed the creation of a space where the ‘economy’s hold over individuals’ 
was relinquished. Thus, the Free Spirit’s emphasis on love is ‘the sole alternative to 
market society’(254). Wrapped around a compelling and extended documentation of the 
Movement of the Free Spirit, Vaneigem argues for what he calls an ‘alchemy of the 
self’ based on unfettered enjoyment and bodily pleasures. He cites the proposition of 
Hippolytus of Rome, ‘The promiscuity of men and women, that is the true communion’. 
Vaneigem advances an opposition between the Free Spirit and the Holy Spirit, where 
the latter is identified with God and the former with his denial. Vaneigem is therefore 
skeptical of Porete’s position in The Mirror, arguing that self-deification is too 
dependant on a repressive, authoritarian idea of God.(246) Although Vaneigem borrows 
Porete’s idea of the refinement of love, which is allegedly the title of one of her lost 
books, he finds her approach too ascetic and intellectualized. Vaneigem defends an 
individualistic hedonism based not on intellect but ‘a flux of passions’.(195) It has a 
stronger affinity with Fourier’s utopianism of passionate attraction filled with 
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phalansteries of free love and leisure than the sort of self-annihilation found in Porete. 
To my mind, something much more interesting than Vaneigem can be found in Gustav 
Landauer, the German anarcho-socialist who exerted such influence over Buber, 
Scholem and the young Benjamin (see Loewy article). In his ‘Anarchic Thoughts on 
Anarchism’(1901), Landauer is writing in the context of the anarchist politics of 
assassination that had seen the killing of U.S. President William McKinley in 1901, 
itself based on the murder of King Umberto I of Italy the previous year. Both 
perpetrators identified themselves as anarchists. Landauer asks, ‘…what has the killing 
of people to do with anarchism, a theory striving for a society without government and 
authoritarian coercion, a movement against the state and legalized violence?’ The 
answer is clear, ‘Nothing at all’. Landauer argues that all forms of violence are despotic 
and anarchism entails non-violence. If anarchists resort to violence, then they are no 
better than the tyrants whom they claim to oppose. Anarchism is not a matter of armed 
revolt or military attack, ‘it is a matter of how one lives’. Its concern is with, ‘a new 
people arising from humble beginnings in small communities that form in the midst of 
the old’. This is what Landauer intriguingly calls ‘inward colonization’.  
 
Yet, how is such an inward colonization possible? Landauer’s response is singular and 
draws us back to the idea of self-annihilation. He writes, ‘Whoever kills, dies. Those 
who want to create life must also embrace it and be reborn from within’. But how can 
such a rebirth take place? It can only happen by killing oneself, ‘…in the mystical 
sense, in order to be reborn after having descended into the depths of their soul’. He 
goes on, ‘Only those who have journeyed through their own selves and waded deep in 
their own blood can help to create the new world without interfering in the lives of 
others’. Landauer insists that such a position does not imply quietism or resignation. On 
the contrary, he writes that ‘one acts with others’, but he adds that, ‘none of this will 
really bring us forward if it is not based on a new spirit won by conquest of one’s inner 
self’. He continues,  
‘It is not enough for us to reject conditions and institutions; we have to reject ourselves. 
“Do not kill others, only yourself”: such will be the maxim of those who accept the 
challenge to create their own chaos in order to discover their most authentic and 
precious inner being and to become mystically one with the world.’ 
Although talk of authenticity and ‘precious inner being’ leaves me somewhat cold, what 
is fascinating here is the connection between the idea of self-annihilation and 
 221 
anarchism. The condition of possibility for a life of cooperation and solidarity with 
others is a subjective transformation, a self-killing that renounces the killing of others. 
For Landauer, it is not a matter of anarchism participating in the usual party politics, 
systemic violence and cold rationalism of the state. It is a rather a question of 
individuals breaking with the state’s authority and uniting together in new forms of life. 
Talk of inward colonization gives a new twist to Cohn’s idea of the Movement of the 
Free Spirit as an ‘invisible empire’. It is a question of the creation of new forms of life 
at a distance from the order of the state - which is the order of visibility - and cultivating 
largely invisible commonalities, what Landauer calls anarchy’s ‘dark deep dream’. 
Perhaps this killing of the self in an ecstatic mystical experience is close to what 
Bataille called ‘sovereignty’, and which for him was constantly linked with his 
experimentation with different forms of small-scale, communal group collaborations, 
particularly in the 1930s and 40s, from Contre Attaque, the Collège de Sociologie and 
the Collège Socratique, through to the more mysterious Acéphale. 
 
 
The Risk of Abstraction 
 
We are living through a long anti-1960s. The various experiments in communal living 
and collective existence that defined that period seem to us either quaintly passé, 
laughably unrealistic or dangerously misguided. We now know better than to try and 
bring heaven crashing down to earth and construct concrete utopias. To that extent, 
despite our occasional and transient enthusiasms, we are all political realists; indeed 
most of us are passive nihilists and cynics. This is why we still require a belief in 
something like original sin. Without the conviction that the human condition is 
essentially flawed and dangerously rapacious, we would have no way of justifying our 
disappointment.  
 
It is indeed true that those utopian political movements of the 1960s, like the 
Situationist International, where an echo of the Movement of the Free Spirit could be 
heard, led to various forms of disillusionment, disintegration and, in extreme cases, 
disaster. Experiments in the collective ownership of property or in communal living 
based on sexual freedom without the repressive institution of the family, or indeed R.D. 
Laing’s experimental communal asylums with no distinction between the so-called mad 
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and the sane seem like distant whimsical cultural memories captured in dog-eared, 
yellowed paperbacks and grainy, poor quality film. It is a world that we struggle to 
understand. Perhaps such communal experiments were too pure and overfull of 
righteous conviction. Perhaps they were, in a word, too moralistic to ever endure. 
Perhaps such experiments were doomed because of what we might call a politics of 
abstraction, in the sense of being overly attached to an idea at the expense of a frontal 
denial of reality.  
 
At their most extreme, say in the activities of the Weather Underground, the Red Army 
Faction and the Red Brigades in the 1970s, the moral certitude of the closed and pure 
community becomes fatally linked to redemptive, cleansing violence. Terror becomes 
the means to bring about end of virtue. The death of individuals is but a speck on the 
vast heroic canvas of the class struggle. This culminated in a politics of violence where 
acts of abduction, kidnapping, hijacking and assassination were justified through an 
attachment to a set of ideas. As a character in Jean-Luc Godard’s Notre Musique 
remarks, ‘To kill a human being in order to defend an idea is not to defend an idea, it is 
to kill a human being’. Perhaps such groups were too attached to the idea of immediacy, 
the propaganda of the violent deed as the impatient attempt to storm the heavens. 
Perhaps such experiments lacked an understanding of politics as a constant and concrete 
process of mediation between a subjective ethical commitment based on a general 
principle, for example the equality of all, and the experience of local organization that 
builds fronts and alliances between disparate groups with often conflicting sets of 
interests. By definition, such a process of mediation is never pure. 
 
Perhaps such utopian experiments in community only live on in the institutionally 
sanctioned spaces of the contemporary art world. One thinks of projects like 
L’Association des Temps Libérés (1995), or Utopia Station (2003) and many other 
examples, somewhat fossilized in a recent show at the Guggenheim in New York, 
Theanyspacewhatever. In the work of artists like Philippe Parreno and Liam Gillick or 
curators like Hans-Ulrich Obrist, there is a deeply-felt Situationist nostalgia for ideas of 
collectivity, action, self-management, collaboration and indeed the idea of the group as 
such. In such art practice, which Nicolas Bourriaud has successfully branded as 
‘relational’, art is the acting out of a situation in order to see if, in Obrist’s words, 
‘something like a collective intelligence might exist’. As Gillick notes, ‘Maybe it would 
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be better if we worked in groups of three’. Of course, the problem with such 
experiments is twofold: on the one hand, they are only enabled and legitimated through 
the cultural institutions of the art world and thus utterly enmeshed in the circuits of 
commodification and spectacle that they seek to subvert; and, on the other hand, the 
dominant mode for approaching an experience of the communal is through the strategy 
of reenactment. One doesn’t engage in a bank heist, one reenacts Patty Hearst’s 
adventures with the Symbionese Liberation Army in a warehouse in Brooklyn, or 
whatever. Situationist détournement is replayed as obsessively planned reenactment. 
Fascinating as I find such experiments and the work of the artists involved, one suspects 
what we might call a ‘mannerist Situationism’, where the old problem of recuperation 
does not even apply because such art is completely co-opted by the socio-economic 
system which provides its life-blood.  
 
Perhaps we are witnessing something related to this in recent events in France 
surrounding the arrest and detention of the so-called ‘Tarnac Nine’ on 11th November 
2008. As part of Sarkozy’s reactionary politics of fear (itself based on an overwhelming 
fear of disorder), a number of activists who had been formerly associated with the group 
Tiqqun were arrested in rural, central France by a force of 150 anti-terrorist police, 
helicopters and attendant media. They were living communally in the small village of 
Tarnac in the Corrèze district of the Massif Central. Apparently a number of the group’s 
members had bought a small farmhouse and ran a cooperative grocery store and were 
engaged in such dangerous activities as running a local film club, planting carrots and 
delivering food to the elderly. With surprising juridical imagination, they were charged 
with ‘pre-terrorism’, an accusation linked to acts of sabotage on France’s TGV rail 
system. The basis for this thought-crime was a passage from L’insurrection qui vient 
from 2007, a wonderfully dystopian diagnosis of contemporary society and a 
compelling strategy to resist it. The final pages of L’insurrection advocate acts of 
sabotage against the transport networks of ‘the social machine’ and ask the question, 
‘How could a TGV line or an electrical network be rendered useless?’(p.101) Two of 
the alleged pre-terrorists, Julien Coupat and Yldune Lévy, are still in jail and others 
have been charged with ‘a terrorist undertaking’ that carries a prison sentence of 20 
years. Such is the repressive and reactionary force of the state, just in case anyone had 
forgotten. As the authors of L’insurrection remind us, ‘Governing has never been 
anything but pushing back by a thousand subterfuges the moment when the crowd will 
 224 
hang you’.(p.83)  
L’insurrection qui vient has powerful echoes of the Situationist International and some 
of the other communist heresies we have examined. The authorship of L’insurrection is 
attributed to La Comité Invisible and the insurrectional strategy of the group turns 
around the question of invisibility. It is a question of ‘learning how to become 
imperceptible’, of regaining ‘the taste for anonymity’ and not exposing and losing 
oneself in the order of visibility, which is always controlled by the police and the state. 
The authors of L’insurrection argue for the proliferation of zones of opacity, anonymous 
spaces where communes might be formed. The book ends with the slogan, ‘All power 
to the communes’ (‘Tout le pouvoir aux communes’). In a nod to Blanchot, these 
communes are described as ‘inoperative’ or ‘désœuvrée’, as refusing the capitalist 
tyranny of work. In a related text simply entitled Call, they seek to establish ‘a series of 
foci of desertion, of secession poles, of rallying points. For the runaways. For those who 
leave. A set of places to take shelter from the control of a civilization that is headed for 
the abyss’. A strategy of sabotage, blockade and what is called ‘the human strike’ is 
proposed in order to weaken still further our doomed civilization. An opposition 
between the city and the country is constantly reiterated, and it is clear that construction 
of zones of opacity is better suited to rural life than the policed space of surveillance of 
the modern metropolis. L’insurrection is compelling, exhilarating, and deeply lyrical 
text that sets off all sorts of historical echoes with movements like the Free Spirit: the 
emphases on secrecy, invisibility and itinerancy, on small scale communal experiments 
in living, on the cultivation of poverty, radical mendicancy and the refusal of work. But 
the double program of sabotage, on the one hand, and secession from civilization, on the 
other, risks remaining trapped within the politics of abstraction identified above. In this 
fascinatingly creative reenactment of the Situationist gesture, what is missed is a 
thinking of political mediation where groups like the Invisible Committee would be able 
to link up and become concretized in relation to multiple and conflicting sites of 
struggle. We need a richer political cartography than the opposition between the city 
and the country. Tempting as it is, sabotage combined with secession from civilization 
smells of the moralism we detected above.  
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Conclusion – The Politics of Love 
 
But what follows from this? Are we to conclude with John Gray that the utopian 
impulse in political thinking is simply the residue of a dangerous political theology that 
we are much better off without? Is the upshot of the critique of mystical anarchism that 
we should be resigned in the face of the world’s violent inequality and update a belief in 
original sin with a reassuringly miserabilistic Darwinism? Should we reconcile 
ourselves to the options of political realism, authoritarianism or liberalism? Should we 
simply renounce the utopian impulse in our personal and political thinking?  
 
If so, then the consequence is clear: we are stuck with the way things are, or possibly 
with something even worse than the way things are. To abandon the utopian impulse in 
thinking is to imprison ourselves within the world as it is and to give up once and for 
the prospect that another world is possible, however small, fleeting and compromised 
such a world might be. In the political circumstances that presently surround us in the 
West, to abandon the utopian impulse in political thinking is to resign oneself to liberal 
democracy which, as we showed above, is the rule of the rule, the reign of law which 
renders impotent anything that would break with law: the miraculous, the moment of 
the event, the break with the situation in the name of the common.  
 
Let me return for a last time to mystical anarchism and to the question of self-
deification. Defending the idea of becoming God might be seen as going a little far, I 
agree. To embrace such mysticism would be to fall prey to what Badiou calls in his 
book on St. Paul the obscurantist discourse of glorification. In terms of the Lacanian 
schema of the four discourses that he borrows (master, university, hysteric, analyst), the 
mystic is identified with the discourse of the hysteric and contrasted with the anti-
obscurantist Christian position that Badiou identifies with the discourse of the analyst. 
Badiou draws a line between St Paul’s declaration of the Christ-event, what he calls ‘an 
ethical dimension of anti-obscurantism’, and the mystical discourse of identity with the 
divine, the ravished subjectivity of someone like Porete. (p.51-52)  
 
Yet, to acquiesce in such a conclusion would be to miss something vital about mystical 
anarchism, what I want to call, in closing, its politics of love. What I find most 
compelling in Porete is the idea of love as an act of absolute spiritual daring that 
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eviscerates the old self in order that something new can come into being. In Anne 
Carson’s words, love dares the self to leave itself behind, to enter into poverty and 
engage with its own annihilation: to hew and hack away at oneself in order to make a 
space that is large enough for love to enter. What is being attempted by Porete – and 
perhaps it is only the attempt which matters here, not some theophanic outcome – is an 
act of absolute daring, not for some nihilistic end, but in order to open what we might 
call the immortal dimension of the subject. The only proof of immortality is the act of 
love, the daring that attempts to extend beyond oneself by annihilating oneself, to 
project onto something that exceeds one’s powers of projection. To love is to give what 
one does not have and to receive that over which one has no power. As we saw in 
Landauer, the point is not to kill others, but to kill oneself in order that a transformed 
relation to others becomes possible, some new way of conceiving the common and 
being with others. Anarchism can only begin with an act of inward colonization, the act 
of love that demands a transformation of the self. Finally - and very simply – anarchism 
is not a question for the future, it is a matter of how one lives now.  
 
Is such a thing conceivable and practicable without the moralism, purism, immediacy, 
and the righteously self-enclosed certainty of previous experiments? To be honest, I 
don’t know. 
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APPENDIX III: A TASTE OF FAITH I (THE HELL WITHIN) BY EDIA CONNOLE 
& SCOTT WILSON (2012) 
 
Rationale for March 25th 2012 ‘Food Thing’ event held in conjunction with 
Simon Critchley and Clodagh Emoe’s Mystical Anarchism at Block T, Dublin. 
 
The more I enter, the more I find, and the more I find the more I seek of Thee. Thou art 
the Food that never satiates, for when the soul is satiated in Thine abyss it is not 
satiated, but ever continues to hunger and thirst for Thee. Catherine of Sienna, Dialogo 
Because Jesus had fed the faithful not merely as servant and waiter, preparer and 
multiplier of loaves and fishes, but as the very bread and wine itself, to eat was a 
powerful proverb. It meant to consume, to assimilate, to become God. Caroline Walker 
Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Religious Significance of Food to Medieval 
Women In the anguish or repose or the madness of love, The heart of each devours the 
other’s heart, As he who is Love itself showed us, When he gave us himself to eat ... 
loves’s most intimate union Is through eating, tasting, and seeing interiorly. Hadewijch 
of Brabant, Letters ‘Taste’ from Latin gustus, described as the sensation of flavour 
perceived in the mouth and throat on contact with a substance, and as the faculty of 
perceiving this quality, is genealogically, if not etymologically linked to ‘test,’ insofar 
as the act of ‘tasting’ is also one of ‘testing,’ of trying or testing the flavour of 
something by taking a small portion into the mouth, as a sample, on the one hand, and 
of permitting a brief experience of something, conveying its basic character, on the 
other. To the extent that this dyad is one of discerning a person’s liking or disliking for 
particular flavours and characters, taste is also genealogically linked to ‘morality,’ to 
that which we conceive as ‘good’ or ‘bad.’ A person’s taste, reflects their conformity or 
failure to conform with generally held views concerning what is offensive or palatable, 
with the fact that this or that joke is deemed to be in good or bad taste. Ultimately then, 
when the very value of truth is called into question, ‘taste’ is genealogically linked to 
‘faith,’ insofar as the genesis of the concept ‘god’ is revealed through a genealogy of 
morality; in fact, in what are commonly referred to as ‘dirty’ jokes this genealogy 
reveals itself ex post facto - good and bad are derived from ‘pure’ and ‘impure’ and 
from the outset simply referred to a persons cleanliness. In distinction, the impure, dirty, 
distasteful, and disgusting, from Latin dis- (expressing reversal) and gustus (taste), had 
a privileged relation to faith for the medieval mystics. Indeed, Catherine of Sienna 
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found cleanliness so incompatible with charity, she deliberately drank off a bowl of 
suppurative matter; the consumption of pus, the perfect corrective for her imperfect 
piety. And just as Angela of Folignio drank the very water with which she had washed 
the feet of lepers, savouring a scab of fetid flesh as if it were the Eucharist, for Marie 
Alacoque, the pungent smell of premodern cheese made its revolting ingestion the most 
burdensome way to test her faith, and prove her love for God. Cheese, it is claimed, has 
always provoked uncontrollable revulsion and passionate devotion, precisely because it 
belongs, in psychoanalytic terms, on the other side of the border - colour, concluded 
Johann Lotichus, in his 1643 De casei neguitta (On the vileness of cheese), is the only 
difference between cheese and excrement - and for Mystical Christendom, ingestion of 
such abjection of self was turned into the ultimate act of humility; from Latin humilitas, 
a noun intending ‘humble’ but also ‘grounded’ or ‘low,’ since it derives from humus - a 
homonym of the Levantine Arab dish - meaning of the ‘earth,’ or ‘ground,’ and 
connected with notions of transcendent unity with the universe or the divine, and of 
egolessness: of liberation, abandonment and ‘annihilation’ of the soul, who stands in 
complete ‘nakedness’ before God (Mazzoni, 2005, 134; 135; Critchley, 2012, 130). 
Central to this mysticism of self-abandonment, was food, taste, and an economy of 
masochism. ‘Prodigious fasting’ [Inedia prodigiosa or, Anorexia Mirabilis, literally 
meaning ‘miraculous lack of appetite’], the renunciation of ordinary food in favour of 
the abject and disgusting, or induced vomiting - in the case of Catherine of Sienna, with 
a ‘stalke of fynel’ or ‘an ofler flinge flat she put in to hir stomake,’ - were used to hack 
and hew at the self to create a space, ‘or widen the place,’ as Margueritte Porete puts it, 
‘in which Love will want to be’ (Vander Veen, 2007, 118; Critchley, 2012, 125). But 
such Love is not easy. The modern mystic Therese of Liseux, who lay dying, bleeding 
from her intestines and unable to keep even water down, was tormented by the thought 
of banquets, her near contemporary Gemma Galgani too, dreamed of food; she asked 
her director, Father Germano, in a letter: ‘“Are you happy that I ask Jesus the grace to 
not let me taste, for as long as I live, any flavor in any food?” “Daddy, this grace is 
necessary to me,”’ she says, and assures her spiritual father, in return for her lack of 
taste , ‘“the certainty of her ability to keep food down, to not throw it all up [the object 
of her disgust] anymore”’ (Mazzoni, 2005, 162). Modern historians have sometimes 
thought these women’s stories to contain the first documentable cases of anorexia 
nervosa. Certainly, it is not difficult to think of it in the life of Gemma Galgani, given 
the timeliness of the diagnosis. An ecstatic, the first stigmatic and Saint of the 
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twentieth-century, Gemma’s brief life (1878 - 1903) bore witness to the coinage of the 
term ‘anorexia nervosa,’ as it did to that of ‘psychoanalysis,’ and of ‘sweets,’ 
incidentally; which, through the emergence of a mass consumer culture, were now 
industrialized commodities available to the poor (2005, 162-163). And Gemma herself 
was not only partial to sweets, but also to the kind of neurotic behaviour that might 
allow us to characterise her as mentally, as well as physically and socially, ill (2005, 
168). The references to food in Gemma’s writing - though mostly to say that she cannot 
eat, that God will not allow her to eat, or to only hold down food occasionally - testify 
to a certain ‘return of the repressed,’ in psychoanalytic terms: chocolate, wine, coffee, 
mints, all the food given up in fast and abstinence reappears in the details of her 
autobiography (2005, 165). Christina Mazzoni tells us ‘she speaks of treats and speaks 
of them with delight, with unsuspected indulgence [in fact] - perhaps because they 
remind her of Jesus’ own dolcezza, that sweetness that is [not only] always on her lips 
[but on the lips of every Christian mystic]’ (2005, 168). One imagines Gemma, 
surrounded by the intricate confections of the late-nineteenth century, gorging and 
vomiting, luxuriating in sweets until sweets and body are almost synonymous. Then one 
thinks of her appeal to Christ to not let her taste ‘any flavour in any food’ anymore (‘ “I 
thank you, Jesus, for letting me taste this sweetness; but I am ready to be deprived of it 
forever, forever”’), such an appeal now seems to stem from a bodily pathology, dictated 
by self-destructive individualistic mental processes; one thinks, indeed, of anorexia or 
even bulimia nervosa (2005 170) . And though Gemma Galgani’s relationship with food 
is not exemplary, it would also be misleading to reduce its spiritual complexity to an 
emotional disorder characterised by an obsessive desire to lose weight. As Mazzoni 
notes,Gemma places herself, and readers familiar with the history of spirituality can 
also easily place her, in a genealogical line of Christian holy fasting [or Holy Anorexia, 
as Rudolph Bell calls it] that in turn had pre-Christian roots in fasting as an expression 
and exorcism of pain, as a purification of the soul that aids contact with the divine, as a 
philosophical choice indicating the liberation of the soul from the body, a return to the 
soul’s original purity, and ultimately the refusal of any fleshly bond (2005, 168). Like 
Mazzoni, Caroline Walker Bynum ‘brackets’ (to use a phenomenological turn of 
phrase) questions of cause - as she does 
modern problems and food obsessions - in her encounter with Christian mysticism. She 
is similarly only interested in what Christian mystics experienced, and while retaining a 
historian’s skepticism about all evidence, she, also, as a historian, prefers to start her 
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study of the past with what people in the past said themselves (1987, 8). The 
philosopher Simon Critchley has drawn on Bynum’s work concomitantly with that of 
Elizabeth Spearing to show, through his exposition of ‘Mystical Anarchism,’ how the 
economy of masochism encountered in Christian mysticism, while ‘more characteristic 
of women than men,’ stems not from some bodily pathology or ego-psychology but 
from ‘the mutilation of Christ’s body in the Passion [which] seems to inspire an echo 
among female mystics at the level of the body’ (2012, 130 - 140). As Bynum has 
convincingly shown, through her lengthy explorations of the analogies in late medieval 
theology, that suggest ‘woman is to man as matter is to spirit’: ... woman or the 
feminine symbolizes the physical, lustful, material, appetitive part of human nature, 
whereas man symbolizes the spiritual, rational, or mental ... Ancient scientists had 
argued frequently that at conception, woman contributes the stuff (or physical nature) of 
the foetus, man the soul or form. Patristic exegetes had regularly seen woman (or Eve) 
as representing the appetites, man (or Adam) as representing the soul or intellect (1987, 
262). While medieval male theologians used women’s association with the appetites to 
denigrate their ‘fleshly weakness,’ it also seems to have been taken up, almost 
unwittingly, by contemporary women mystics, who redeemed the concept by further 
associating themselves with Christ’s physical incarnate humanity; as Bynum explains, 
‘both men and women ... may at some almost unconscious level have felt that woman's 
suffering was her way of fusing with Christ because Christ's suffering flesh was 
“woman”’ (1987, 261). Accordingly, these analogies had been presented in the writings 
of Hildegard of Bingen, in the twelfth-century, ‘who had explicitly advanced the 
opinion that “man signifies the divinity of the Son of God, and woman his humanity,” 
who argued from an idea rooted in a fundamental implication of the virgin birth: Christ 
having no human father must have derived his fleshly nature directly from Mary’; in 
sum, then, as Brian C. Vander Veen notes, in his Doctoral thesis on THE VITAE OF 
BODLEIAN LIBRARY (2007), ‘Whereas men expressed Christ qua God through the 
intellectual activity of preaching and teaching, holy women could express Christ qua 
man through their very physical identification with his suffering humanity... [because] 
the fleshly humanity whose suffering redeemed the world was female flesh’ (2007, 84). 
Sustained fasting, subsistence on the sacrament solely or, in conjunction with a diet that 
demonstrated extreme abstemiousness; as in the case of Marie Alacoque - dirty laundry-
water, mouldy bread, rotten fruits and excrement (she described in her autobiography 
the ecstasy she experienced as she filled her mouth with the faeces of a sick man), or 
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Catherine of Sienna, who, even with such meagre subsistence - a diet of ‘olde and 
corrupte cheese’, the juice of grapes, or the heads and tails of eels - would induce 
vomiting, with such violence, ‘bitterness’ and ‘peyne’, in fact, ‘quykke blode’ would 
‘come oute of hir moup’. This self emptying, that is, as Critchley notes, a stringent and 
demanding ethical disciplining of the self all the way to its nihilation - as in the case of 
Mary of Oignes, who starved herself to death until ‘“her spine was stuck to her 
stomach”’ - is chosen in a context of self-giving where its figural value (clothes 
sometimes stood in for the self - as in the case of Angela of Folignio, who, in an 
exquisitely Franciscan gesture, stripped off all her clothes in order to follow naked, the 
naked and crucified Christ or, on another occasion, in order to exchange them for food 
for the poor, suffering and afflicted, so that she may, out of little or nothing, out of 
herself, like Christ once did, multiply loaves and fishes to feed the hungry) lies in the 
mystic’s imitation of Christ to form a total sacrifice that divinizes even as it annihilates 
(2012, 132; 2005, 99). The graphic we have devised to over-arch this TOF project - a 
digitally rendered linocut of a painting by William Hogarth, of one Francis Mathew 
Schutz (third cousin to the Prince of Wales) in his bed, palefaced and vomiting into a 
piss-pot - serves to illustrate this. (As the story goes) Norwich castle Museum in 
England, currently holds in its collection a painting by Hogarth of Schutz in his bed, 
hunched over and pallid, puking into a piss-pot, as we said. Behind the figure of Schutz, 
there is a quote from Horace inscribed above a lyre that hangs on the wall - the lyre, 
incidentally, is the instrument the poet symbolically hung up when he stopped playing 
the field. The quote reads: Vixi poellis nuper idoneous (‘Not long ago I kept it in good 
order for the girls’). A parody of the sickbed portrait, the painting was commissioned by 
Schutz’s new wife, and was intended to remind Schutz why he had settled-down, by 
filling him with disgust for his debauched days. Evidently, Schultz’ heirs didn’t want to 
be similarly reminded, and following his death in 1779, his daughter had the piss-pot 
and vomit painted out. In place of his spewing, Schultz appeared to be reading a 
newspaper in bed, at a rather awkward angle - hunched over as though in need of his 
glasses. It was only in the 1990’s when the painting was restored to its former state that 
the prohibition was revealed and followed up by critics such as Christopher Turner who, 
in writing a column for Cabinet that investigates the cultural significance of detritus, 
noted how this ‘desire to substitute words for vomit, logos for disgust, was more than a 
simple act of Protestant censorship; it unwittingly struck at a knotty problem at the very 
centre of the emerging philosophy of aesthetics,’ for which, the disgusting, unlike the 
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ugly, the evil, the sublime, or even terrible, was deemed to be unrepresentable. ‘There is 
only one kind of ugliness which cannot be represented in accordance with nature 
without destroying all aesthetical satisfaction, and consequently artistic beauty,’ states 
Kant in his Critique of Judgement (1790), ‘viz., that which excites disgust’ (1951,155). 
He continues, For in this singular sensation, which rests on mere imagination the object 
is represented as it were obtruding itself for our enjoyment while we strive against it 
with all our might. And the artistic representation of the object is no longer 
distinguished from the nature of the object itself in our sensation, and thus it is 
impossible that it can be regarded as beautiful (1951, 155). It is, therefore, ‘ no longer a 
question of one of those negative values that art can represent and thereby idealize,’ as 
Derrida notes: ‘The absolute excluded [l’exclu absolu] does not allow itself even to be 
granted thestatus of an object of negative pleasure or of ugliness redeemed by 
representation. It is unrepresentable’ (1981, 21). And yet, Kant does speak of a certain 
representation regarding it. The key here, as Derrida suggests, is in Kant’s passage 
above, in which vomit as ‘the object... represented as it were obtruding itself for our 
enjoyment’ is linked by Kant to jouissance, if not pleasure; it forces pleasure, it even 
represents the very thing that forces us to enjoy in spite of ourselves, and through 
which, we find traces of that jouissance inscribed in the en corps [in and of the body, 
but also a homonym of encore, more!] to which mysticism testifies - the en plus 
(excess) of the en corps. It is this dimension of ecstasy, as Critchley notes after Lacan, 
‘following the line of a transgressive desire into its askesis, that we can call love’ (2012, 
140). Through our culinary curation/assemblage, we have put together a taste/test in 
which we have faith that something or rather some new experience may emerge that is 
‘anarchic’ in the sense that it is not subject to any law - including the law of taste (what 
we see, essentially, as a fundamentally phallogocentric philosophy of determinatedness) 
– and cannot be predicted. Our methodology is formlessness. Perhaps God will be 
tasted as an outcome of the test, perhaps vomit, these are possibilities. Perhaps nothing. 
Or perhaps something else entirely about which we know nothing other than it will have 
been tasted as a retroactive effect of the test. This is the very path we sought at the 
beginning when presenting you with, in Lacan’s terms, these objets a. ‘Regarding one’s 
[culinary] partner’, Lacan nearly wrote in Seminar XX, ‘love can only actualize what, in 
a sort of poetic flight, ... I called courage’, a taste that is also a test of faith (144). 
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